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SUMMARY  TABLE 
      
  2005 2006 2007 2008 
OUTPUT 
(Real Annual Growth %) 
     
Private Consumer Expenditure 7.3 5.7 7.0 3.8 
Public Net Current Expenditure 4.0 5.3 5.0 3.5 
Investment 11.8 3.1 0.1 -3.7 
Exports 5.2 4.4 5.7 5.0 
Imports 7.7 4.4 5.0 4.4 
Gross Domestic Product (GDP) 5.9 5.7 4.8 2.3 
Gross National Product (GNP) 4.9 6.5 4.4 2.3 
GNP per capita (constant prices) 2.7 3.7 1.8 0.9 
          
PRICES 
(Annual Growth %)       
Harmonised Index of Consumer Prices (HICP) 2.1 2.7 2.9 2.8 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) 2.5 4.0 4.9 3.3 
Wage Growth 5.6 4.9 5.5 4.0 
      
LABOUR MARKET       
Employment Levels (ILO basis (000s))    1,952 2,039 2,100 2,108 
Unemployment Levels (ILO basis (000s))      89 93 102 130 
Unemployment Rate (as % of Labour Force) 4.4 4.4 4.6 5.8 
          
PUBLIC FINANCE       
Exchequer Balance (€m) -500 2,264 -1,623 -4,833 
General Government Balance (€m) 1,934 5,107   899    -1,813 
General Government Balance (% of GDP) 1.2 2.9 0.5 -0.9 
General Government Debt (% of GDP) 27.4 25.1 24.4 25.7 
  
EXTERNAL TRADE       
Balance of Payments Current Account (€m) -5,692.0 -7,271 -8,617.0 -8,784.0 
Current Account (% of GNP) -4.2 -4.9 -5.4 -5.2 
  
EXCHANGE AND INTEREST RATES 
(end of year) 
  
     
US$/€ Exchange Rate 1.19 1.32 1.45 1.45 
STG£/€ Exchange Rate  0.68 0.67 0.70 0.70 
Main ECB Interest Rate  2.25 3.50 4.00 4.00 
      

 SUMMARY 
Real growth in GNP is estimated to be 4.4 per cent in 2007. This means that 2007 has 
been another year of strong economic growth in Ireland. However, the growth will have 
been fuelled by a number of unsustainable components, including the effects of SSIAs and 
a highly stimulatory fiscal stance. Employment will register an impressive rate of growth in 
2007, at almost 3 per cent.  
 
While the full-year figures for 2007 are strong, it appears that a deceleration in the rate of 
growth began to take hold in the second part of the year. This is largely related to a 
contraction in house building. Given the weight of house building in total economic 
activity in Ireland, the contraction is placing a drag on growth and this will be prominent in 
the economic story for 2008. 
 
We now expect real GNP to grow by 2.3 per cent in 2008, the slowest pace of real GNP 
growth since 1992. Investment is forecast to contract by almost 4 per cent in 2008 and so 
will partly cancel out growth in the other components of demand. The slow pace of 
economic growth will be reflected in the labour market where we expect employment to 
grow by less than 0.5 per cent. We expect unemployment to rise to 5.8 per cent. 
 
The forecasts for both 2007 and 2008 have been prepared against a background of 
continued uncertainty in international financial markets. The international context also 
includes anticipated slowdowns in the UK, the US and the Euro Area, which are in turn 
partly related to the global credit crunch. We expect the rate of growth in exports to 
moderate in 2008 relative to 2007 (5 per cent versus 5.7 per cent) in response to these 
slowdowns. 
 
We have adopted a technical assumption that the ECB will not change interest rates in 
2008. Although inflationary pressures are present in the Euro Area, growth appears to be 
weakening and so it is unclear in which direction the ECB will take interest rates. Based on 
this assumption, we forecast that CPI inflation will be 3.3 per cent in 2008, while our 
forecast for HICP is 2.8 per cent.  This represents a significant reduction in the difference 
between the two measures of inflation. 
 
In the General Assessment we look at three issues. First, we discuss what we see as being 
unsustainable elements in Ireland’s recent growth performance. With these elements now 
receding, there is a heightened need for competitiveness to be restored so that other 
sectors can grow. Second, we look behind the employment forecast for 2008 of a net 
increase of 8,000 jobs. This increase is made up of an increase of over 28,000 jobs in 
services and a fall of approximately 20,000 jobs in industry (including construction). Hence, 
the figure of 8,000 understates the full extent of employment dynamics. Finally, we reflect 
on the recent Budget. While broadly welcoming the measures included and the overall 
fiscal stance for 2008, we note again the highly stimulatory nature of fiscal policy in 2007 
and its effects on the economy. 
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NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2006 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
    
 2005 2006 Change in 2006 
  Forecast €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume 
          
Private Consumer Expenditure 76,435 82,483 6,048 4,388 7.9 2.1 5.7 
Public Net Current Expenditure 22,870 24,939 2,069 1,204 9.0 3.6 5.3 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 42,079 46,027 3,948 1,298  9.4 6.1 3.1 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 132,098 139,766 7,669 5,870 5.8 1.3 4.4 
Physical Changes in Stocks 162 1,476 1,313 1,204    
        
Final Demand 273,645 294,691 21,046 13,965 7.7 2.5 5.1 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 112,279 120,997 8,718 4,899 7.8 3.3 4.4 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -132 -1,011 -878 -196    
        
GDP at Market Prices 161,498 174,705 13,207 9,262 8.2 2.3 5.7 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,775 -25,575  200 -481 -0.8 -2.6  1.9 
        
GNP at Market Prices 135,723 149,130 13,407  8,781  9.9 3.2 6.5 
          
B:  Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2005 2006 Change in 2006 
  Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,397 3,195 -202 -5.9 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 65,992 72,426 6,434 9.8 
 Other: 56,270 59,649 3,379 6.0 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -538 -329   
 Statistical   
    Discrepancy -132 -1011   
     
Net Domestic Product 124,989 133,931  8,942 7.2 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -25,775 -25,575  200 -0.8 
     
National Income  99,214 108,356  9,142  9.2 
Depreciation 17,424 18,436 1,012 5.8 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 116,638 126,792 10,154 8.7 
Taxes less Subsidies 19,085 22,338 3,253 17.0 
     
GNP at Market Prices 135,723 149,130 13,407  9.9 
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account 
    
 2005 2006 Change in 
2006 
  Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 19,818 18,769  -1,049 
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,775 -25,575      200 
Net Transfers 265 -465     -730 
    
Balance on Current Account -5,692 -7,271 -1,579 
as % of GNP -4.2 -4.9      -0.7 
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FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2007 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product  
    
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
 Forecast Forecast €m  % 
 €m €m Value Volum
e 
 Value Price Volume 
         
Private Consumer Expenditure 82,483 91,346 8,863 5,774 10.7 3.5 7.0 
Public Net Current Expenditure 24,939 27,808 2,868 1,247 11.5 6.2 5.0 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 46,027 47,007 981   37 2.1 2.0 0.1 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 139,766 148,739  8,973 7,939 6.4 0.7 5.7 
Physical Changes in Stocks 1,476 664 - 812 - 812    
       
Final Demand 294,691 315,564 20,873 14,326 7.1 2.1 4.9 
less:       
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 120,997 129,687  8,690 5,994 7.2 2.1 5.0 
less:       
Statistical Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011 0 -34    
       
GDP at Market Prices 174,705 186,888 12,183  8,366 7.0 2.1 4.8 
less:       
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,575 -27,069 -1,494 -1,768 5.8 -1.0 6.9 
       
GNP at Market Prices 149,130 159,819 10,689  6,566 7.2 2.6 4.4 
          
B:  Gross National Product by Origin  
    
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
2006 
 Forecast Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,195 3,355 160 5.0 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 72,426 78,923 6,497 9.0 
 Other: 59,649 62,924 3,275 5.5 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -329 -200   
 Statistical   
    Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011   
     
Net Domestic Product 133,931 143,992 10,061 7.5 
less:     
Net Factor Payments -25,575 -27,069 -1,494 5.8 
     
National Income 108,356 116,922 8,567 7.9 
Depreciation 18,436 20,008 1,572 8.5 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 126,792 136,930 10,138 8.0 
Taxes less Subsidies 22,338 22,888 550  2.5 
     
GNP at Market Prices 149,130 159,819 10,689 7.2 
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2006 2007 Change in 2007 
 Forecast Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 18,769 19,052 283 
Net Factor Payments (F) -25,575 -27,069 -1,494 
Net Transfers -465 -600 -135 
 
   
Balance on Current Account -7,271 -8,617 -1,346 
as % of GNP -4.9 -5.4 -0.5 
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 FORECAST NATIONAL ACCOUNTS 2008 
A: Expenditure on Gross National Product 
    
 2007 2008 Change in 2008 
 Preliminary Forecast €m % 
 €m €m Value Volume Value Price Volume 
        
Private Consumer Expenditure 91,346 97,141 5,795 3,425 6.3 2.5 3.8 
Public Net Current Expenditure 27,808 30,449 2,642 973 9.5 5.8 3.5 
Gross Fixed Capital Formation 47,007 46,900 -107  -1,761 -0.2 3.7 -3.7 
Exports of Goods and Services (X) 148,739 157,960  9,220 7,421 6.2 1.2 5.0 
Physical Changes in Stocks 664 531 -133 0    
        
Final Demand 315,564 332,981 17,416 10,101 5.5 2.2 3.2 
less:        
Imports of Goods and Services (M) 129,687 137,809 8,122 5,754 6.3 1.7 4.4 
less:        
Statistical Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011 0 -37    
        
GDP at Market Prices 186,888 196,183  9,295 4,383 5.0 2.6 2.3 
less:        
Net Factor Payments (F) -27,069 -28,335 -1,265 -710 4.7 2.0 2.6 
        
GNP at Market Prices 159,819 167,848  8,029 3,666 5.0 2.7 2.3 
          
B:  Gross National Product by Origin 
    
 2007 2008 Change in 2008 
 Preliminary Forecast   
 €m €m €m % 
     
Agriculture, Forestry, Fishing 3,355 3,489 134 4.0 
Non-Agricultural: Wages, etc. 78,923 82,434 3,511 4.4 
 Other: 62,924 66,251 3,327 5.3 
Adjustments: Stock Appreciation -200 -200  
 Statistical   
    Discrepancy -1,011 -1,011  
     
Net Domestic Product 143,992 150,964 6,972 4.8 
less:    
Net Factor Payments -27,069 -28,335 -1,265 4.7 
    
National Income 116,922 122,629 5,706 4.9 
Depreciation 20,008 21,187 1,179 5.9 
     
GNP at Factor Cost 136,930 143,816 6,885 5.0 
Taxes less Subsidies 22,888 24,032 1,144 5.0 
    
GNP at Market Prices 159,819 167,848  8,029 5.0 
     
C:  Balance of Payments on Current Account  
    
 2007 2008 Change in 2008
  Forecast  
 €m €m €m 
Exports (X) less Imports (M) 19,052 20,151 1,098 
Net Factor Payments (F) -27,069 -28,335 -1,265 
Net Transfers -600 -600 0 
    
Balance on Current Account -8,617 -8,784 -167 
as % of GNP -5.4 -5.2  0.2 
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 THE INTERNATIONAL 
ECONOMY 
The main developments in the international economy may be 
summarised as follows: 
 
• The international context is still characterised by 
uncertainty as the fall-out from the US sub-prime mortgage 
crisis is likely to extend into 2008. 
• Growth in the Euro Area is expected to moderate in 2007 
and 2008 at 2.6 and 1.9 per cent respectively. Inflation is 
expected to increase in the short term as the labour market 
tightens, but less favourable credit conditions for 
individuals and businesses may have the same impact as a 
tightening of monetary policy. We assume no change in the 
ECB main refinancing rate. 
• UK economic growth is forecast to slow significantly to 2 
per cent in 2008 as a rapidly cooling housing market 
combined with less credit availability depresses consumer 
and business sentiment. 
• Growth in the US economy in 2007 has slowed due to a 
rapid contraction in residential investment. In 2008 we 
expect a further contraction in the housing market and 
tighter credit conditions to impact negatively on 
consumption and investment leading to real GDP growth 
of 2 per cent. 
• On exchange rates, we have assumed that the $/€ rate will 
be 1.45 at the end of this year and throughout next year 
and that the £/€ rate will be 0.7 over the same period. 
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 Following strong growth in 2006 of 2.9 per cent, the Euro Area 
economy has continued to expand at a strong pace in 2007. Real 
GDP is expected to increase by 2.6 per cent in 2007, moderating to 
1.9 per cent in 2008, with exports and investment being the main 
drivers of growth. Unemployment is expected to average 6.8 per 
cent in 2007, down from 7.7 per cent in 2006. Further tightening in 
the labour market is forecast to contribute to modest increases in 
wage demands in 2008. Consumer spending growth in 2007 has 
been less than expected as higher interest rates, less favourable 
credit conditions, and uncertainty due to the turbulence on financial 
markets has dampened activity. This is expected to ease during the 
course of 2008.  
Euro Area 
  
With the labour market tightening and prices for oil and food 
rising quite sharply in recent months, consumer price inflation has 
begun to pick up in the Euro Area. Inflation in the Euro Area is 
expected to average 2.1 per cent in 2007, rising to 2.5 per cent in 
2008. This is above the European Central Bank (ECB) medium-
term target of “close to but below 2 per cent”. At the December 
meeting of the Governing Council, ECB President Jean Claude 
Trichet stressed that cutting interest rates was not currently being 
considered. Our forecasts are based on the assumption of no 
changes in the ECB main refinancing rate, currently at 4 per cent, 
during 2008. 
 
Turning to developments in the main Euro Area economies, the 
outturn for German real GDP growth is expected to be strong in 
2007 at 2.6 per cent. This is a moderation on the growth seen in 
2006 of 3.1 per cent, but still reflects robust growth in external 
demand and investment. Unemployment has continued to fall in 
2007 and is expected to average 5.7 per cent in 2008. Economic 
growth is expected to revert to trend in 2008 with real GDP 
increasing by 1.8 per cent. Private consumption is anticipated to be 
the main driver of growth as exports and business investment 
slows. The tightening of the labour market is expected to feed 
through to higher wage demands in 2007 and 2008, ultimately 
contributing to consumer prices rising above 2 per cent this year 
and next. 
 
The French economy is likely to record moderate real GDP 
growth in 2007 of 1.9 per cent and 1.8 per cent in 2008. This 
follows growth of 2.2 per cent in 2006. Falling unemployment has 
been accompanied by relatively strong wage growth in 2007. In 
2008 fiscal policy is expected to provide a stimulus to private 
consumption and to offset the likely pressure on real disposable 
incomes that will result from rising oil and food prices. Consumer 
prices are forecast to increase by 2.2 per cent in 2008. 
 
In 2006 the Italian economy grew by 1.9 per cent in real terms, 
with export growth being a key factor. Growth is expected to be 
similar in 2007, at 1.8 per cent. Rising wage costs and consumer 
prices as the labour market tightens are expected to depress export 
activity in 2008. Combined with a fall in construction activity, real 
GDP growth is expected to be around its trend of 1.3 per cent in 
2008. 
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Figure 1: Interest Rates (2001-present, forecast to end 2008)* 
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*Mortgage rate used is the Irish Representative Building Societies Mortgage Rate. 
Source: Central Statistics Office. 
 
 The robust pace of real GDP growth in 2006 of 2.8 per cent 
continued into the first half of 2007. Despite the likelihood of 
moderating growth towards the end of this year, the economy is 
likely to expand by 3.1 per cent for 2007 as a whole. However, 
growth is forecast to slow in 2008 to just 2 per cent, as a rapidly 
cooling housing market is dampening consumer and business 
sentiment. Combined with tighter credit conditions as a result of 
the recent events in financial markets, this is expected to lead to 
slower investment and consumer spending growth. However, fiscal 
policy is expected to provide some stimulus to the economy in 2008 
as the government deficit is forecast to rise to –3.4 per cent of 
GDP. 
United 
Kingdom 
 
The labour market adjustment to the slower pace of economic 
expansion in 2008 is likely to come mostly through lower earnings 
growth as opposed to large increases in unemployment. Wage 
growth in 2008 is expected to be 2.6 per cent, well below the 5.2 per 
cent growth seen in 2006. This compounds the effect of tighter 
credit on private consumption and is anticipated to dampen 
domestic demand growth in 2008. It should also help to ensure that 
consumer price inflation meets the Bank of England’s (BoE) target 
of approximately 2 per cent next year. In its latest Inflation Report 
(November 2007), the BoE noted the danger of high food and oil 
prices leading to inflation being above target at a time when overall 
economic growth slows significantly. However, this is only expected 
to be the case in the very short term, as commodity prices are 
expected to stabilise during 2008, so that it is likely that monetary 
policy will be further eased in the coming months. The BoE has 
signalled that a further cut of at least 25 basis points is likely in the 
opening months of 2008 following its recent decision to reduce the 
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 main policy rate from 5.75 per cent to 5.5 per cent. 
Figure 2: Exchange Rates (1999-present, forecast to end 2008) 
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Economic Outlook, December 2007 (forecast). 
 
 Real GDP growth in the US is expected to slow in 2007 to 2.2 per 
cent from the 2.9 per cent growth rate in 2006. This slowdown is 
expected to continue in 2008 with GDP forecast to grow by just 2 
per cent. The impetus for this slowdown was originally 
concentrated in the house-building sector with housing output now 
expected to decline by over 17 per cent in 2007 and a further 15 per 
cent in 2008. These developments in the US housing market have 
contributed to the ongoing turmoil on international financial 
markets. However, the consequences of this slowdown are likely to 
permeate more widely through the economy in 2008. Current 
indicators suggest US consumer spending has remained robust in 
2007 but it is expected to slow significantly in 2008. Job creation in 
the private sector has eased significantly and unemployment has 
begun to increase. Wages are forecast to grow by 3.6 per cent next 
year, well below the 5 per cent growth expected for 2007. 
Meanwhile the unemployment rate in 2008 is anticipated to increase 
to 5 per cent.  
United States 
 
Offsetting this slowdown in private consumption growth, strong 
non-residential investment growth and an improving net export 
performance due to the fall in the value of the dollar, should 
prevent the US economy moving into recession. Continued strong 
export growth and muted domestic demand contributes to the US 
current account deficit narrowing in 2008 to -5.4 per cent of GDP. 
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 Table 1:  Short-term International Outlook  
      
 GDP Output Growth Consumer Price Average Earnings Growth Unemployment Rate Current Account Balance 
 Inflation* % % of GDP 
    
Country 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 2006 2007 2008 
                
UK 2.8 3.1 2.0 2.3 2.4 2.0 5.2 4.2 2.6 5.5 5.5 5.7 -3.1 -2.9 -3.1 
Germany 3.1 2.6 1.8 1.8 2.2 2.3 1.7 2.9 2.9 8.1 6.4 5.7 4.9 6.0 6.0 
France 2.2 1.9 1.8 1.9 1.5 2.2 3.8 4.2 3.7 8.8 8.0 7.5 -1.3 -1.3 -2.2 
Italy 1.9 1.8 1.3 2.2 2.0 2.4 4.6 3.6 4.2 6.8 5.9 5.8 -2.6 -2.0 -2.1 
                
Euro Area 2.9 2.6 1.9 2.2 2.1 2.5 1.8 2.4 2.8 7.7 6.8 6.4 0.0 0.2 -0.1 
USA 2.9 2.2 2.0 3.2 2.8 2.7 4.0 5.0 3.6 4.6 4.6 5.0 -6.2 -5.6 -5.4 
Japan 2.2 1.9 1.6  0.2  0.0 0.3 1.7 0.9 0.6 4.1 3.8 3.7 3.9 4.7 4.8 
China 11.1 11.4 10.7 3.1 4.4 4.5       9.4 11.2 11.3 
                
OECD 3.2 2.7 2.7 3.9 4.5 4.2 3.1 3.3 3.7 5.9 5.4 5.4 -1.8 -1.4 -1.4 
                
Ireland 5.7 4.8 2.3 2.7 2.9 2.8 4.9 5.5 4.0 4.4 4.6 5.8 -4.2 -4.6 -4.5 
                
Source: OECD Economic Outlook No. 82, December 2007 and own forecasts. 
* HICP for Euro Area countries and the UK. 
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 Despite higher oil prices and a weakening dollar, inflationary 
pressures over our forecast horizon are expected to remain 
subdued. Headline inflation in the US is currently running above 3 
per cent, but is expected to average 2.8 per cent for 2007 as a whole 
and 2.7 per cent in 2008. Core inflation, which excludes energy and 
food, appears to be anchored at around 2 per cent. The Federal 
Reserve has cut its main policy rate by 1 per cent to 4.25 per cent in 
recent months to support growth in the US next year and prevent a 
spillover from the financial market turmoil to the real economy. 
This easing is unlikely to have a major stimulatory effect on 
inflation. However the outlook for growth in the US is subject to 
significant downside risks as the full extent of the impact on the real 
economy of the financial market turmoil and the on-going 
correction in the housing market is still uncertain. 
 
 The Japanese economy grew by 2.2 per cent in 2006 in real terms, 
with external demand being the key factor. Real GDP growth of 1.9 
per cent is estimated for 2007 and growth of 1.6 per cent is 
expected in 2008. This moderation in growth is mainly due to a fall 
in residential construction and the continued faltering in personal 
consumption growth. Despite a continuing fall in unemployment, 
from an average of 4.1 per cent in 2006 to an anticipated 3.8 per 
cent in 2007, wage growth has remained relatively low. In the 
absence of significant rises in consumer prices, the steady increases 
in the cost of raw materials have squeezed corporate profitability. 
The trend of weak growth in domestic demand is expected to 
continue through most of 2008, and while the risk of deflation still 
exists consumer prices are expected to increase by 0.3 per cent in 
2008.  
Asia 
 
China continues to grow very rapidly, with real GDP growth of 
11.4 per cent expected in 2007, following 11.1 per cent growth in 
2006. While external demand remains the fundamental driver of 
growth, domestic demand has begun to increase significantly in 
2007. Investment in particular has risen, but despite the expanding 
capital stock the Chinese economy continues to grow above its 
potential, contributing to inflationary pressures. Inflation rose to an 
eleven-year high in November of 6.9 per cent. Much of this increase 
in inflation is attributed to food prices accelerating, as a result of 
rising animal feed costs and a shortage of pigs. However, non-food 
prices have also started to rise and wage pressures are becoming 
evident. Real GDP growth is expected to moderate to 10.7 per cent 
next year as these domestic price and wage pressures impact upon 
competitiveness. This is not expected to be enough to dampen 
excess demand significantly. Despite the People’s Bank of China 
moving to a tighter monetary stance, inflation is expected to remain 
above its desired rate, contributing to speculative bubbles in various 
asset markets.  
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  Uncertainty in the international financial markets continues to be 
a feature of the context in which our forecasts for Ireland were 
prepared. Although the original source of the financial turmoil is 
the problem of defaults in the US sub-prime mortgage market, the 
main problem now is one of uncertainty. As many of these sub-
prime mortgages were sold on to other institutions in the form of 
complex financial instruments, it became unclear as to which 
institutions would ultimately hold the bad debts. Given this 
uncertainty, banks became unwilling to lend to each other and 
hence the credit crunch began in August 2007. The spread between 
official interest rates and market rates rose and central banks found 
it necessary to provide liquidity to the financial markets to assist in 
their on-going operation. 
International 
Context for 
Ireland1
 
At the outset of the credit crunch, it might have been expected 
that the major problems in the US and broader OECD financial 
system would have impacted in Ireland in the form of a rise in retail 
interest rates. As Honohan (2006)2 pointed out, the Irish financial 
system has borrowed heavily abroad to fund the very large rise in 
domestic credit that has underpinned the boom in building and 
construction. However, mortgage interest rates for existing 
customers have remained unchanged in Ireland over the second 
half of 2007 in the face of the rise in the international cost of funds 
for banks. This indicates that the mortgage customers of the Irish 
banking system have been reasonably insulated from the credit 
crunch. While the banks themselves may have absorbed some of 
the increases in their costs, the recent report on financial stability 
from the Central Bank3 points to the on-going health of the Irish 
financial system.  
 
One part of the reason for the stability of Ireland’s financial 
system is the generally favourable outlook for the household sector. 
Although debt levels have risen dramatically since the beginning of 
the decade, much of the borrowed money has been used to 
purchase assets (i.e., houses). However, the net financial position of 
Irish households is strong. When combined with the recent easing 
in credit growth and high wage growth in recent years, the 
household sector can be viewed as a stable component in the 
overall context in which Ireland’s banks operate.4  
 
Looking beyond Ireland, the Euroframe-EFN5 report of 
September argued that a short-run problem in international 
 
1 We are grateful to John Fitz Gerald for contributions to this section. 
2 Honohan, Patrick (2006), “To What Extent Has Finance Been a Driver of 
Ireland’s Economic Success?”, Quarterly Economic Commentary, Winter. 
3 Central Bank of Ireland (2007), Financial Stability Report, Dublin: Central Bank 
4 See also Central Bank (2007). 
5 Euroframe-EFN (2007), Economic Assessment of the Euro Area: Forecasts and Policy 
Analysis, available through www.euroframe.org 
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 financial markets would have a limited impact on output in the 
Euro Area. On that basis, Euroframe-EFN did not factor the credit 
crunch into its analysis. One caveat that was added in the 
September report was the acknowledgement that a full-blown 
banking crisis in Europe or the US would indeed have significant 
macroeconomic impacts. We have followed Euroframe-EFN in 
basing our forecasts on the more benign view of the current 
difficulties and as such have proceeded on the expectation that the 
impact in Ireland will remain limited. 
 
Growth prospects for many of Ireland’s trading partners have 
been revised downwards for 2008, with significant downside risks 
to the forecasts. However, the current spike in commodity prices is 
beginning to feed through to consumer prices in most economies. 
Combining the outlook for growth and inflation, the possibility 
remains that over the short term there will be a period of high 
inflation and below potential economic growth.  
 
While this scenario is clearly of concern, it should be noted that 
the global economy entered this current phase on the back of a long 
period of expansion, with low unemployment and high levels of 
corporate profitability. In addition, the reaction of monetary 
authorities to date has been to assist in the maintenance of liquidity 
in financial markets, including combined efforts across central 
banks. In the case of both the US Federal Reserve and the Bank of 
England, decisions have also been taken to cut interest rates. These 
actions serve to counteract the effects of the credit crunch. 
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 THE DOMESTIC 
ECONOMY 
The slowdown in the house-building sector continues to place a 
drag on economic growth. Following a record level of completions 
in 2006 of 88,000, we now estimate that completions will be in the 
mid-70,000s this year and in the mid-50,000s in 2008. These levels 
of house completions imply a contraction in housing investment of 
over 12 per cent in 2007 and over 20 per cent in 2008. Given the 
current weight of housing in total investment, we now estimate that 
investment will be static in 2007 relative to 2006 and that 2008 will 
see a decline in investment of almost 4 per cent. 
General 
 
Given the strong pace of consumption growth that is being 
experienced this year, we expect to see consumption growth of 7 
per cent for 2007. With Government spending also growing 
strongly in 2007 and exports showing a recovery relative to 2006, 
growth for 2007 is now expected to be 4.4 per cent in GNP volume 
terms (4.8 per cent in GDP).  
 
For 2008, a number of factors will combine to reduce growth 
significantly. First, as discussed above, the contraction in house- 
building will be very substantial. Second, with the SSIA effect no 
longer present, consumption growth will be lower. Third, current 
government spending will grow at a slower pace, following Budget 
2008. As a result of these factors, we expect to see growth slowing 
to 2.3 per cent in 2008, for both GDP and GNP. This low rate of 
growth will be reflected in the labour market where we expect net 
employment growth to be well below 1 per cent.  
 
 
Consumption continued to grow strongly in 2007, although not at 
the pace expected earlier in the year. In the Spring Commentary, we 
were forecasting consumption growth of 7.8 per cent for 2007, a 
significant jump from the 2006 growth rate of 5.7 per cent.  The 
2007 forecast had been (and continues to be) based partly on an 
anticipated SSIA effect but also on strong wage and employment 
growth.  
Consumption 
 
According to the Quarterly National Accounts (QNA), 
consumption had grown by 5.3 per cent in the year ending 2007 
Q2. As shown in Figure 3, this implies that growth in consumption 
 13 
 has been declining in each quarter since 2005 Q4. The Retail Sales 
Index shows a different story in terms of trends, again as shown in 
Figure 3. According to it, retail sales remain on an upward trajectory 
and grew by 7.3 per cent in the year ended September 2007. 
Excluding the motor trade, the index grew by 7 per cent over this 
period so car purchases are not distorting the overall picture. 
Figure 3: Growth in Consumption and Retail Sales 
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Source: Quarterly National Accounts and Retail Sales Index, CSO. 
 
Our estimate for 2007 has now been revised down to 7 per cent. 
One reason for the slower growth in consumption in 2007 
compared with earlier expectations is likely to have been the fall in 
consumer sentiment during the course of 2007 as shown in Figure 
4. Looking at the three month moving average, the index has fallen 
steadily over the course of the year from a high of 90.3 in January to 
a reading of 69.7 in November. The fall has been such that the 
index is now close to its lowest reading since its inception in 1996. 
As the fall in sentiment is related to the general slowing in the 
economy, it is unlikely to rebound in 2008. When combined with 
lower employment growth in 2008, we arrive at a forecast for 
consumption growth in 2008 of 3.8 per cent in volume terms. This 
represents a marginal reduction from our forecast of 4 per cent in 
the Autumn Commentary. 
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Figure 4: IIB/ESRI Consumer Sentiment Index, 2000-2007 
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 Following a year of modest investment growth in 2006, at 3.1 per 
cent, investment growth appears to have accelerated to 7 per cent in 
the year ended 2007 Q2, as reported in the QNA. However, this 
overall figure hides very different trends within the category.  
Investment 
 
Housing investment continues to show signs of contraction. The 
number of completions in the twelve months to 2007 Q3 was just 
below 83,500, which is around 5,000 below both the number of 
completions in 2006 and in the twelve months ended 2007 Q2. 
Commencements data also show signs of contraction. In the year 
ended 2007 Q3, there were 63,262 commencements, around 15,000 
below the commencement’s peak of 2006 Q2. Finally, figures for 
registrations show the same trend, with a figure of just over 45,000 
for the year ended 2007 Q3 (see Figure 5). This is almost 10,000 
fewer than for the corresponding figure for the previous quarter. 
Based on these figures, we now expect house completions to 
number in the mid-70,000s in 2007 and the mid-50,000s in 2008, 
both of which are further downward adjustments relative to the 
previous Commentary. Such levels of output imply a contraction in 
housing investment volumes of 12.7 per cent in 2007 and 20.4 per 
cent in 2008.6
 
6 From Figure 5, it will be noticed that planning permissions have actually turned 
upward in the most recent data. While this points to an upturn in activity at some 
point in the future, we do not think that this will happen before the end of 2008. 
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Table 2: Gross Fixed Capital Formation 
 
  
        
 2005 % Change in 2006 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 
 €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Housing 20,975 3.5 10.7 23,221 -12.7 -14.1 19,945 -20.4 -19.2 16,123 
           
Other Building 11,201  9.5 18.0 13,216 12.0 20.4 15,913 10.0 16.6 18,554 
           
Building and 
Construction 32,176 5.6 13.2 36,438 -3.8 -1.6 35,857 -7.6 -3.3 34,677 
           
Machinery and 
Equipment  9,903 -5.1 -3.2  9,589 14.0 16.3 11,150 8.0 9.6 12,223 
           
Total 42,079 3.1  9.4 46,027 0.1 2.1 47,007 -3.7 -0.2 46,900 
           
 
 
 Figure 5: Housing Statistics 
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On house prices, the permanent tsb/ESRI house price index 
continues to show declines. The October release reported a month-
on-month decline of 1.3 per cent and also that prices as recorded 
were almost 5 per cent below those reported in the December 2006 
release. Given the on-going picture of house price declines, we have 
maintained our forecast for house prices in December 2007 to be 
15 per cent below their December 2006 values. Such a forecast 
might appear overly pessimistic based on the October house price 
release but it should be noted that the October release refers to 
prices agreed about two months earlier (i.e. in August 2007). Our 
view is that prices will have fallen since August although these will 
not have been picked up in the permanent tsb/ESRI index yet. Given 
that an adjustment of this magnitude would eliminate the over-
valuation of houses (as suggested by our modelling of the housing 
market), we expect house prices to stabilise during 2008. 
 
Apart from housing, we have seen other elements of building 
and construction doing well in 2007 and expect this to continue 
into 2008. The spending of SSIAs on home improvements in 2007 
has added to activity in this area and the National Development 
Plan continues to add significantly to investment spending. While 
the SSIA effect is likely to diminish in 2008, the NDP will continue 
to inject a large volume of spending. Overall, we expect non-
housing building and construction to grow by 12 per cent in 2007 
and 10 per cent in 2008. However, given the weight of house 
building in overall building and construction, we expect overall 
declines in this sector in both 2007 and 2008, with the decline being 
particularly severe in 2008. 
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 On machinery and equipment, we estimate that investment will 
grow by 14 per cent in volume terms in 2007 and by 8 per cent in 
2008. As discussed in the previous Commentary, machinery and 
equipment investment flows in Ireland can be heavily influenced by 
the purchases of aircraft. For this reason, there is a considerable 
degree of uncertainty about these forecasts and especially in the 
case of 2008. Both of the major airlines with bases in Ireland have 
announced expansion plans but the precise timing is uncertain. 
 
Overall, we estimate that the outturn for investment will be 
static in 2007 in volume terms and that it will contract by 3.7 per 
cent in 2008.  
 
 Budget 2008 and the release of the Exchequer returns have 
dominated developments in the public finances in recent weeks. 
Looking firstly at the Exchequer returns, figures on revenue inflows 
have shown a rapid slowdown in the latter part of the year whereby 
it is now estimated that the total tax take for 2007 will be €1.75 
billion below that forecast by the Department of Finance at Budget 
2007. This shortfall on the forecast level is far lower than that in 
our own forecasts (€3.3 billion) and in Box 1 we discuss our tax 
forecasts in some detail.  
Government 
Spending and 
the Public 
Finances 
 
The biggest shortfall in absolute terms was for stamp duties. 
They are likely to be €730 million below the Budget 2007 forecast 
and so 14 per cent below their 2006 level. This is clearly related to 
the slowdown in the housing market, both in terms of volumes of 
transactions and in terms of price. VAT and corporation tax also 
showed large absolute shortfalls relative to the Budget 2007 forecasts 
(minus €325 million and minus €300 million respectively). The VAT 
figures may be related in part to the housing slowdown and also to 
a lower SSIA effect than was anticipated at the start of the year. In 
contrast, income taxes are likely to come in on target, thereby 
reflecting the continued strength of the labour market. The income 
tax take in 2007 was also boosted by the inflow of exit tax receipts 
from SSIA funds. 
 
With voted current spending rising by 12.3 per cent in 2007 
(marginally below the Budget 2007 forecast), it now appears that the 
outturn for the General Government surplus will amount to 0.5 per 
cent of GDP in 2007. Given that the surplus in 2006 was 2.9 per 
cent of GDP, 2007 has seen a significant turnaround in the public 
finances and consequently fiscal policy has been highly stimulatory. 
The impact of fiscal policy in 2007 can be seen in part in the role 
played by public sector employment in the strong labour market 
performance mentioned above. Of the 67,600 net jobs created in 
the year ended 2007 Q3, 22,000 were in health, education and 
public administration. We return to this point in the General 
Assessment below when we discuss what we see as unsustainable 
elements in the growth outturn for 2007. 
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 Table 3: Public Finances 
      
 2006 % Change 2007 % Change 2008 
      
Current Revenue 46,145 4.0 47,999 3.4 49,627 
Current Expenditure 37,077 10.4 40,938 9.5 44,827 
   of which: Voted 32,915 12.3 36,948 9.3 40,390 
Current Surplus 9,068 -22.1 7,061 -32.0 4,800 
      
Capital Receipts 1,871  -24.8 1,407 3.5 1,456 
Capital Expenditure 8,675 16.3 10,091 9.9 11,089 
   of which: Voted 6,476 18.9 7,700 11.2 8,562 
Capital Borrowing -6,804 27.6 -8,684 10.9  -9,633 
      
Exchequer Balance 2,264.3  -1,623.1  -4,832.8 
 as % of GNP 1.5  -1.0  -2.9 
       
General Gove ment Balance rn 5,107.3   899.2  -1,812.7 
 as % of GDP 2.9  0.5  -0.9 
      
Gross Debt as % of GDP 25.1  24.4  25.7 
      
Net Debt as % of GDP* 12.7   10.3  9.7 
      
*Net of pensions fund and Social Insurance Fund. 
 
The slowdown in tax revenues in 2007 and the anticipated 
slowdown in economic activity in 2008 set the context for Budget 
2008. Looking firstly at the expenditure side, the Tánaiste sought to 
reduce the rate of growth in voted current expenditure relative to 
2007 and budgeted for an increase of 8.2 per cent.7 Approximately 
5 percentage points of this increase will be taken up by the 
increased cost of providing existing services. The scope for 
additional services provision within this envelope is somewhat 
limited, especially when compared with the situation in 2006 and 
2007. Given this, it will be a major challenge to contain spending to 
the extent set out. On the capital side, voted expenditure is set to 
rise by 11.2 per cent. The higher increase on the capital side relative 
to the current side shows the importance being attached to the on-
going roll-out of the NDP. 
 
Based on our forecasts for economic growth in 2008, we 
estimate that current revenues will grow by 3.4 per cent. Factoring 
in the growth rates in other elements of the public finances leads us 
to forecast a General Government deficit of 0.9 per cent of GDP in 
2008. This is very similar to the forecast by the Department of 
Finance, in spite of the fact that our forecast for economic growth 
next year is lower. Our higher underlying tax elasticity means that 
the slightly lower growth rate translates into a similar estimate for 
tax revenues (see Box 1). 
 
 
 
7 In Table 3 this is 9.3 per cent because Budget 2008 includes local government 
funding for non-national roads in the 2008 figure but not in the 2007 figure. 
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Box 1: Forecasting Tax Revenues 
 
The QEC developed a detailed set of tax forecasting rules during 
the course of 2006 and 2007. These broadly consist of a series of 
elasticities linked to endogenous macroeconomic variables within 
the QEC forecasting framework. The elements of the approach are 
as follows: 
 
a. Corporation tax is driven by non-agricultural profits. For 2007 
we make a downward adjustment to our forecast due to once-
off effects of changes in payment schedules. 
b. Income tax is driven by non-agricultural incomes. We first 
adjust the income tax numbers to remove the effect of Special 
Investigations revenues and SSIA contributions, both of which 
are included by the Revenue Commissioners in the income tax 
category. 
c. Customs are driven by the value of merchandise imports. 
d. Excise taxes are driven by the volume personal consumption. 
e. VAT is driven by the value of personal consumption. 
f. Stamp duties are sub-divided and linked to separate drivers: 
 i.  Residential stamp duty is driven by the value of investment 
 in housing (an indicator of activity in the property market). 
 ii.  Non-residential stamp duty is driven by the value of 
 investment in other building and construction excluding 
 roads. 
 iii. Non-property stamp duties are driven by the value of 
 personal consumption. 
g. Capital Gains Tax and Capital Acquisitions Tax forecasts are 
driven by the value of personal consumption. 
 
The table below looks at our 2006 and 2007 tax forecasting 
performance. The first column is based on initial forecasts for 2006 
in the QEC of Winter 2005. These were the official Budget day 
forecasts. The second column shows the outcome for 2006. The 
third column shows our initial forecasts for 2007 based on our own 
tax forecasting elasticities. The fourth column shows the estimated 
outturn announced in Budget 2008.  
 
Initial QEC forecasts underestimated 2006 tax revenues by €3.9 
billion, equivalent to 8.5 per cent of the outturn and overestimated 
2007 tax revenues by €3.3 billion, equivalent to 7 per cent of the 
estimated outturn. These represent relatively large divergences. 
However, if we turn to individual tax forecasts we can see that the 
bulk of this error is due to poor forecasting of capital taxes.8 For 
2006, our forecast for capital taxes was over 30 per cent below the 
actual outturn and for 2007 it was over 30 per cent above the actual 
outturn. These forecasts are directly related to developments in the 
housing market. Excluding capital taxes our forecasts were 4.4 per 
 
8 Stamps, capital gains tax, capital acquisitions tax. 
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 cent below outturn in 2006, improving to a smaller 3.1 per cent 
overestimate in 2007 using our own forecasting model. 
 
The QEC forecasts tax heads individually, but we also use an 
average tax-to-GDP elasticity estimate as a top-down check on the 
overall forecast. While over the medium term total tax revenue 
tends to have a one-to-one relationship with nominal GDP, 
(average elasticity of 1.1 over the period 1976-2006), this can 
fluctuate dramatically in individual years. For example in 2006 this 
elasticity was equal to 2.0, falling to an estimated 0.5 for 2007. 
Excluding capital taxes the equivalent figures are 1.4 and 0.8 
respectively. Clearly 2006 was an exceptionally buoyant year for tax 
revenues while 2007 has underperformed, in terms of revenues, 
relative to estimated growth. For 2008 our forecasts imply a 
relatively modest growth in tax revenues, with an overall elasticity of 
0.8. Excluding capital taxes, this elasticity is equivalent to 1.0.  
 
    
 2006 2007 2008 
       
Source QEC 
Winter 
2005 
Forecast 
 
 
 
Outturn 
QEC 
Winter 
2006 
Forecast 
 
Budget 
2008 
estimate 
 
Budget 
2008 
Forecast 
QEC 
Winter 
2007 
Forecast 
       
Forecast Error Relative to Outturn: 
 €m % €m %   
Exchequer Balance -5,191  2,646    
   Tax Revenue -3,889 -8.5% 3,319 7.0   
   Capital Taxes -2,189 -30.5% 2,075 30.9   
Taxes excl capital -1,700 -4.4% 1,243 3.1   
   Income Tax -580 -4.7% -379 -2.8   
   Corporation Tax -653 -9.8% 659 10.4   
   Excise -99 -1.8% 344 5.9   
   VAT -353 -2.6% 615 4.2   
Growth rates       
Total Tax Revenue 6.1 16.0 11.2 3.9 3.3 3.7 
Excl capital taxes 6.8 11.8 9.1 5.8 4.5 4.8 
Nominal GDP growth  7.7 8.2 9.3 7.6 5.5 5.3 
Elasticity w.r.t. GDP       
Total tax revenues 0.8 2.0 1.2 0.5 0.6 0.7 
Taxes excl capital 0.9 1.4 1.0 0.8 0.8 0.9 
       
 
 All recent indicators suggest that the pace of growth in the 
volume of exports has been increasing throughout 2007. Following 
growth of 4.4 per cent in 2006, data from the most recent Quarterly 
National Accounts indicate that exports grew by 5.8 per cent annually 
in 2007 Q2 in volume terms and 6.2 per cent in value terms. While 
this growth is dominated by the continued strong expansion  
of services exports, merchandise exports have also 
Exports 
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Table 4: Exports of Goods and Services  
 
 
        
   2005 % Change in 2006 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 
        €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Merchandise 82,686 0.8 0.8 83,355 2.5 1.5 84,605 2.5 2.0 86,297 
Tourism 3,863 8.0 10.2 4,258 6.3 10.0 4,684 5.9 8.5 5,082 
Other Services 44,356 10.7 14.5 50,793 10.9 14.0 57,904 8.7 12.0 64,853 
           
Exports of Goods  
  and Services 130,905 4.4 5.7 138,406 5.7 6.3 147,193 5.0 6.1 156,232 
           
FISIM Adjustment 1,193   1,360   1,546   1,728 
           
Adjusted Exports 132,098 4.4 5.8 139,766 5.7 6.4 148,739 5.0 6.2 157,960 
           
 
 
 
 shown signs of recovery following a disappointing performance in 
2006. According to the Balance of Payments, which only provides data 
in current prices, annual growth in non-tourism services exports 
was 14.1 per cent for the year ended 2007 Q2, with tourism exports 
growing at 10.1 per cent. The growth in the value of merchandise 
exports was significantly lower at 1.4 per cent for the same period. 
 
Towards the end of 2006 there was a significant deterioration in 
the performance of merchandise exports which was largely 
concentrated in the final quarter of the year. This poor performance 
in Q4 meant that in 2006 volume growth in merchandise exports 
was just 0.8 per cent. However, as discussed in previous 
Commentaries, this slowdown appears to have been temporary in 
nature. Data from the latest External Trade statistics estimate that 
volume growth in merchandise exports rose by 5.5 per cent in the 
year ended 2007 Q2, with export prices falling by 2.6 per cent over 
the same period. Export prices have been falling since mid-2006 
and there is no evidence so far of this trend reversing as the 
Wholesale Price Index for manufacturing, a good indicator of 
merchandise export prices, has continued to fall through 2007. We 
expect this trend of falling merchandise export prices to continue 
throughout the forecast period. Consequently, our forecasts for 
growth in the value of merchandise exports in 2007 and 2008, at 1.5 
per cent and 2 per cent respectively, are below our forecasts for 
volume growth of 2.5 per cent in both years. Our forecast for 
volume growth has been revised downwards from our Autumn 
Commentary. This reflects the projected slowdown in growth of our 
major trading partners, in particular the US, and the strengthening 
of the Euro. 
 
As discussed in previous Commentaries, the share of services 
exports in total exports has increased significantly in recent years. 
While services accounted for 22 per cent of the total value of 
exports in 2000, this had risen to 40 per cent in 2006 and is 
expected to rise further to 45 per cent in 2008 according to our 
forecasts. Unsurprisingly, overall export growth has been 
dominated by the growth in services exports, which increased by 
14.2 per cent in value and 10.5 per cent in volume terms in 2006. 
This growth was concentrated in insurance, financial and other 
business services which together accounted for 73.8 per cent of the 
total growth in the value of services exports last year. Data for the 
year ending 2007 Q2 show that services exports grew by 13.7 per 
cent in value terms and 10.5 per cent in volume terms. Looking 
forward, we expect the pattern of more services intensive growth to 
continue, with growth in the value of non-tourism services exports 
of 14 per cent and 12 per cent in 2007 and 2008 respectively. The 
equivalent forecasts for volume growth are 10.9 per cent and 8.7 
per cent. Meanwhile, tourism services exports are expected to grow 
robustly this year and next at 10 per cent and 8.5 per cent in value 
terms. 
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 Our expectation for the outturn 2007 is for 5.7 per cent growth 
in the volume of exports of goods and services, with growth 
expected to moderate in 2008 to 5 per cent. The 2008 forecast has 
been revised downwards since our Autumn Commentary. As noted 
above, this is because the international outlook is less favourable 
and remains somewhat uncertain and also because of exchange rate 
movements.  
Figure 6: Volume Growth Rates (Annual Average) 
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 The volume of imports of goods and services grew by 4.4 per 
cent in 2006, while the total value of imports rose by 7.8 per cent. 
The most recent data for 2007 suggest lower growth rates in 
imports this year. The QNA estimate volume growth of 4.1 per 
cent and value growth at 6 per cent in the year ending 2007 Q2 (see 
Figure 6). According to the latest Balance of Payments data, there has 
been a marked slowdown in the pace of growth in the value of 
services imports in recent quarters. This is particularly the case for 
non-tourism services, which grew by just 5 per cent in the year 
ending 2007 Q2. Meanwhile, the value of tourism imports grew by 
11.6 per cent and merchandise imports grew by 6.4 per cent over 
the same period. 
Imports 
 
Merchandise import volume growth was estimated at 1.6 per 
cent in 2006 according to the CSO. In the year ended 2007 Q2 that 
growth had accelerated to 4.6 per cent. The value of merchandise 
imports from a number of economies has increased in recent 
months, particularly from some of the New Member States. For the 
period January to August 2007 the value of merchandise imports 
from Poland, for example, increased by 71 per cent compared to 
the same period in 2006. 
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 Table 5: Imports of Goods and Services  
 
 
        
   2005 % Change in 2006 2006 % Change in 2007 2007 % Change in 2008 2008 
        €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Merchandise 54,467 1.6 6.4 57,967 4.9 7.0 62,025 4.9 6.5 66,056 
Tourism 4,898  8.5 11.2 5,446  8.8 11.0 6,045 3.9 6.5 6,438 
Other Services 52,623 6.8 8.4 57,025 4.6  7.0 61,017 4.0 6.0 64,678 
           
Imports of Goods  
  and Services 111,988 4.4 7.5 120,438 5.0 7.2 129,087 4.4 6.3 137,172 
           
FISIM Adjustment 291   559   601   637 
           
Adjusted Imports 112,279 4.4  7.8 120,997 5.0 7.2 129,687 4.4 6.3 137,809 
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The growth in the volume of services imports in 2006 is 
estimated at 7 per cent by the CSO. In 2007 Q2 that growth had 
slowed significantly to 3.7 per cent on an annual average basis. An 
analysis of the Balance of Payments data, which provides a more 
detailed breakdown in current prices, suggest that the slowdown in 
services imports relates to a moderation in the growth of insurance 
and transport services. 
 
For 2007 our estimate suggests growth in the volume of goods 
and services imports of 5 per cent. While this is higher than the 
growth recorded in 2006, it is a significant downward revision on 
our forecast 5.8 per cent growth rate in the Autumn Commentary. 
Based on current indicators we estimate a significant acceleration in 
the pace of growth of merchandise imports to 4.9 per cent. The 
anticipated increase in merchandise import growth this year is 
driven in part by the current solid performance of the industrial 
sector (excluding construction) and the large increase in machinery 
and equipment investment, mostly aircraft. Nevertheless, our 
overall estimate of import growth for 2007 has been revised 
downwards because of the current slow pace of growth in non-
tourism services imports.     
 
For 2008 volume growth in imports of goods and services is 
forecast to slow to 4.4 per cent, a significant downward revision 
from our Autumn forecast. This moderation is driven by the 
forecast slowdown in the growth of personal consumption next 
year, which is particularly reflected in services imports. Growth in 
non-tourism services imports is anticipated to fall to 4.0 per cent 
(6.0 per cent value) while tourism import growth declines rapidly to 
just 3.9 per cent (6.5 per cent value). 
 
Our forecasts for growth in the value of goods and services 
imports are 7.2 per cent and 6.3 per cent for 2007 and 2008 
respectively. 
 
 Our forecasts for merchandise imports and exports for 2007 and 
2008 imply a further narrowing of the merchandise trade balance 
this year and next. Both volume and price developments contribute 
to this trend. Our expectation of further falls in merchandise export 
prices leads to a continuing deterioration in the terms of trade over 
the forecast period. Offsetting this is the narrowing of the services 
trade deficit, where services export growth continues to outstrip 
imports growth. The strong performance from services is expected 
to compensate entirely for the contraction in the merchandise trade 
balance in 2007 and 2008, leading to the first increase in the trade 
balance since 2002. We now expect the trade balance to stabilise at 
approximately 11.3 per cent of GNP this year and next. 
Balance of 
Payments 
 
 26 
 Table 6: Balance of Payments* 
        
 2005 Change 2006 Change 2007 Change 2008 
 €m % €m % €m % €m 
Merchandise Trade  
Balance 28,219 -10.0 25,388 -11.1 22,581 -10.4 20,241 
Service Trade Balance - 9,302 -20.2 -7,420 -39.7 -4,474 -73.6 -1,181 
Trade Balance in 
Goods and 
Services on BOP 
basis 18,917 -5.0 17,968  0.8 18,107 5.3 19,060 
% of GNP 13.9  12.0  11.3  11.4 
Total Debit Flows 68,287 24.0 84,651 26.7 107,269 16.2 124,618 
Total Credit Flows 43,417 37.9 59,870 35.5 81,146 20.0 97,375 
Net Factor Flows  -24,870 -0.4 -24,781 5.4 -26,124 4.3 -27,244 
Net Current Transfers  265 -275.5 -465  29.0 -600 0.0 -600 
Balance on Current 
Account -5,688  -7,278  -8,617  - 8,784 
        
Capital Transfers 264 -15.5 223 34.5 300 0.0 300 
Effective Current 
Balance  -5,424  -7,055  -8,317  -8,484 
% of GNP -4.0  -4.7  -5.2  -5.1 
        
*This table includes adjustments to Balance of Payments basis.  
 
 
In relation to net factor flows, the latest Balance of Payments data 
estimate that the net factor income deficit widened by 9.4 per cent 
in the year ended 2007 Q2. This followed a small contraction of the 
deficit in 2006 of -0.4 per cent. Credit flows increased by 33.3 per 
cent in the year ended 2007 Q2, with much of this growth being 
accounted for by portfolio and other investment income. There was 
an increase in debit flows of 25.7 per cent in the year ended 2007 
Q2. A fall in repatriated profit flows of 35.9 per cent (approximately 
€9.6 billion) over the period was more than offset by an increase of 
37.4 per cent in portfolio and other investment flows 
(approximately €16.1 billion). 
 
Given the scale and volatility of these net factor flows, 
forecasting their future course is quite difficult. For 2007 and 2008 
we have increased our forecast growth in net factor income to 5.4 
per cent and 4.3 per cent respectively. Combined with our forecasts 
for the trade balance, this implies an effective current account 
balance equivalent to –5.2 per cent of GNP in 2007, narrowing 
slightly to –5.1 per cent of GNP in 2008 (Table 6). 
 
 The anticipation of lower rates of GNP and GDP growth relative 
to recent years has been covered above. The last time a rate of 
growth below 3 per cent was experienced was in 2002, when GNP 
grew by 2.9 per cent (although in the same year, GDP growth was 
6.4 per cent). Looking at other measures of growth, GNP adjusted 
for the terms of trade is expected to grow by 1.7 per cent in 2008. 
This lower figure relative to GNP growth reflects our expectation 
of a deterioration in the terms of trade in 2008. This is part of a 
Measures of 
Growth 
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 longer-run trend as seen in the table. Growth in GNP per capita is 
expected to be just under 1 per cent in 2008 and arises from our 
expectation that the population will grow by about 1.5 per cent in 
2008. 
Table 7: Measures of Growth 
Growth Indicators 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
GNP 3.7 4.9 6.5 4.4 2.3 
GNP adjusted for Terms of Trade 2.9 3.8 4.5 3.0 1.7 
GNDI 2.9 3.7 4.0 2.9 1.7 
National Resources 3.0 3.6 4.0 3.0 1.7 
GNP per capita (constant prices) 2.0 2.7 3.7 1.8 0.9 
 
Consumption per capita (constant 
prices) 2.5 5.1 3.0 4.4 2.3 
Personal disposable income per capita 3.4 6.7 3.6 6.6 5.2 
Investment in Housing/GNP 13.5 15.5 15.6 12.5 9.6 
Investment/GNP 28.0 31.0 30.9 29.4 27.9 
      
 
 Following the good performance of industry in 2006, with 
growth (excluding construction) of 5.3 per cent, it appears that 2007 
will again be a year of relatively good growth. The most recent 
Quarterly National Accounts showed industry growing by 6 per cent in 
the year ended 2007 Q2. With construction now growing more 
slowly than other industry, this figure conceals an even better 
performance in the non-construction component where growth up 
to 2007 Q2 was 7.2 per cent. Construction itself grew by 3 per cent 
in the year to 2007 Q2. 
Sectoral 
Output 
 
This positive performance is also seen in the Index of Industrial 
Production. The index for all industries grew by 5.6 per cent for the 
year up to September 2007. Within this, manufacturing grew by 5.9 
per cent over the same period. 
 
For 2007, we estimate that industrial production (excluding 
construction) will grow by 4.5 per cent in volume terms. However, 
due to unfavourable price movements, we expect the growth rate in 
value terms to be lower, at 3.5 per cent. This view of prices is partly 
informed by observed movements in the wholesale price index, 
which posted a reading of -1.3 per cent on an annual basis for the 
year ended September 2007. For 2008, we expect industry (again 
excluding construction) to grow by 3 per cent in volume terms and 
by 2 per cent in value terms. This slowdown between 2007 and 
2008 is related in part to a slowing in exports (as discussed in the 
section on Exports above) in the face of slower global growth in 
2008 and the weaker dollar. 
 
Services continue to exhibit the strongest rates of growth across 
the sectors of the economy. Across all services, growth was 6.8 per 
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 cent in 2006 with the highest rate of growth being shown in the 
“other services” category (7.8 per cent). The indications for 2007 
continue to be positive. According to the QNA, services grew by 
7.1 per cent in volume terms in the year ended 2007 Q2. The 
breakdown in growth rates within the sector is as follows: 
distribution, transport and communications: +6.4 per cent; public 
administration and defence: +1.8 per cent; other services +7.8 per 
cent. These growth rates in output are mirrored in the employment 
numbers where the highest numbers of additional jobs are in the 
areas of finance and business services. We should note, however, 
that employment is also growing in publicly-provided services, i.e. 
health and education. Hence, the overall growth in services is partly 
related to the large increase in Government spending in 2007.  
 
For 2007, we estimate that services in total will grow by 6.2 per 
cent in volume terms and by 10.7 per cent in value terms. These 
aggregate figures are dominated by our estimate of growth in “other 
services”, which we estimate will grow by 7.2 per cent in volume 
terms and by 12.5 per cent in value terms. 
 
For 2008, growth in services is expected to moderate but, 
nonetheless, growth will be strong and higher than in other sectors 
again. Overall growth in volume terms is forecast to be 3.6 per cent, 
with the growth rate for “other services” forecast to be 4.3 per cent. 
The corresponding value growth rates are 7.2 per cent and 8.5 per 
cent respectively. 
 
For agriculture, declines in output over the last year have been 
counterbalanced by large increases in output prices. The QNA 
record a decline in the volume of output of 7.5 per cent in the year 
ended 2007 Q2. However, the index of output prices in September 
2007 was 16.6 per cent higher than in September of 2006. The 
largest increase in output prices was for cereals (67.7 per cent), 
followed by milk (44.9 per cent). These trends are related to 
international movements in food prices, discussed under consumer 
prices. 
 
For 2007, we expect that the trend towards lower output 
volumes but higher output in value terms will have continued. For 
2008, we expect a modest pick-up in volume, with growth of 1 per 
cent forecast. Positive price developments should see this translate 
into a value increase of 4 per cent. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 29 
 30 
 
Table 8: GDP by Sector  
 
  
        
 2005 Change  2006 Change 2007 Change 2008 
     €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m Volume Value €m 
           
Agriculture 4,097 -6.8 -4.4 3,918 -1.0 5.0 4,113 1.0 4.0 4,277 
           
Industry: 50,465 4.6 5.1 53,043 2.3 2.0 54,129 0.3 0.5 54,423 
Other Industry 36,961 4.3 2.6 37,906 4.5 3.5 39,233 3.0 2.0 40,018 
Building & Construction 13,504 5.3 12.1 15,137 -3.8 -1.6 14,896 -7.6 -3.3 14,406 
           
Services: 87,983 6.8 9.6 96,417 6.2 10.7 106,769 3.6 7.2 114,461 
 Public Administration &  
 Defence 5,127 3.0 7.0 5,485 2.5 7.0 5,869 1.0 4.5 6,133 
 Distribution, Transport 
 and Communications 21,759 4.6 6.1 23,075 4.0 6.6 24,592 2.0 3.8 25,521 
 Other Services 
 (including rent) 61,098 7.8 11.1 67,857 7.2 12.5 76,308 4.3 8.5 82,807 
           
GDP at Factor Cost – 
output basis 142,545 5.6 7.6 153,378 4.6 7.6 165,011 2.4 4.9 173,161 
           
 
 According to the latest Quarterly National Household Survey, 
employment grew by 3.8 per cent in the year ended 2007 Q3 
(+67,600 jobs). Relative to Q3 of 2006, employment in 2007 Q3 
was 3.3 per cent higher. As was the case with the figures in the 
previous QNHS, these figures suggest that while employment 
growth remains strong, the rate of growth is softening. The point is 
illustrated in Figure 7. Annual employment growth peaked in 2006  
Q1 when the growth rate reached 4.9 per cent. Since then, there has 
been a slow but steady decline in the growth rate.  
Employment 
 
Although the annual rate of growth in employment in 
construction, at 7.6 per cent, is higher than the average growth rate, 
a better sense of the unfolding story in construction is provided by 
quarter-on-quarter comparisons. Employment in this sector was 
just 1.7 per cent higher in 2007 Q3 relative to 2006 Q3. As recently 
as 2007 Q1, employment in construction was 11.2 per cent higher 
than in the corresponding quarter of the previous year. Hence, the 
rapid slowdown in construction is clearly evident. Furthermore, the 
monthly index of construction (firms of five or more) has fallen in 
each month since April 2007. 
Figure 7: Annual Employment Growth 2002 Q1 to 2007 Q3 
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Source: Quarterly National Household Survey, CSO. 
 
With construction no longer being the main source of job 
growth, financial and other business services now show the highest 
number of additional jobs. Between 2006 Q3 and 2007 Q3, 
employment grew by 28,700 in this sector. The sector with the next 
highest level of employment growth in absolute numbers was retail 
and wholesale, adding 11,800 jobs between 2006 Q3 and 2007 Q3.  
 
One interesting feature of the job growth in the most recent 
period is the fact that over half of the extra jobs created between 
2006 Q3 and 2007 Q3 were part-time. By contrast, in the year 
ended 2006 Q3, only 7 per cent of the extra jobs created were part-
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 time. We should note that most of the extra part-time jobs were in 
the category of “not under-employed”, thereby suggesting that 
people were choosing to work part-time as opposed to facing a 
constraint in the labour market. Hence, the part-time intensity of 
the employment growth does not necessarily point to a weakening 
in the labour market. 
 
Of the 67,600 extra jobs created in the year to 2007 Q3, 48,400 
were filled by immigrants. This represents almost 72 per cent of the 
additional jobs and suggests that immigrants are filling an increasing 
proportion of new jobs. In Q2, 53 per cent of the new jobs created 
in the previous year were filled by non-nationals. This trend 
suggests that the reduction in employment growth has not been met 
yet with a similar decline in the growth rate of the immigrant inflow. 
Were this to persist, there would be implications in terms of 
competition for jobs with possible consequences in terms of wages 
level and unemployment rates.9
 
Looking ahead to 2008, we expect the deceleration in 
employment growth to continue to such a degree that employment 
will only grow by 8,000 or 0.4 per cent. This is obviously a notably 
low figure when compared to recent years but arises largely from 
the contraction in house building, which is a highly labour-intensive 
sector. Employment in services is forecast to rise by 28,000 but the 
drag which results from house building will all but erase these gains 
in an aggregate sense. As a result of the low growth in employment, 
the rate of unemployment is forecast to rise to 5.8 per cent. Net 
inward migration is forecast to be 25,000, a significant fall relative 
to the 2007 estimate of 71,000. 
TABLE 9: Employment and Unemployment 
  
 Annual Averages 000s 
 2005 2006 2007   2008 
     
Agriculture 115 117 115 115 
Industry 539 560 569 550 
Services 1,298 1,362 1,416 1,444 
     
Total at Work 1,952 2,039 2,100 2,108 
Unemployed 89 93 102 130 
     
Labour Force 2,041 2,132 2,202 2,238 
Unemployment Rate % 4.4 4.4 4.6 5.8 
Net Migration 53.4 69.9 70.6 25.0 
   of which: Inward Migration 70.0 86.9 87.6 42.0 
Change in Participation Rate* 1.7 1.0 0.9 0.3 
* Note: Participation rate measured as share of population aged 15-64 years. 
 
9 Comparing the period January – October 2007 with the equivalent period in 
2006, there has been a 5.3 per cent drop in the number of PPS number allocations 
to immigrants from the NMS, from 121,669 to 116,084. PPS numbers are a very 
inexact indicator of migration trends but this figure does point to a moderation in 
the inward flow. 
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  In Table 10, we report trends in wages up to 2007 Q2. On an 
economy-wide basis, wage growth continues to be strong with 
growth of 5.1 per cent in the year ended 2007 Q2. The highest rate 
of growth is in financial and other business services and this is 
consistent with the employment data that shows this to be a 
particularly buoyant sector. The low rate of growth in hotels and 
restaurants may be related to the inflow of immigrants into that 
sector. According to the QNHS, of the 9,400 extra jobs in that 
sector in the year to 2007 Q3, 9,200 were filled by immigrants. 
Incomes 
Table 10: Growth in Average Hourly Earnings 1999-2006 
     
  Hourly Annualised Annual Growth  
 Earnings Growth         
 2007 Q2 2007 Q2  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006** 
  Euro % % 
Economy* 18.61 5.1 5.6 7.6 9.8 6.0 4.9 5.8 5.1 4.7 
Industry 15.68 4.7 5.3 6.1 10.4 7.9 5.4 4.7 2.9 4.1 
Construction 18.34 4.2 7.7 12.5 11.4 10.4 5.2 4.4 7.2 2.1 
Distribution 18.10 5.7 6.3 12.0 10.0 6.8 5.7 4.4 4.4 6.3 
Hotels and 
Restaurants 11.15 2.0 7.6 6.5 5.5 3.6 7.1 8.0 6.1 3.2 
Transport, Storage 
and 
Communications 20.44 7.4 3.5 5.6 8.4 1.0 5.3 5.7 4.2 6.5 
Non-Market Public 
Services 26.45 5.8 5.4 5.7 9.6 3.7 3.8 9.5 7.1 6.0 
Other Market Services 18.88 4.9 6.8 8.4 7.7 2.7 5.6 4.1 3.7 4.5 
Financial and Other 
Business 22.56 7.6 3.6 6.1 11.5 4.2 1.8 6.1 5.6 7.4 
           
* Excludes agriculture and health sector earnings. 
** Annual growth to 2006 defined as the annual growth in the four quarter moving average ended in Q4. 
 
On the basis of trends so far in 2007, we estimate that wages will 
grow by 5.5 per cent this year. When combined with our estimate of 
employment growth, we arrive at an estimate for growth in non-
agricultural wages of 9 per cent. With transfers having grown 
strongly this year, partly as a result of the social welfare package in 
Budget 2007, gross personal incomes should rise by 9.6 per cent this 
year. Given the strong growth in consumption in 2007, even if the 
growth rate was slightly lower than expected, the savings rate 
should fall to 5.7 per cent in 2007, down from 7 per cent in 2006. 
 
For 2008, we expect the rate of growth in wages to moderate 
somewhat in the context of slower employment growth and rising 
unemployment. Our forecast is for wages to grow by 4 per cent. 
Given our expectation that employment growth will be very low 
next year, we expect non-agricultural wages to grow by only 4.4 per 
cent. As the social welfare package in Budget 2008 is more modest 
that than in Budget 2007, current transfers will grow by a lower rate 7 
per cent compared with 15.4 per cent in 2007. Although incomes 
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 will grow more slowly in 2008 relative to 2007, so too will 
consumption. Hence, we expect the saving rate to increase slightly 
to 6 per cent in 2008. 
 
 Inflation, as measured by the Consumer Price Index (CPI), was 
estimated at 5 per cent year-on-year in November. This was a slight 
increase on the 4.8 per cent registered in October but consistent 
with the trend of price increases approaching 5 per cent seen 
through most of 2007. This trend is reflected in the twelve-month 
moving average inflation rate shown in Figure 8, which has been 
rising consistently since the beginning of 2006. The average 
inflation rate for the twelve months to November  was 4.9 per cent. 
Consumer 
Prices 
Figure 8: CPI Inflation Rate 
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Despite no further interest rate increases since June of this year 
the impact of previous ECB decisions to increase its main 
refinancing rate, from 2 per cent at the end of 2005 to its current 
level of 4 per cent, still dominates the development of consumer 
prices. Given its treatment in calculating the CPI, the mortgage 
interest component accounted for 36.7 per cent of the total rate of 
inflation reported in November. The impact of mortgage interest 
rates on consumer price inflation has, however, fallen significantly 
in recent months. Our forecasts are based upon the technical 
assumption of no changes in the ECB main refinancing rate over 
our forecast horizon to the end of 2008. This implies the influence 
of the mortgage interest rate component on overall inflation, as 
measured by the CPI, should continue to fall. Meanwhile, rents 
continue to increase at a robust pace, registering an 11.1 per cent 
increase in November compared with the same month in 2006. 
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  Table 11: Personal Disposable Income  
 
        
 2005 Change  2006 Change 2007 Change 2008 
     €m % €m €m % €m €m % €m €m 
           
Agriculture, etc. 3,397 -5.9 -202 3,195 5.0 160 3,355 4.0 134 3,489 
Non-Agricultural 
Wages 65,992 9.8 6,434 72,426 9.0 6,497 78,923 4.4 3,511 82,434 
Other Non-Agricultural 
Income 15,409 6.3 974 16,383 6.9 1,135 17,517 13.0 2,271 19,788 
           
Total Income 
Received 84,798 8.5 7,207 92,004 8.5 7,791  99,795 5.9 5,916 105,711 
Current Transfers 18,126 -0.5 -94 18,031 15.4 2,776 20,807 7.0 1,461 22,268 
           
Gross Personal 
Income 102,923 6.9 7,112 110,035 9.6 10,568 120,603 6.1 7,377 127,980 
Direct Personal Taxes 19,561 9.2 1,809 21,371 10.9 2,321 23,691 4.0   942 24,634 
           
Personal Disposable 
Income  83,362 6.4 5,303 88,665 9.3 8,247 96,912 6.6 6,435 103,346 
Consumption 76,435  7.9 6,048 82,483 10.7 8,863 91,346 6.3 5,795 97,141 
Personal Savings 6,926   6,181   5,565   6,205 
Savings Ratio  8.3    7.0   5.7   6.0 
Average Personal 
Tax Rate 19.0   19.4   19.6   19.2 
           
 
 
  
Apart from interest rates, much of the recent increases in 
consumer prices are driven by other external forces. Supply 
constraints internationally for a number of commodities, alongside 
increasing demand from emerging market economies, have 
contributed to overall consumer price inflation in Ireland in recent 
months. This is particularly the case for certain foodstuffs. The 
food component of the CPI increased by 6 per cent year-on-year in 
November, significantly above the 2.6 per cent average rate of 
increase in food prices for the first eleven months of 2007. The 
increases have been particularly high for cereals, bread and dairy 
products. The pace of increase in food prices is likely to remain 
quite elevated over the coming months, but our forecasts assume a 
return to trend growth in food prices towards the end of 2008. 
 
The recent spike in the price of oil is also reflected in the current 
inflation rate, with petrol prices increasing by 15.8 per cent year-on- 
year in November alongside a significant rise in the cost of home 
heating oil. Most commentators expect the price of oil to stabilise in 
the opening months of 2008. The strengthening of the Euro against 
the US dollar has helped, and should continue to help contain the 
feed through of increased oil prices on the overall CPI. 
 
The main domestic drivers of consumer price inflation are 
found in the services sector of the economy. Inflation for services 
averaged 8.4 per cent in the twelve months to October 2007 while 
inflation for goods averaged 0.9 per cent. 
 
Ireland remains above the Euro Area average in terms of 
consumer price inflation. Using the EU Harmonised Index of 
Consumer Prices (HICP),10 Ireland’s year-on-year rate of inflation 
in November was 3.5 per cent. This measure of inflation has 
averaged 2.9 per cent for the twelve months up to and including 
November 2007, which is significantly higher than the equivalent 
measure for the Euro Area as a whole of 2 per cent. 
Table 12: Inflation Measures (%) 
          
 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 
HICP (Ireland) 5.3 4.0 4.7 4.0 2.3 2.2 2.7 2.9 2.8 
CPI 5.6 4.9 4.6 3.5 2.2 2.4 3.9 4.9 3.3 
Mortgage 
Interest 12.5 24.7 -7.6 -8.3 5.4 12.3 31.4 40.1 7.0 
HICP (Euro 
Area) 2.1 2.3 2.2 2.1 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.1 2.5 
          
 
10 The HICP excludes mortgage interest, building materials, concrete blocks, union 
subscriptions, motor car insurance, dwellings insurance, motor car tax and 
motorcycle tax. 
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 Looking forward we expect Ireland to remain above the Euro 
Area average in terms of consumer price inflation. For 2007 and 
2008 we expect HICP inflation to average 2.9 and 2.8 per cent 
respectively. Our forecasts for CPI inflation hinge upon the 
technical assumption of no changes in the ECB main refinancing 
rate over our forecast horizon. This implies the gap between the 
CPI and HICP measures narrows next year. CPI inflation is 
expected to average 4.9 per cent in 2007 and 3.3 per cent in 2008. 
The current forecast for 2008 is slightly below that in the previous 
Commentary due to the change in our assumption on interest rates, 
which had previously been based on an expected 25 basis points 
increase in December 2007. We now expect the pace of growth in 
consumer prices to peak at the end of this year and moderate 
through 2008, as shown in Figure 9. 
Figure 9: Inflation Profile 2006-2008 (Forecasts 2007M10 onwards) 
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forecasts. 
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 GENERAL ASSESSMENT 
We address three issues in this assessment. First, we outline what 
we see as unsustainable aspects of the recent growth performance. 
Second, we look at labour market dynamics in the context of low 
employment growth. Third, we reflect on the recent Budget. 
 
 If our forecast for GNP growth in 2008 of 2.3 per cent is realised, 
Ireland will experience its slowest pace of economic growth since 
1992. As discussed in the text, the slow pace of growth in 2008 is 
heavily influenced by the contraction in house building. The level of 
housing output that we expect to see in 2008 will imply a decrease 
in volume of over 20 per cent. Given the current weight of house 
building in Ireland’s total output, such a contraction places a very 
significant drag on growth.  
The 
Unsustainable 
Nature of the 
Recent Growth 
Experience 
 
As we have argued in a number of Commentaries, this contraction 
in house building can be viewed as a return to a more sustainable 
rate of housing output. In this way, the adjustment is not entirely 
negative for the economy and should result in labour resources 
being released from this sector that can be re-deployed elsewhere in 
the economy. 
 
While much has been written about the housing sector and its 
contraction, it should be noted that the scale of housing output was 
not the only unsustainable element of the recent growth experience. 
As discussed above in the section on the public finances, 2007 saw 
a large fiscal stimulus with very rapid growth in expenditure. 
Combined with very sluggish growth in tax revenues this year – not 
anticipated at the time of Budget 2007 – the change in the General 
Government surplus from 2.9 per cent of GDP in 2006 to 0.5 per 
cent in 2007 points to a large injection of demand into the economy 
on the part of the Government. The effect of this can be seen in 
the profile of employment growth. Of the 67,600 jobs created 
between 2006 Q3 and 2007 Q3, almost a third (22,000) was in 
health, education and public administration. The rate of growth is 
current public spending is being significantly curtailed in 2008 
because the rate of increase seen in 2007 was unsustainable. 
 
The final element of the 2007 growth experience that will not be 
present in 2008 is the SSIA effect. While consumption may not 
have grown as rapidly as expected at the outset of 2007, our 
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 estimate of 7 per cent growth is still a large increase that will not be 
repeated in 2008. 
 
With the ending of the housing boom, SSIA-led consumption 
growth and the large fiscal stimulus of 2007, it is clear that other 
sectors will now have to perform well if the growth rate is to 
recover in 2009. The addition of almost 30,000 jobs in “financial 
and other business services” in the year ended 2007 Q3 shows that 
there is growth potential elsewhere in the economy, even if some 
concerns now exist for the global employment prospects of the 
financial sector in the short term, given the turmoil in financial 
markets.  
 
The key to an improved performance is, as always, 
competitiveness. In this context, moderation in wage growth in 
2008 would be particularly welcome. High rates of wage inflation in 
recent years have led to Ireland’s share of world export markets 
falling. A reversal of this trend is imperative in the context that we 
have just set out. 
 
 Given the very different outlooks for the house building sector 
and for other industries and services, our forecast for overall 
employment growth in 2008 also hides a much more mixed picture. 
As can be seen from Table 8 above, we expect total employment to 
grow by just 8,000 in 2008. However, we expect employment in 
services to grow by 28,000. As employment in industry, including 
construction, is expected to fall by approximately 20,000 it is clear 
that gross employment changes will vastly exceed the net change. 
Even these figures understate the full extent of the changing 
structure of employment because employment shifts within industry 
will also occur. 
Employment 
Dynamics 
 
Our employment forecasts are based on a somewhat optimistic 
view of the potential for labour to flow across sectors. Without 
detailed knowledge of the skills of those losing jobs in one sector 
and the skills needed in expanding sectors, it is difficult to model 
the labour re-allocation process. However, it is worth pointing out 
that if labour cannot readily flow between sectors, our forecast for 
unemployment next year might be overly optimistic. To use a 
slightly old-fashioned term, “structural unemployment” might 
emerge, whereby the number of vacancies matches the number of 
unemployed workers but where skill mismatches prevent job 
matches. In this context, the importance of training policies comes 
to the fore because there is a need to supplement the skills of those 
becoming unemployed so that they can move to other sectors.  
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 Although Budget 2008 was the most high profile public finance 
“event” in recent weeks, the Exchequer returns were in some ways 
more noteworthy from an economic perspective. The slowdown in 
revenue flows meant that the general government surplus was 
substantially lower than had been expected. By extension, this 
meant that fiscal policy was more stimulatory in 2007 than had been 
planned in Budget 2007. As discussed above, this will have impacted 
on the growth rate in 2007 but will not be an on-going stimulus, 
given the need to curtail growth in current public spending. 
The Budget 
 
Budget 2008 itself contained a number of positive elements. The 
curtailing of the rate of growth in current spending is to be 
welcomed, as are the planned lower rates of growth indicated for 
2009 and 2010. Meeting these targets will represent a serious 
challenge for government. The continued growth in capital 
expenditure to fund the NDP is also welcome. The decision to 
borrow close to 1 per cent of GDP is sensible given the situation 
that the economy faces in 2008 and the general health of the public 
finances. The decision to index tax bands and allowances was also 
to be welcomed because it is preferable that decisions to increase 
tax revenue should be explicit and should not come about through 
fiscal drag. 
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This paper has three objectives. First, a review of the developing body of work on 
the economics of immigration in Ireland is provided. Second, the analysis 
undertaken by Barrett and McCarthy (2007) of earnings of immigrants in 
Ireland is updated. Third, the earnings of immigrant women are assessed to see if 
they experience a “double disadvantage”. Among other findings, the review of the 
emerging literature points to immigrants faring less well in the Irish labour 
market relative to native employees. As regards the analysis conducted in this 
paper, we find that immigrants were earning 15 per cent less than comparable 
Irish employees in 2005. For immigrants from non-English speaking countries, 
the wage disadvantage was 20 per cent. The corresponding figure for immigrants 
from the EU’s New Member States was 32 per cent. A double disadvantage is 
found for immigrant women. By this we mean that the analysis shows (a) women 
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(immigrants plus natives) earn 12 per cent less than comparable men (again, 
immigrants plus natives) and (b) female immigrants earn 14 per cent less than 
comparable native female employees. This double disadvantage is concentrated 
among female immigrants with third level degrees. 
 
 In recent years, immigration has become one of the most 
important economic and social issues facing Ireland. Over a 
remarkably short time-span, Ireland went from being a country with 
relatively few immigrants to one with an immigrant share of 
population similar to the EU average. The presence of this 
immigrant population has given rise to a wide range of research 
questions, relating to issues such as the experiences of immigrants in 
Ireland and their impacts.  
1. 
Introduction 
 
In this paper, we address a number of themes. First, we review 
the literature that has emerged in recent years on the economics of 
immigration into Ireland. A number of papers have been written 
since the mid-1990s but no overview has been provided yet. Our 
second task in the paper is to provide an addition to this emerging 
body of research through an analysis of the earnings of immigrants 
in Ireland relative to natives. Earnings are obviously an indicator of 
labour market success so it is important that we know how the 
earnings of immigrants compare to those of natives. Significant 
differences in wages between natives and immigrants can point to 
efficiency losses for the economy if those lower wages reflect a sub-
optimal use of immigrant human capital. Wage differences can also 
have unfavourable distributional implications. 
 
We conduct our analysis using data from the 2005 wave of the 
European Union Survey of Income and Living Conditions (EU-
SILC). In undertaking this analysis, we have two objectives. First, 
we want to update the findings in Barrett and McCarthy (2007) in 
which data from the 2004 wave of the EU-SILC were used. We also 
want to develop the analysis in Barrett and McCarthy and in 
particular to consider the earnings of immigrants by gender.  
 
The Barrett and McCarthy paper contains the only analysis of 
immigrants’ earnings in Ireland that is based on a representative 
sample. For this reason, the addition of a second observation of 
immigrant earnings has merit. However, we also see this update as 
having merit because the sample on which Barrett and McCarthy 
based their analysis contained less than 200 immigrants. The sample 
used here is also limited in terms of the number of immigrants 
included but by re-examining the pattern of immigrants’ earnings 
relative to natives we can assess if the findings of Barrett and 
McCarthy are largely robust. 
 
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we provide the 
overview of research on the economic dimensions of immigration 
in Ireland. In Section 3, we describe the data on which the analysis 
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is based, we present some descriptive statistics and then we present 
the results from the regression analysis. In Section 4, we offer some 
conclusions.1
 
 Although immigration into Ireland is a recent phenomenon, the 
research community in Ireland has been able to draw on a vast 
literature on the topic from other countries in setting research 
questions. Here, we provide a brief note on each question, with 
some examples of relevant papers. Our focus is purely on the 
economic dimensions. 
2. 
Research on 
the Economics 
of Immigration 
in Ireland  
1. What determines the size of migration flows? A typical approach under 
this line of research is to consider the relative economic positions of 
two countries or regions (such as incomes per head) and to relate 
this to population flows. One recent example is Bauer and 
Zimmermann (1999) who sought to forecast possible population 
movements following the expansion of the EU in May 2004. 
 
2. What are the characteristics of migrants, for example, in terms of human 
capital? There are many examples of papers looking at this issue, 
with one of the best known being Borjas (1987). Borjas showed 
how immigrants in the US differed in their human capital across 
countries of origin. In particular, he showed how the shift towards a 
greater concentration of Latin American immigrants in the inflow 
after the mid-1960s, and away from Europeans who had higher 
levels of education, led to a less educated immigrant population in 
the US.  
 
3. What are the experiences of migrants in their host countries? For example, 
how do they perform in the labour market? Chiswick (1978) was one of 
the earliest and most influential papers on this topic. He appeared to 
show that immigrants earned less on average than comparable 
natives when they arrived in the US but that their earnings 
converged on those of natives over time, as they acquired “location-
specific human capital”. Much work has followed this line and has 
looked at dimensions of the immigrant experience other than 
earnings such as occupational attainment (Chiswick et al. 2005) and 
welfare participation (Hansen and Lofstrom, 2003). 
 
4. What are the economic impacts of migrants on variables such as GNP, 
earnings and the public finances? The measurement of impacts is a more 
controversial area than those just mentioned. Some studies have 
used variations in immigrant concentrations across geographic areas 
to assess impacts and have found the impact to be minor. However, 
Borjas et al. (1997) suggest that this approach may be flawed and 
that a model-based simulation approach is needed. The results from 
the Borjas et al., approach tend to show immigration having a 
 
1 In an Appendix, we compare the results here with those from Barrett and 
McCarthy (2007) who used EU-SILC data from 2004. 
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relatively minor impact on average incomes but with more 
significant distributional implications.  
 
We will now look at the recent Irish research under each 
heading. A number of papers addressed the question of migration 
flows between Ireland and the UK (Geary and McCarthy, 1976; 
Honohan, 1984 and 1992). The approach was to relate changes in 
relative incomes and relative unemployment rates between Ireland 
and the UK to population flows between the two economies. These 
papers clearly belong to a time when such flows were the dominant 
component in Ireland’s migratory experience. Since the beginning 
of the era of large-scale inward migration, only one paper has 
looked at the determinants of more recent flows. Duffy et al. (2005) 
consider how inward migration has tended to contribute to 
increasing the price of houses and how this increase, in turn, 
reduces the attractiveness of migrating to Ireland. The authors 
conclude that this house price/migration link reduces potential 
migration and so lessens the potential for migration to dampen 
wage pressures in Ireland. 
 
Starting with Barrett and Trace (1998), a number of papers have 
looked at the characteristics of immigrants (Barrett et al., 2006; 
Minns, 2005). Barrett and Trace showed that immigrants in the mid-
1990s were a highly educated group, with levels of education that 
significantly exceeded those of the native population. One of the 
hypotheses explaining this observation was that the immigrants of 
the 1990s were “early movers” and may have had access to more 
information on Ireland. This gave rise to an expectation that the 
level of education among immigrants would fall as inward migration 
continued and increased. 
 
The later analyses of immigrant characteristics continued to 
show immigrants as being a highly educated group, based on both 
the Quarterly National Household Surveys (Barrett et al., 2006) and the 
Census 2002 (Minns, 2005). It was also shown that immigrants had 
higher rates of labour force participation and higher employment 
rates. Barrett and Duffy (2008 forthcoming) show that the level of 
education among immigrants was lower among the more recent 
arrivals. Even so, the most recently arrived cohort (as of 2005) still 
had higher levels of education than the native population.  Another 
paper on this issue of characteristics is Duffy (2007). He looks at 
the housing tenure of immigrants and finds that they are less likely 
to be owner-occupiers.  
 
On the issue of how migrants are performing in the Irish labour 
market, the evidence suggests that they do less well than the native 
population. Ruhs (2005) provided the first study on earnings but his 
data was limited to work permit holders and so omitted the many 
EU nationals who were living in Ireland at the time of his analysis. 
Barrett and McCarthy (2007) is the first, and only, analysis of 
earnings that is based on a nationally representative dataset. They 
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show that immigrants earn 18 per cent less, on average, relative to 
native workers, controlling for factors such as education and length 
of labour market experience. For immigrants from non-English 
speaking countries, this wage gap is 31 per cent. Barrett and 
McCarthy also show that the wage gap is biggest for the more highly 
educated immigrants, relative to comparable native employees. 
 
The issue of labour market performance is also addressed in 
Barrett et al. (2006) and Barrett and Duffy (2008 forthcoming). As 
these papers use the CSO’s Quarterly National Household Survey, the 
sample sizes are larger than that used by Barrett and McCarthy. 
However, as the QNHS does not include information on earnings, 
the analyses in these papers use occupational attainment rather than 
wages as a measure of labour market outcomes. Both papers show 
how immigrants are less likely to be in higher-level occupations, 
controlling for factors such as age and education, and label this as 
an “occupational gap”. Barrett and Duffy (2008 forthcoming) also 
show how this “occupational gap” is largest for immigrants from 
the EU’s New Member States and how the gap does not seem to 
decline for this group as they spend longer in Ireland. Based on this 
finding, Barrett and Duffy conclude that there is an absence of 
evidence of increased labour market integration of immigrants over 
time. 
 
The question of economic impacts has been addressed in Barrett 
et al. (2002), Barrett et al. (2006), Barrell et al. (2007) and Bergin and 
Kearney (2007). All four papers follow the simulation approach to 
measuring immigration impacts, as promoted by Borjas et al. (1997). 
Given the high-skilled nature of the immigrant inflow into Ireland, 
Barrett et al. (2002) and Bergin and Kearney (2007) see immigration 
dampening wage pressures at the high-paid end of the labour 
market and thereby allowing increased demand for such labour to 
translate into increased high-skilled employment and output. Barrett 
et al. (2002) link this process to an observation that earnings 
inequality grew at a slower pace in Ireland after 1997. Barrett et al. 
(2006) take account of the fact that immigrants, although highly 
educated, experience an occupational gap (defined above). As a 
result, immigration may have contributed to a dampening of wage 
pressures at the lower end of the distribution, as immigrants 
competed with lower-skilled native employees. Barrell et al. (2007) 
model immigration into Ireland in the broader context of 
population movements within the EU, following enlargement in 
2004, and estimate what the on-going impact might be out to 2015. 
Ireland is shown to be the largest gainer from EU movements  
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(in proportionate GDP increases). As part of the same exercise, the 
accession states are shown to experience losses in GDP.2
 
In summary, the main lessons from the economics literature on 
immigration in Ireland are as follows. Immigration into Ireland has 
been notable for the high level of education among the immigrant 
inflow and also the high levels of labour force participation and 
employment. In spite of the high levels of education, immigrants in 
Ireland from non-English-speaking countries have been shown to 
experience labour market disadvantages relative to natives in terms 
of occupational attainment and wages. The impact of immigration 
has been shown to be positive for GNP but negative for average 
wage growth. Given the greater controversy that surrounds the 
measurement of impacts, it is important to note that findings with 
respect to impacts could be less pronounced, although of the same 
sign, if different methods were used. 
 
 Although our literature review has covered a broad range of 
topics, we now focus on one of the issues, namely, the analysis of 
immigrant earnings in Ireland. The data on which the analysis below 
is based come from the EU Survey on Income and Living 
Conditions (EU-SILC) for 2005. A full description of the sampling 
methodology can be found in Central Statistics Office (2006) but 
here we will set out the broad features of the survey. The EU-SILC 
is a voluntary survey of private households and is carried out under 
EU legislation. To date, it has been used mainly to provide 
information on the rates of poverty and deprivation in Ireland 
(CSO, 2006). The survey seeks to provide a nationally representative 
sample of households. It does so by first creating a sample of 2,600 
small areas and then selecting a random sample of households 
within each block. About 130 households were surveyed each week 
during the twelve months of 2005, resulting in a sample of 6,085 
households and 15,539 individuals. 
3. 
Data, 
Descriptives 
and 
Regression 
Results
 
For each individual, the survey contains information on variables 
such as age, education, labour force status and earnings. Crucially 
for our purposes, the place of birth and citizenship of each 
respondent is provided and we use these to identify the immigrants 
in the sample. If an individual reports themselves as having been 
born in Ireland and as being an Irish citizen, we code them as being 
a native. If an individual reports that they were born outside of 
Ireland and that they are not Irish citizens, we code them as being 
 
2 As noted above, another topic that has been addressed in the international 
literature is the fiscal impact of immigration – see, for example, Auerbach and 
Oreopoulos (2000).  No studies have looked at this in the Irish context. However, 
the findings of higher labour force participation rates for immigrants (Barrett et al., 
2006) and lower rates of welfare programme participation (Barrett and McCarthy, 
2007) point to a more positive fiscal impact of immigration in Ireland relative to 
elsewhere. 
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immigrants. In addition, we take their reported citizenship to 
describe where they are from.3 It should be borne in mind that the 
immigrants we observe in the sample will have entered Ireland 
through a number of routes. For citizens of the EU, there are no 
restrictions on movement to Ireland and on working there. Other 
admission routes include work permits and family re-unification 
measures. 
 
One weakness of the data that should be noted is that we have 
no information on the length of time that immigrants have been in 
Ireland. For this reason, we are not able to look at wage growth 
over time and to address the issue of whether any immigrant wage 
gap falls as immigrants acquire location-specific human capital. 
There is a longitudinal component in the data in that 44 per cent of 
households that were interviewed in 2005 were also interviewed in 
the 2004 wave of the EU-SILC. Unfortunately, only 31 per cent of 
immigrants were interviewed in both 2004 and 2005. This leaves too 
small a sample for any dynamic analysis to be conducted. Even if 
the sample were larger, one year would probably represent too short 
a time span over which to capture wage convergence. 
 
We now turn to the descriptive statistics. In Table 1, we show 
the age distribution of immigrants in the sample and also that of the 
native population.4 The familiar picture emerges of immigrants 
being relatively younger than the native population, with almost 50 
per cent aged between 20 and 44 years. In Table 2 we show the 
labour force status of the immigrant and native populations and, 
again, some features emerge that have been seen in some of the 
papers discussed above. Immigrants have higher employment and 
participation rates relative to the native population and also a higher 
unemployment rate. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
3 One group that we exclude from the analysis are people who are Irish citizens 
but who were not born here.  
4 We should note that immigrants make up 5 per cent of the sample. This is an 
undercount as Census 2006 showed 10 per cent of the population to be non-
national. A similar degree of under-representation of non-nationals in the 2004 
EU-SILC was found by Barrett and McCarthy 2007. They used the Quarterly 
National Household Survey for 2004, with its much larger sample size, to assess 
whether the under-representation of non-nationals was systematic along any 
observable dimension. No major bias was detected and so the same should hold 
for the 2005 data. 
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Table 1: Age Distribution of the Native and Immigrant Populations 
(%)  
   
Age Group (Years) EU-SILC Irish EU-SILC 
Immigrant 
  0 -14 21.4 16.1 
15-19 7.8 5.6 
20-24 5.8 8.2 
25-34 7.7 21.6 
35-44 12.9  19.4 
45-54 13.8 11.3 
55-59 6.0 4.3 
60-64 5.6 4.4 
65+ 19.0 9.0 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Mean 39.4 35.6 
N 14,199 687 
   
 
Table 2: Work Status Distribution of the Native and Immigrant 
Populations (%) 
   
 
EU-SILC 
Irish 
EU-SILC 
Immigrant 
Full-time Employment 36.5 45.7 
Part-time Employment 11.1 8.6 
Unemployed but Seeking Work 2.5 4.0 
Unemployed but Not Currently Seeking Work 1.2 2.0 
Not Economically Active 48.7 39.7 
Total 100.0 100.0 
Participation Rate 49.0 56.8 
Unemployment Rate 4.9 6.8 
N 1,0912 564 
   
 
In Table 3, we focus on labour force participants and present the 
distribution of educational qualifications for natives and immigrants. 
The high level of educational attainment of Ireland’s immigrants is 
shown again, with over 40 per cent having third level degrees or 
better.  
Table 3: Distribution of Educational Attainment for the Native and 
Immigrant Labour Force (%) 
   
 EU-SILC Irish 
EU-SILC 
Immigrant 
Less than Leaving Certificate 35.7 16.4 
Leaving Certificate and Non-Degree 45.8 40.1 
Third Level Degree and Above 18.4 43.5 
Total 100.0 100.0 
N 5,458 299 
   
 
We now move on to consider the earnings of immigrants relative 
to natives. We use hourly wages as our measure because our main 
interest is in how the human capital of immigrants is valued in the 
labour market rather than in the total resources they command 
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through employment. On average, the data show that native 
workers earn €20 per hour whereas immigrants earn €18. This 
implies an unadjusted wage differential of around 10 per cent. 
However, given the higher education levels of immigrants it is clear 
that the adjusted differential might be higher so we turn to 
regression analysis to investigate this point. 
 
In Table 4, we present a series of regression results. The model 
in each case is the standard Mincer wage equation, where the 
dependent variable is the log of hourly wages and the independent 
variables capture earnings-related characteristics such as education, 
length of labour market experience and gender. We also include 
dummy variables indicating immigrants generally and different 
groups of immigrants. We will briefly discuss the coefficients on the 
other variables before looking more closely at the coefficients on 
the immigrant dummy variables. 
 
The coefficient of the gender variable suggests that men earn 12 
per cent more than women, a result that is in line with other studies 
of the gender wage differential in Ireland. The “years worked” 
variable can be interpreted as saying that earnings rise by 4 per cent 
for each additional year worked. The two variables relating to 
education are dummy variables indicating (a) those with Leaving 
Certificates or equivalent and (b) those with third level degrees. The 
omitted category is “less than Leaving Certificate” and the 
coefficients should be interpreted as the earnings of each group 
relative to those in the omitted category. Hence, we find that people 
with Leaving Certificates earn 30 per cent more than those without 
this qualification while people with third level qualifications earn 82 
per cent more. 
 
Turning to the immigrant dummy variables, the coefficient on 
“immigrant” in Model 1 indicates that immigrants, on average, earn 
15 per cent less than natives controlling for gender, education and 
experience. While this is an interesting finding, Barrett and 
McCarthy (2007) show that the aggregate figure might hide 
differences across different immigrant groups. For this reason, we 
follow Barrett and McCarthy and re-estimate Model 1 looking 
within the group. 
 
In Model 2, we create two immigrant dummy variables – one 
indicating immigrants from English speaking countries and the 
other indicating immigrants from non-English-speaking countries. 
The coefficients on each can be interpreted as showing the earnings 
gap between the two groups and natives. In the case of immigrants 
from English-speaking countries, the point-estimate shows 
immigrants earning less than natives. However, as the estimate is 
not statistically significantly different from zero, we are not finding 
evidence of a difference between the earnings of these immigrants 
and natives. 
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In the case of immigrants from non-English speaking countries, 
the point estimate is statistically significant and indicates that this 
group earns 20 per cent less than comparable natives. In Model 3, 
we look within the immigrants from non-English speaking countries 
and uncover some further differences.5 For immigrants from the 
EU-13 (i.e., the EU-15, prior to May 2004, less Ireland and the UK), 
we do not find an earnings difference relative to natives that is 
statistically different from zero. However, for immigrants from the 
EU-10 (i.e., the 2004 New Member States) and for immigrants from 
non-English speaking countries outside of the EU, the earnings gap 
relative to natives is in the region of 30 per cent. 
Table 4: Wage Regressions (Dependent Variable: Log of Hourly Earnings) 
    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 
 Coef. S. E Coef. S. E Coef. S. E 
Constant 1.88 0.03 1.88 0.03 1.88 0.03 
Immigrant -0.15 0.04     
Immigrant: English 
 Speaking Country 
  -0.09 0.06   
Immigrant: Non-English 
 Speaking Country 
  -0.20 0.05   
Immigrant: Non-English 
 Speaking EU-10 
    -0.32 0.09 
Immigrant: Non-English  
 Speaking EU-13 
    0.06 0.09 
Immigrant: Non-English  
 Speaking Outside EU-25 
    -0.29 0.08 
Gender 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.02 
Years Worked 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 
(Years Worked)2  x 1,000 -0.5 0.06 -0.5 0.06 -0.5 0.06 
Leaving Certificate** 0.30 0.02 0.30 0.02 0.30 0.02 
Third Level** 0.82 0.03 0.82 0.03 0.82 0.03 
N 3,493 3,493 3,411 
            Total Immigrants = 201    English Speaking = 82 
                Non-English Speaking = 119 
 
EU-10 = 38 
EU-13 = 35 
Non-EU25 = 46   
 
 Adj. R2 = 0.29 Adj. R2 = 0.29 Adj. R2 = 0.29 
    
Note: ** Omitted category is Primary Education or Less than Leaving Certificate. 
 
Part of the explanation often given for lower immigrant earnings 
is lower returns on education and labour market experience 
acquired in the home- as opposed to the host- country (see for 
example, Friedberg, 2000). Our data do not include information on 
where these forms of human capital were acquired. However, we 
attempt to provide some insight on this point by following Barrett 
and McCarthy and re-estimating Models 1 and 2 from Table 4 but 
 
5As there appears to be no statistical difference between native employees and 
immigrants from English speaking countries, we drop them from the analysis.  
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this time including interactions between the immigrants dummy 
variables and the education and labour market experience variables. 
If it is the case that immigrants acquired their human capital outside 
of Ireland, then immigrants may experience lower returns to 
education and experience relative to Irish employees when working 
in Ireland. This would be captured by negative and significant 
coefficients on the respective interaction terms. 
 
In Model 1 of Table 5, we look at all immigrants and include a 
third level education/immigrant interaction. We use a two-way 
classification of education at this point (third level versus lower) 
because of small cell sizes. The first point to note is that, relative to 
Model 1 of Table 4, the coefficient on the immigrant dummy 
variable is no longer statistically significant. The education/ 
immigrant coefficient is, however, significant thereby suggesting 
that much of the immigrant wage disadvantage is concentrated 
among third level graduates. In Model 2 of Table 5, we add the 
experience/immigrant interaction but little of substance changes in 
the move from Models 1 and 2. 
 
In Model 3 of Table 5, we focus on the immigrants from non-
English-speaking countries. As with Model 1, the introduction of 
the education/immigrant interaction produces a statistically 
significant coefficient on the interaction itself and a loss in 
significance for the immigrant dummy variable. So again, we appear 
to be finding that the immigrant wage disadvantage is concentrated 
among third level graduates. As with Model 2 of Table 2, the 
addition of the experience/immigrant interaction has little 
substantive impact. The coefficient on the immigrant dummy 
variable does change but remains statistically insignificant as we 
move from Model 3 to 4. 
Table 5: Wage Regressions with Education and Experience Interactions Included 
(Dependent Variable: Log of Hourly Earnings) 
     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. S. E Coef. S. E Coef. S. E Coef. S. E 
Constant 2.09 0.03 2.08 0.03 2.09 0.03 2.08 0.03 
Immigrant -0.07 0.06 0.05 0.08     
Immigrant: Non-English 
    Speaking Country 
     
-0.03 
 
0.08 
 
0.12 
 
0.09 
Gender 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.02 
Years Worked 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 
(Years Worked)2 x 1,000 -0.7 0.06 -0.7 0.06 -0.7 0.06 -0.7 0.06 
Third Level** 0.63 0.02 0.63 0.02 0.63 0.02 0.63 0.02 
Immigrant*Third Level -0.15 0.08 -0.17 0.08 -0.27 0.10 -0.25 0.10 
Immigrant* 
    Years Worked 
   
-0.01 
 
0.00 
   
-0.02 
 
0.00 
N 3,493 3,493 3,411 3,411 
     
 Adj. R2 = 0.26 Adj. R2 = 0.26 Adj. R2 = 0.25 Adj. R2 = 0.26 
     
Note: ** Omitted category is less than third level degree. 
 
At this point, we look to extend the analysis in two directions. 
The first of these extensions is to control for occupations in the 
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wage regressions. As noted in Section 2, Barrett et al. (2006) and 
Barrett and Duffy (2008 forthcoming) have shown that immigrants 
tend to be in lower level occupations given their education levels, 
relative to natives. For this reason, it could be the case that the 
earnings disadvantage of immigrants is partly due to the 
occupational gap, with immigrants earning the same as natives 
within occupational categories.6 We can test for this by adding 
occupations to the regressions and by seeing whether the sign and 
significance of the immigrant dummy variables is altered. The 
results are presented in Tables 6 and 7. 
 
If we compare the coefficients on the immigrant dummy 
variables in Table 6 with those in Table 4, we can see that the  
 
Table 6: Wage Regressions with Occupations Included (Dependent Variable: Log of 
Hourly Earnings) 
    
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3  
 Coef. S. E Coef. S. E Coef. S. E 
Constant 2.00 0.04 2.00 0.04 1.99 0.05 
Immigrant -0.14 0.04     
Immigrant: English Speaking Country   -0.11 0.06   
Immigrant: Non-English Speaking 
  Country 
   
-0.16 
 
0.05 
  
Immigrant: Non-English Speaking EU-10     -0.25 0.09 
Immigrant: Non-English Speaking EU-13     0.07 0.09 
Immigrant: Non-English Speaking 
 Outside EU-25 
     
-0.22 
 
0.08 
Gender 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.02 0.12 0.02 
Years Worked 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 
(Years Worked)2 x 1,000 -0.5 0.06 -0.5 0.06 -0.5 0.06 
Leaving Certificate** 0.20 0.02 0.20 0.02 0.21 0.02 
Third Level** 0.53 0.03 0.53 0.03 0.53 0.03 
Managers and Administrators*** 0.17 0.04 0.17 0.04 0.17 0.04 
Professional*** 0.33 0.04 0.32 0.04 0.33 0.04 
Associate Professional and Technical*** 0.15 0.05 0.14 0.05 0.14 0.05 
Clerical and Secretarial*** -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 -0.02 0.04 
Personal and Protective Service*** -0.09 0.04 -0.09 0.04 -0.09 0.04 
Sales*** -0.19 0.05 -0.19 0.05 -0.18 0.05 
Plant and Machinery Operatives*** -0.10 0.04 -0.10 0.04 -0.09 0.05 
Other (includes not stated) *** -0.12 0.04 -0.12 0.04 -0.11 0.04 
       
N 3,491 3,491 3,409 
    
 Total Immigrants = 201 English Speaking = 82 
 
                Non-English Speaking = 119 
EU-10 = 38 
EU-13 = 35 
Non-EU25 = 46  
    
 Adj. R2 = 0.34 Adj. R2 = 0.34 Adj. R2 = 0.34 
Note:** Omitted category is Primary Education or Less than Leaving Certificate. 
*** Omitted category is Craft and Related. 
 
 
6 If this was found to be the case, the important research question arises as to why 
immigrants are in lower-level occupations, given their human capital, and the 
policy issue is how this might be overcome. 
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inclusion of controls for occupation produces little change and 
certainly no changes that are statistically significant. Looking, for 
example, at Model 2 in both tables, the earnings disadvantage for 
immigrants from non-English speaking countries falls from 20 per 
cent to 16 per cent but a test for a difference between the 
coefficients shows that they are statistically the same. Given that the 
cell sizes are now getting very small as we cut the data more finely, it 
could be that the failure to find an impact from the inclusion of 
occupations is related to the limitations of the data as opposed to 
the actual absence of such an effect. For this reason, we can only 
say that we are not finding an effect; we cannot conclude that lower 
immigrant wages are unrelated to some form of occupational 
segregation. 
 
In Table 7, we add the occupation controls to the regressions 
with the education/immigrant interactions. If we compare the 
immigrant dummy coefficients with those in Table 5 (Models 3 and 
4), we again see a fall in the point estimates. For example, the 
coefficient on the immigrant/third level interaction term in Model 3 
falls from minus 27 per cent to (in Table 5) to minus 19 per cent in 
Table 7. However, these point estimates are not statistically different 
and so the results can only be described as suggestive and not 
conclusive. 
Table 7: Wage Regressions with Occupations and Education/Experience Interactions 
Included (Dependent Variable: Log of Hourly Earnings) 
     
 Model 1 Model 2 Model 3 Model 4 
 Coef. S. E Coef. S. E Coef. S. E Coef. S. E 
Constant 2.14 0.04 2.13 0.04 2.14 0.04 2.13 0.04 
Immigrant -0.08 0.05 0.03 0.08     
Immigrant: Non-English Speaking 
Country 
    -0.03 0.07 0.10 0.09 
   Gender 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 0.13 0.02 
Years Worked 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 0.04 0.00 
(Years Worked)2 x 1,000 -0.5 0.06 -0.5 0.06 -0.5 0.06 -0.5 0.06 
Third Level* 0.37 0.03 0.37 0.03 0.37 0.03 0.38 0.03 
Immigrant* in Third Level -0.09 0.08 -0.10 0.08 -0.19 0.10 -0.17 0.10 
Immigrant* Years Worked   -0.01 0.00   -0.01 0.01 
Managers and Administrators** 0.21 0.04 0.20 0.04 0.21 0.04 0.21 0.04 
Professional ** 0.37 0.04 0.37 0.04 0.37 0.04 0.37 0.04 
Associate Professional and  
   Technical** 
 
0.18 
 
0.05 
 
0.18 
 
0.05 
 
0.18 
 
0.05 
 
0.18 
 
0.05 
Clerical and Secretarial** 0.01 0.04 0.01 0.04 0.02 0.04 0.01 0.04 
Personal and Protective Service** -0.09 0.04 -0.10 0.04 -0.09 0.04 -0.10 0.04 
Sales** -0.20 0.05 -0.20 0.05 -0.19 0.05 -0.20 0.05 
Plant and Machinery Operatives** -0.13 0.05 -0.14 0.05 -0.12 0.05 -0.13 0.05 
Other (includes not stated) ** -0.17 0.04 -0.17 0.04 -0.16 0.04 -0.16 0.04 
     
N 3,491 3,491 3,409 3,409 
     
 Adj. R2 = 0.32 Adj. R2 = 0.32 Adj. R2 = 0.32 Adj. R2 = 0.32 
     
Note: * Omitted category is less than third level degree. 
** Omitted category is Craft and Related. 
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Our next extension moves the analysis beyond the earlier work 
of Barrett and McCarthy and concerns the analysis of immigrant 
earnings by gender. It is well known that a gender pay gap exists in 
Ireland, whereby women earn less than men and we have shown 
above that immigrants earn less than natives. It is of interest to see 
if immigrant women suffer a “double disadvantage”, in the sense of 
experiencing both the gender and immigrant pay gaps. It could be 
the case that our general findings for immigrants above are 
disguising even worse outcomes for immigrant men relative to 
natives and more favourable outcomes for female immigrants (or 
vice versa). It could also be the case that immigrant women suffer a 
disadvantage beyond those of being female and immigrant, if the 
combined characteristics of female and immigrant lead to a wage 
disadvantage that is over and above the “double disadvantage” just 
outlined. This issue has been addressed for Canada (Beach and 
Worswisck, 1993) and for the US (Duleep and Dowhan, 2002) but 
not for Ireland. 
 
In order to see why a double disadvantage (or worse) might 
apply, it is useful to think in terms of the family migration model 
proposed by Mincer (1978). It is often the case that the migration 
decisions of women are closely linked with those of male partners. 
Although the family’s migration may be income maximising, this 
could arise if the income gain to the male partner exceeds an 
income loss for the female partner. Hence, female immigrants may 
find themselves in unfavourable labour market situations and this 
could be reflected in the double disadvantage phenomenon.7
  
In exploring this issue, we divided the sample into male and 
female sub-samples. We then selected employees and re-ran the 
regressions in Table 4 above. Splitting the sample in this way and 
focusing on employees leads to small cell sizes and our female-
focused analysis is based on 95 immigrants, 65 of whom are from 
non-English speaking countries. In spite of the small sample, we do 
find results that are statistically significant.8  
 
Within the female group, a finding of a negative and significant 
coefficient on the immigrant dummy would point to the existence 
of a double disadvantage. In Table 8, we see that this is indeed the 
case. Immigrant women earn 14 per cent less than native women. 
As women earn about 12 per cent less than men (according to Table 
4), the double disadvantage is clear. While our findings here imply 
that immigrant women suffer in wage terms from being both female 
 
7 Another possible explanation for a double disadvantage would be the existence 
of discrimination on the grounds of both gender and immigrant status. Similarly, 
occupational segregation along both gender and migrant dimensions could be 
present.  
8 It should be noted that we are only looking at the earnings of employees here. As 
we are not trying to control for selection effects, we are not saying anything about 
the potential earnings of immigrants who are unemployed or non-participants.  
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and immigrants, we are not finding evidence of an additional wage 
disadvantage from the combined impact of these two factors. If 
there was a specific immigrant/female interaction effect, the 
immigrant coefficient in the female regression would be significantly 
different from the corresponding coefficient in the male regression 
but this is not the case.  
 
From Table 8, we can also see that the pattern of relative 
outcomes between immigrants and natives shows similarities across 
the genders, with no significant earnings penalty for immigrants 
from English speaking countries or from the EU-13. The earnings 
disadvantages are concentrated among the immigrants from the 
EU-10 and those from outside of the EU. The point estimates 
suggest some difference across the genders with respect to the 
relative size of the wage disadvantages between these two national 
groupings, with immigrants from the EU-10 having the largest wage 
disadvantage among women but immigrants from outside of the 
EU having the largest disadvantage among men. Within each gender 
group, the coefficients on the EU-10 and non-EU immigrant 
dummy variables are not statistically different from each other so 
nothing definitive can be read into that pattern.  
 
We found earlier that for immigrants as a group, the earnings 
disadvantage was particularly evident for immigrants with third level 
qualifications. Table 8 suggests that this effect is actually much more 
a feature of the female immigrant experience relative to that of male 
immigrants. For women, the immigrant/education interaction term 
is negative and significant but this is not the case for men. It is also 
substantial in quantitative terms for women, at minus 38 per cent. 
This suggests that there exist particular difficulties for immigrant 
women in having qualifications either recognised and/or rewarded. 
Table 8: Coefficients for Male and Female Immigrants 
   
 Males Females 
 Coef. S. E Coef. S. E 
Full sample     
All immigrants -0.15 0.04 -0.14 0.05 
     
 
Breaking the full sample of immigrants into those from English-speaking and 
non-English speaking countries 
 
English speaking countries -0.12 0.08 -0.03 0.09 
Non-English speaking countries -0.19 0.08 -0.20 0.07 
     
 
Further sub-dividing the sample of immigrants from non-English speaking 
countries 
 
EU-10 -0.24 0.11 -0.42 0.14 
EU-13 0.23 0.14 -0.08 0.12 
Outside of EU -0.43 0.14 -0.18 0.10 
     
 
Results for immigrants from non-English speaking countries when the 
education/immigrant interaction is added 
 
Immigrant -0.09 0.10 0.04 0.11 
Immigrant *Third level -0.17 0.15 -0.38 0.14 
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This finding is interesting in itself but it is particularly interesting 
in the context of an identical finding from Canada. Beach and 
Worswick (1993) ran similar Mincer-type wage equations on 
Canadian data, comparing native-born and foreign-born women. As 
they point out “… the double-negative effect on earnings does not 
appear to hold across the board for all immigrant women, but is 
quite marked for highly-educated women” (p. 38). They estimate 
that a foreign-born woman with a post-graduate degree earns 
between 9 and 7 per cent less than a comparable Canadian-born 
woman and suggest that this finding is related to either problems 
surrounding the recognition of foreign credentials or discrimination 
against immigrant women in accessing higher-level jobs. 
 
 One first purpose in this paper was to review the literature on the 
economics of immigration in Ireland. The review showed how 
immigrants have been found to experience labour market 
disadvantage relative to natives both in terms of occupational 
attainment and earnings. Based on the international literature, this is 
unsurprising, as immigrants typically fare less well than natives, 
especially in the earlier period of their migratory experience, before 
they have acquired “location-specific human capital”. The one piece 
of work that has looked at immigrants by year of arrival is Barrett 
and Duffy (2008 forthcoming) but they do not find evidence of 
integration. Other findings from the emerging literature of the 
economics of immigration in Ireland include positive impacts on 
GNP, partly achieved through a dampening in wage pressures. The 
earlier papers saw this dampening effect at the upper end of the 
labour market, as a result of high-skilled immigration. However, a 
more recent study has taken account of the lower occupational 
attainment of immigrants and has suggested that the wage impact of 
immigrants may have been more broadly spread. 
4. 
Conclusions 
 
While a collection of papers is being built up on immigrants’ 
characteristics, experiences and impacts, the volume of papers is still 
small. For this reason, another purpose of the paper was to update 
the only previous analysis of the earnings of immigrants in Ireland 
that was based on a nationally representative sample, using data 
from 2005. In broad terms, the findings confirm those of the earlier 
paper. Using average hourly earnings as our measure of labour 
market outcomes, immigrants were found to earn 15 per cent less 
on average than natives. Although the corresponding figure from 
the 2004 data was higher at 18 per cent (Barrett and McCarthy, 
2007), the estimates are statistically identical. As with the earlier 
analysis, the earnings disadvantage applies only to immigrants from 
non-English speaking countries, with immigrants from the 
accession countries of the EU earning over 30 per cent less than 
comparable native employees. 
 
A third objective in the paper was to develop the analysis 
beyond that undertaken by Barrett and McCarthy. The analysis 
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along gender lines showed immigrant men and immigrant women 
experiencing similar degrees and similar patterns of wage 
disadvantage relative to native men and native women respectively. 
Given the earnings disadvantage of native women relative to native 
men, this implies a double disadvantage for immigrant women. 
However, we did not find an additional wage disadvantage for 
immigrant women over this double disadvantage that could have 
resulted from the interaction of gender and immigrant 
characteristics.  
 
Our analysis has confirmed many of the results from Barrett and 
McCarthy (2007). However, given discrepancies between some of 
the results here and those from the 2004 analysis (see the Appendix 
below), there is an on-going need to add to the stock of 
observations on the immigrant wage gap in Ireland, preferably using 
different datasets with significantly higher numbers of immigrants. 
Hopefully, further analysis will help us to define more clearly the 
precise nature of the immigrant wage disadvantage and to establish, 
for example, if the finding here that the wage disadvantage is 
concentrated among the better educated immigrants is correct. It 
would also be helpful to know whether the immigrant wage 
disadvantage reduces for immigrants who spend longer in Ireland.  
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APPENDIX 
In Table A1, we present the results from the 2004 data (from 
Barrett and McCarthy, 2007) and from the 2005 data. As noted 
above, 31 per cent of the immigrants in the 2005 sample also 
appeared in the 2004 sample so there is some overlap. However, as 
the sample is almost 70 per cent new, we are using a substantially 
different sample and so are providing a substantially new 
observation of immigrant earnings. 
 
In general, the pattern of results is similar so our analysis broadly 
confirms the results of Barrett and McCarthy (2007). The overall 
immigrant wage disadvantage was estimated to be 18 per cent based 
on the 2004 data; based on the 2005 data, it is estimated to be 15 
per cent although there is no statistical difference between these 
estimates. In the 2005 data, we again find that the earnings 
disadvantage relates to immigrants from non-English speaking 
countries and, in particular, to immigrants from the EU’s New 
Member States. While the point estimates from the 2004 data were 
higher, the 2005 estimates are statistically the same.  
 
There are two differences between the 2004 and 2005 results. 
First, in 2004 immigrants from the EU-13 were found to have a 
wage disadvantage relative to natives but this is not the case in the 
2005 data. The 2005 finding is more in line with Barrett and Duffy’s 
(2007) findings on occupational attainment and so, on that basis at 
least, is more believable. We do not have an explanation for why the 
2004 and 2005 samples lead to different results for this group but it 
should be recalled that the results here are based on 35 individuals 
while the 2004 result was based on 27. Such small cell sizes were 
one of our motivations for undertaking this updated analysis and 
the discrepancy here shows that this component of the 2004 
analysis was not robust. Hence, further analyses will be needed as 
newer, larger-scale datasets become available with larger samples of 
immigrants. 
 
The second difference between the 2004 and 2005 results 
concerns the immigrant/education interaction term and its impact 
on the immigrant dummy variable. Looking specifically at 
immigrants from non-English speaking countries, the addition of 
the (non-significant) third-level/immigrant interaction in the 2004 
case left the immigrant dummy itself statistically different from zero. 
However, in the 2005 case, the interaction term is significantly 
different from zero and its inclusion led to the immigrant dummy 
becoming insignificant.9 This means that the 2005 data was showing 
more evidence of the wage penalty for immigrants from non-
English speaking countries being concentrated among third level 
graduates. As Table 8 reveals, this effect seems to be particularly 
concentrated among female immigrants. The comments just made 
about small cell sizes and the robustness of the 2004 analysis apply 
here also. 
Table A1: Comparing the Coefficients of the Immigrant Dummy Variables from the 
2004 and 2005 Datasets 
   
 2004 2005 
 Coef. S. E Coef. S. E 
Full sample     
All immigrants -0.18 0.04 -0.15 0.04 
     
Breaking the full sample of immigrants into those from English-speaking and non-English speaking 
countries 
 
English speaking countries -0.03 0.06 -0.09 0.06 
Non-English speaking countries -0.31 0.06 -0.20 0.05 
     
Further sub-dividing the sample of immigrants from non-English speaking countries 
 
EU-10 -0.45 0.12 -0.32 0.09 
EU-13 -0.27 0.11 0.06 0.09 
Outside of EU -0.27 0.08 -0.29 0.08 
     
Results for immigrants from non-English speaking countries when the education/immigrant 
interaction is added 
 
Immigrant -0.26 0.08 -0.03 0.08 
Immigrant *Third level -0.13 0.12 -0.27 0.12 
     
 
 
9 The 2004 and 2005 immigrant coefficients in the second last row of Table A1 are 
statistically different, although the final rows are not. 
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HUB AIRPORT SLOTS, 
MARKET EXIT AND 
IRISH REGIONAL 
ECONOMIC 
DEVELOPMENT 
Sean D. Barrett*
 From January 14 2008 slots previously used on the Shannon-
Heathrow air service by Aer Lingus will be transferred to the 
Belfast-Heathrow route. The case for the transfer is that it will 
increase the profitability of the airline. The case against the transfer 
is that it will undermine the economy of the Atlantic coast region of 
Ireland and that the government should intervene to prevent market 
exit by Aer Lingus from the Heathrow-Shannon route. This paper 
examines the economic issues involved in slot allocation in a 
deregulated aviation market with freedom of market entry and exit. 
Section 2 deals with airport slots and property rights. Sections 3 and 
4 deal with the impacts of airline and airport competition on traffic 
distribution in the London area and in the Atlantic region of Ireland 
respectively. Section 5 examines eight market alternatives to the 
Shannon-Heathrow service. Section 6 examines arguments for 
government intervention to secure Shannon-Heathrow services on 
the grounds of business promotion, tourism promotion, regional 
development and the use of a national airline as an instrument of 
economic policy. Section 7 deals with the prospect of further 
Heathrow slot transfers. Section 8 contains a summary and 
conclusions. 
1. 
Introduction 
 
 
 
* Author’s contact address sbarrett@tcd.ie. The author would like to thank, with 
the usual disclaimer, an anonymous referee and editors for their helpful comments. 
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 Airport slots or units of capacity at capacity-constrained airports 
are allocated to airlines in order of seniority that is according to an 
airline’s grandfather rights at the airport. The de facto vesting of slot 
property rights at airports in airlines rather than in airport 
management or in an independent regulator is based on the historic 
allocation of functions at airports. Airport management were 
responsible for the construction and maintenance of infrastructure 
and, encouraged by the duty free system, developed significant 
retailing at airports.  
2. 
Airport Slots 
and Property 
Rights 
 
The management of the allocation of the capacity of airports 
became a function of the airlines with precedence in order of 
seniority. The property rights of grandfather airlines at slot 
constrained airports contrast with normal markets in which the 
customers purchase goods and services from producers rather than 
from other customers. However, the property rights of grandfather 
airlines are by now embedded and are likely to remain so. Doganis 
(2006) states that “…attempts to open up the system of slot 
allocation by abandoning the grandfather rules are unlikely to be any 
more successful in generating real competition than they have been 
in the past. Nevertheless, the European Commission, in a 
controversial staff working document released in September 2004, 
put forward a number of proposals including secondary slot trading, 
slot auctions, and progressive returns of grandfathered slots. It is 
difficult to see how far these proposals will go but the problem 
remains. How to ensure greater competition when slots are in short 
supply will be a key issue for regulators and a key challenge for 
airlines wishing to expand at hubs other than their own.” 
 
Since deregulation in Europe new entrant airlines have 
concentrated on developing routes at the many underused airports 
in the region. They thus avoid slot purchase at hubs, the high costs 
of legacy airports from the era of noncompeting airlines and the 
congestion costs of slot constrained hubs (Barrett, 2002). The new 
entrant airlines have also redefined the airport product to meet the 
requirements of low cost airlines operating point-to-point services 
rather than interlining at hubs. They do not require expensive 
terminals, business class lounges, or airbridges (Barrett 2004). 
Passengers responded favourably to less congested small airports 
with benefits such as lower fares, less walking and waiting times, 
fewer lost bags, cheaper car parks, better punctuality and less time 
spent in aircraft stacking over congested airports. Less congested 
new airports facilitated quicker turnaround times of 25 minutes 
compared to as much as 75 minutes at congested hubs. Aircraft 
serving uncongested airports fly more trips per day per aircraft than 
at hubs.  
 
Airlines holding slots at hub airports find the price of slots rising 
due to increased demand while supply is constrained usually due to 
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environmental and planning objections to expansion proposals. 
Davy (2006a) noted sales of Heathrow slots at €15 million per pair 
in 2006 and estimated the value of slots held by Aer Lingus at 
Heathrow to be €306 million for the twenty-one pairs of slots it 
held there. In addition, British Midland allocates seven Heathrow 
slots to its Dublin route. The Republic of Ireland slots at Heathrow 
thus have a combined value of some €400 million. The price of a 
slot depends on the time of day to which it applies and the number 
of airlines seeking to acquire slots. The price of Heathrow slots is 
likely to rise in 2008 as airlines seek to open new routes in response 
to the market opportunities arising from the EU/USA open skies 
agreement. 
 
Airport slot prices indicate the opportunity cost facing an airline 
in deciding to either sell, retain, or reallocate slots at a slot 
constrained airport. The Heathrow experience has been that the 
slots have been transferred from short-haul to long haul routes both 
by sale between airlines, and by management decision for transfers 
within airlines. There have been no purchases of Heathrow slots by 
low cost airlines. The two largest low cost airlines serving the 
United Kingdom, Ryanair and easyJet, had a combined total of 65 
million passengers in 2006. This is double the number carried by 
British Airways which has the most slots at Heathrow but neither 
Ryanair or easyJet has sought to purchase Heathrow slots. Charter 
airlines, the traditional low cost sector before deregulation, carry the 
same number of passengers as British Airways but have not 
purchased Heathrow slots. Ryanair, easyJet, or charter airlines could 
acquire either the Aer Lingus or the same number of slots from 
other incumbents’ slots at Heathrow for €304 million according to 
the Davy estimate of slot prices. In addition to this outlay there 
would be extra costs in landing charges, delays and longer 
turnaround times at Heathrow. The investment and output policies 
of the low cost airlines have avoided the Heathrow investment 
choices and concentrated on other airports. A Ryanair statement in 
November 2007 criticised easyJet as “…just another high fares 
airline” and claiming that “…all easyJet have left to do is to start 
levying fuel surcharges and move to Heathrow.” 
 
 In a deregulated aviation market, such as Ireland-United Kingdom 
since 1986, the ability of slot constrained airports such as Heathrow 
to command a premium fare per passenger on short-haul routes has 
been reduced by the growth of both airline and airport competition 
and significant changes in the unbundled deregulated aviation 
product. 
3. 
The Impact of 
Airline and 
Airport 
Deregulation 
on the Ireland- 
London 
Market 
 
Before deregulation route development outside slot constrained 
airports typically required the airline developing the new route to 
give up capacity at hub airports in order to remain within overall 
market sharing arrangements between the designated national 
airlines of each state. The deregulated market on the other hand 
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allowed the development of new routes by new entrant airlines 
serving new airports. 
 
The pre-deregulation unrestricted return fare between Shannon 
and Heathrow in 1985 of Ir£240 (€305), is equal to €575 at 2007 
prices. Yield revenue per passenger per route by airline is not 
published and is a closely guarded commercial secret by airlines. 
However, yield data per passenger over the entire networks of 
airlines are published. Goodbody estimate that the 2007 one-way 
fare per short haul passenger on Aer Lingus was €72.80 and on 
Ryanair it was €46.50. The current Aer Lingus network yield per 
passenger is 26 per cent of the pre-deregulation unrestricted fare on 
Shannon-Heathrow while the Ryanair fare is 16 per cent. This 
indicates the impact of deregulation on price in European aviation.  
The airport charges per passenger are €15 on Aer Lingus and €8.1 
on Ryanair in 2007. The average Aer Lingus airport charge is 85 per 
cent more than the average Ryanair airport charge indicating a 
significant degree of passenger savings from competition between 
airports. 
 
The deregulated market unbundled the traditional airline product 
for both airlines and airports. No frills service replaced full service 
airlines between Ireland and the United Kingdom with the 
exception of the City jet service from Dublin to London City which 
has only a 1 per cent market share of the Ireland/United Kingdom 
market of over 12 million passengers. CityJet’s business model in 
1997 emphasised food, champagne, leather seats and passenger 
comfort on their London City-Paris service in conjunction with Air 
France. “They were happy with our performance on the 
Paris/London City service, which was now, next to Concorde, 
producing the highest passenger revenue per kilometre yield in the 
entire Air France global network. It was all business class and 
passengers were paying Stg£330 per return journey for their fifty-
five minute experience” (Byrne, 2004).  
 
Passengers on routes between Ireland and the United Kingdom 
overwhelmingly chose the lowcost airline model. British Airways 
exited the Ireland market rather than adapt the low-cost model and 
transferred its Heathrow slots to other routes. Both Aer Lingus and 
British Midland adopted the no frills model. The Aer Lingus Initial 
Public Offering Prospectus (2006) described the airline as “low-cost 
low-fares” operating a single economy class service on its short-haul 
network “ and a “two-class service on its long haul network.” The 
product was low-cost single fares with seat reservation. Food 
service is sold separately rather than bundled in high fares. The 
prospectus in part 3 examined sixteen risk factors relating to the 
airline industry and twenty-five relating to Aer Lingus but a scenario 
that the previous first class, business class or premium class would 
again command a premium fare in a deregulated market was not 
included.  Weldon (2002) notes the commitment of Aer Lingus 
“…to making over three million cheap seats available in the Irish 
66 
market in 2002 at prices up to 60 per cent lower than in the 
previous year.” 
 
The 99 per cent share of low-cost airlines between Ireland and 
the United Kingdom, with only 1 per cent for CityJet’s full service 
model, considerably exceeds the low cost share of 30.8 per cent for 
18 European countries in February 2006 for intra-Europe traffic 
(Davy, 2006b). The opening of competition between Dublin and 
London in 1986 makes the Ireland-United Kingdom market the 
most mature deregulated market in Europe. It is also the market 
with the highest preference for low-cost airlines and airports. Table 
1 shows the numbers of Shannon passengers that have availed of 
the new airport choices in the London area since deregulation and 
that the Heathrow monopoly on Shannon-London in 1995 fell to a 
38 per cent market share in 2006. Passenger numbers between 
Shannon and London increased by 521,000 between 1996 and 2006 
but fell by 12,000 between Shannon and Heathrow, a decline of 4 
per cent in a market which grew by 156 per cent.  
Table 1:  Shannon-London Air Passenger Numbers (000s) 
      
Route  2006 2005 2000 1995 1990 
Heathrow 323 338 304 335 311 
Stansted   290 305 234 - - 
Gatwick 160 154 123 - - 
Luton 83 65 - - 27 
Total 856 862 661 335 338 
Heathrow share % 38 39 46 100 92 
      
Source: Civil Aviation Authority, International Air Passenger Traffic Series. 
 
In addition to lower fares and increased numbers of flights 
airport competition in the London area brings benefits such as 
reduced surface journey access times to local airports. The perceived 
isolation of the new entrant airports was reduced by the 
development of car hire services and cheaper car parks, and 
improved public transport links. In addition, the more widely 
dispersed pattern of distribution of economic activity in the modern 
economy makes Stansted, Gatwick and Luton the preferred choice 
of London airports for 533,000 Shannon passengers or 62 per cent 
of that market.  
 
The Shannon-London case of airport competition includes 
competition at both ends of the route. Heathrow was the sole 
airport served in the London area before deregulation with only 
Shannon and Cork providing the service in the entire Irish Atlantic 
coast region. Section 4 examines the impact of deregulation on 
aviation in the Irish Atlantic region.  
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Since deregulation alternatives to Heathrow are available at 
Stansted, Gatwick, and Luton as shown in Section 3 above. In the 
Irish Atlantic region five new entrant airports since deregulation 
compete with Cork and Shannon, the dominant airports before 
deregulation. These are at Derry, Knock, Galway, Kerry, and 
Waterford, each with direct services to London. In addition two 
other new entrant airports, at Donegal and Sligo offer service to 
London over Dublin.  
4. 
The Impact of 
Deregulation 
on Airlines and 
Airports in the 
Irish Atlantic 
Region  
Table 2 shows the growth in air travel between the Atlantic 
region and London. This market has increased from 995,000 in 
1990 to 2.682 million in 2006. The growth in the market since 
deregulation is dominated by new entrant airlines and airports. Of 
the increase of 1.687 million passengers 94 per cent is accounted for 
by three major developments.  
 
(i) The new Irish airports at Derry, Knock, Galway, Kerry 
and Waterford added 554,000 London passengers. 
(ii) Services from Cork to London airports other than 
Heathrow added 526,000 passengers. 
(iii) Services from Shannon to London airports other than 
Heathrow added 506,000 passengers. 
Table 2: Atlantic Region (Ireland) Air Travel to London, 1990-2006 
    
 2006 2005 1990 
Shannon- Heathrow 323 338 311 
Shannon-Other London 533 524 27 
Cork-Heathrow 426 434 337 
Cork-Other London 614 616 88 
Knock-London 356 282 88 
Derry-London 153 106 n.a. 
Kerry-London 149 148 48 
Galway-London 65 60 56 
Waterford-London 63 55 40 
Total 2,682 2,563 995 
    
Shannon-Heathrow share % 12.0 13.2 31.1 
Shannon-Other London share % 19.9 20.4 2.7 
Cork share % 38.8 41.0 42.7 
Knock share % 13.3 11.0 8.8 
Derry share % 5.7 4.1 n.a. 
Kerry share% 5.6 5.8 4.8 
Galway share % 2.4 2.3 5.6 
Waterford share % 2.3 2.1 4.0 
New Airports share % * 29.3 25.3 23.2 
    
* Combined share of Knock, Derry, Kerry, Galway and Waterford. 
Source: Civil Aviation Authority, International Air Passenger Traffic Series. City of 
Derry Airport. 
 
By contrast only 12,000 or 0.7 per cent of the increase in 
passengers was on the Shannon-Heathrow route. The share of 
Shannon-Heathrow in the Atlantic Region traffic to London fell 
from 31.1 per cent in 1990 to 12.0 per cent in 2006. Table 3 shows 
the decline of the Shannon-Heathrow route in the total aviation 
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market between the Republic of Ireland and the United Kingdom 
from 7 per cent in 1990 to 2.6 per cent in 2006. 
Table 3: Passenger Numbers on Shannon-Heathrow and Ireland-
United Kingdom Routes, 1990-2006 (000s) 
   
 2006 1990 
Shannon-Heathrow 323 311 
Ireland-United Kingdom 12,356 4,429 
Shannon-Heathrow Share % 2.6 7.0 
Civil Aviation Authority, op. cit   
   
 
Table 4 shows the routes served from airports in the Atlantic 
region in summer 2007. The routes served directly from Shannon 
and Cork have increased to 47 and 40 respectively since Aer Lingus 
chose Cork and Ryanair chose Shannon as bases The new regional 
airports have developed 61 routes giving a total of 148 routes from 
the Atlantic region’s nine airports in the summer of 2007. This 
compares with 150 routes at Dublin Airport. Each direct route 
offers a lower cost quicker journey than the previous routing of 
passengers through a hub such as Heathrow. This development of 
some 300 air routes gives more direct access to final destinations 
than a system based on feeder routes to hubs such as Heathrow.  
Passengers using the new local airports in Ireland save time and 
other journey costs to Dublin, Cork and Shannon which were the 
only international airports prior to deregulation. Airline deregulation 
in Ireland thus replicates the success of the precedent set by US 
airline deregulation some eight years previously. “The consumer 
benefits have taken the form not only of huge monetary savings but 
also more convenient access to a greater number of origins and 
destinations.” (Kahn, 2005.) 
Table 4: Number of Routes Served from Irish Atlantic Region 
Airports, Summer 2007 
  
Shannon 47 
Cork 40 
Knock 18 
Galway 16 
Derry 12 
Kerry 6 
Waterford 5 
Donegal 2 
Sligo 2 
Total 148 
  
Source: Airport websites. 
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The Aer Lingus decision to leave the Shannon-Heathrow route 
opens up a market of 323,000 extra passengers for other airlines and 
other airports in the region. The market adjustment is relatively easy 
since the share of Shannon-Heathrow in total traffic from the 
Atlantic region has fallen to 12 per cent in 2006, as shown in Table 
2. 
5. 
Market 
Alternatives 
Following 
Shannon-
Heathrow 
Market Exit 
  
The market alternatives include:- 
 
(a) Increased services by Ryanair on its London services from 
Shannon. These were announced within days of the Aer 
Lingus withdrawal announcement “…in order to ensure 
Shannon Airport’s capacity and traffic does not fall as a 
result of the Aer Lingus closure”. The increased services 
announced by Ryanair are a fourth daily service to Stansted, 
a second daily service to Gatwick and a daily service to 
Luton. The seven daily departures on these services from 
Shannon to London are at 06.30, 10.35, 12.25, 13.05, 16.20, 
19.50 and 20.00. The Aer Lingus departure times are shown 
in Table 5, column 1. 
 
 The development of the Shannon-Gatwick route offers 
new options to passengers who used Heathrow as a hub. The 
Shannon-Gatwick route in 2006 provided connections to US 
Points not served from Heathrow such as Atlanta, Charlotte, 
Dallas/Forth Worth, Minneapolis/St Paul, Las Vegas and 
Orlando, with a total of 2.2 million passengers. In addition 
Gatwick offers connections to points also served from 
Heathrow such as Detroit, Newark, and Philadelphia with 38 
per cent of the 1.7 million passengers on these routes using 
Gatwick and 62 per cent using Heathrow. Gatwick’s 
connecting airports in the Irish Atlantic region are Shannon, 
Cork and Knock. Gatwick in 2006 had 84 daily long- 
distance departures (Civil Aviation Authority, 2007). 
 
(b) Increased services by Ryanair on direct services from 
Shannon. In addition to the Luton service at (a) above the 
new Shannon routes announced on November 7, 2007 were 
Birmingham, Fuerteventura, Kaunas, Leeds-Bradford, Riga, 
Tenerife and Dublin. Suspended services from Shannon to 
Madrid and Rome might be reopened to attract passengers 
now routed over Shannon-Heathrow.    
 
(c) Increased service on routes from Cork, Kerry, Galway and 
Knock to London. The new route from Kerry to Luton will 
seek to serve some of the area’s passengers who previously 
used the Shannon-Heathrow route. 
 
(d) Transfer of Heathrow “captive” traffic from Shannon to the 
Cork-Heathrow route. Shannon and Cork are eighty miles 
apart. Passengers located between Cork and Limerick face 
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marginal increases in travel times to Cork should they wish to 
retain access to Heathrow. All of the Shannon flights have 
parallel flight times from Cork as shown in Table 5 so that 
little disruption of travel schedules is required. In addition 
Cork has an extra flight at 14.40. 
Table 5: Departure Times from Shannon and Cork to London, 
Autumn 2007 
  
Shannon Cork 
08.45 07.30 
12.55 12.10 
17.15 16.15 
21.30 20.20 
 14.40  
(no matching Shannon service) 
  
Source: Aer Lingus timetable, October 2007. 
 
(e) Transfer of some Heathrow captive traffic through Dublin. 
The high frequency Cork-Dublin service by Ryanair and Aer 
Arann, with twelve services per day, has increased from 
238,000 passengers in 2005, to 400,000 in 2006 and the 
monthly increase in June 2007 was 25.3 per cent over June 
2006, indicating an estimated 600,000 passengers in 2007.  
 
  The Shannon-Dublin service which commenced in 
November 2007, if it replicates the success of the Cork-
Dublin route, will give the Shannon region a faster 
connectivity to the Dublin hub of 150 routes than 
experienced now by many passengers based in Dublin itself. 
 
(f) Transfer of Shannon’s 80,000 connecting passengers at 
Heathrow to Frankfurt, Paris and Amsterdam. The Shannon-
Paris service by CityJet, commencing in February 2008, will 
be the first market test of these options. Table 6 shows 
passenger numbers at these hubs. Paris has almost 80 per 
cent of the Heathrow passenger numbers while Frankfurt 
and Amsterdam have respectively 77 per cent and 65 per cent 
of the Heathrow passenger numbers. These airports, unlike 
Heathrow, are designed as hubs. The business model chosen 
by the hub airlines at Paris, Frankfurt and Amsterdam has 
been to feed short haul passengers to their own long haul 
services. The Civil Aviation Authority (2007) noted that 
KLM feeds its Amsterdam hub with nearly 50 flights a day 
from twelve regional UK airports with Air France linking six 
UK airports to its Paris hub and Lufthansa operating 
eighteen flights a day to Frankfurt, Munich, and Hamburg 
from UK regional airports. The problem for Shannon-
Heathrow connecting passengers is that long haul airlines at 
Heathrow have not adopted the Paris/Frankfort/Amsterdam 
feeder model. The Heathrow long haul airlines are unwilling 
to rebalance the Aer Lingus share of the through ticket price. 
Aer Lingus no longer wishes to perform this role because of 
71 
its low yields from feeder passengers and withdrew from the 
One World Alliance in May 2007. 
 
   It is also possible that the interline point for Irish traffic 
to the Middle East, Asia and Australasia will be further east 
than Heathrow, Paris, Frankfurt or Amsterdam. The Civil 
Aviation Authority (2007) notes that “…an interesting 
development has been Emirates’ expansion into the UK 
regions from its Dubai hub. It started a Birmingham service 
in 2001, having gradually built up its Heathrow, Gatwick, and 
Manchester services during the 1990s. By 2004 both 
Birmingham and Manchester were twice-daily, the same year 
that a new Glasgow service began.”  Newcastle was added in 
September 2007 and Emirates serves 88 destinations in 59 
countries. 
Table 6: Passenger Numbers at Major Hub Airports in 
Western Europe, 2005  
  
 Passengers (m) 
Heathrow   67.9 
Paris CDG 53.6 
Frankfurt   52.2 
Amsterdam 44.2 
  
Source: Davy (2006a). 
 
(g) Transfer of Shannon’s connecting North America traffic at 
Heathrow to direct services from Shannon under the 
EU/USA Open Skies regime from 2008. Many new routes 
are planned under this liberalisation. For example, Shannon 
passengers currently interlining at Heathrow might, after the 
open skies agreement, interline at Atlanta, Chicago or Dallas. 
Shannon offers advantages such as being the first European 
airport on the main transatlantic routes, lack of congestion, 
and connectivity to the Ryanair hub for onward destinations 
on 31 routes, including 8 launched in November 2007. The 
nine biggest US routes from Heathrow in 2006 were New 
York, Chicago, Los Angeles, Washington, San Francisco, 
Boston, Miami, and Philadelphia with a total of 4.3 million 
passengers. All of these US points, plus Atlanta, are 
scheduled to have direct service from Ireland under Open 
Skies. 
 
(h) It is open for any EU airline to replace Aer Lingus on the 
Shannon-Heathrow route by acquiring slots to commence 
operations there. The extra costs involved at Heathrow over 
starting other routes and the overwhelming preference of the 
deregulated market for low-cost airlines and airports make 
this alternative an unlikely one. Indeed many supporters of 
the Shannon-Heathrow service seek government intervention 
to compel Aer Lingus to operate the service. This option is 
examined in Section 6 below. 
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 The theory of contestable markets, which underpins the policy of 
deregulation, is based on freedom of entry and exit (Baumol, 1981). 
On market entry the theory of contestable markets “…merely 
reinforces the view that a barrier to entry must start off with a heavy 
presumption against its adoption.” The removal of entry barriers in 
aviation has had a more dramatic impact in Ireland than in any 
other EU country or in the USA after deregulation in 1978.  
6. 
 Economic 
Aspects of 
Seeking 
Government 
Intervention in 
the Shannon-
Heathrow Slots 
Issue 
 
In 1985/6, the last year before deregulation in May 1986, the 
protected airline, Aer Lingus, carried 2.3 million passengers. In 2007 
four Irish international scheduled airlines, Ryanair, Aer Lingus, 
CityJet and Aer Arann, will carry over 60 million passengers. 
Sections 3 and 4 above showed how, since deregulation, fares have 
fallen, services have increased and new airports in the Atlantic 
region of Ireland have commenced services. Nostalgia for a return 
to an era when the Government might have ordered Aer Lingus to 
serve routes against its commercial judgement ignores the large 
gains from deregulation in 1986. The Atlantic region in Ireland has 
been a particular beneficiary of airline and airport competition, 
including much enhanced services to the London region. 
 
On the removal of exit barriers in a deregulated market Baumol 
states that “…perhaps a bit newer is the emphasis on the 
importance of freedom of exit which is as crucial a requirement of 
contestability as is freedom of entry. Thus we must reject as 
perverse the propensity of regulators to resist the closing down of 
unprofitable lines of activity.”  
 
The removal of exit barriers has been important in the growth of 
aviation in Ireland such as the market exit of British Airways from 
the Republic, and the exits of Aer Lingus from Kerry, Galway, 
Waterford, Knock, and Sligo and from the Dublin-Cork route. New 
entrants such as Aer Arann and Ryanair developed these routes 
after the British Airways and Aer Lingus market exits. 
 
In Section 5 above eight market responses to the Heathrow-
Shannon route cessation were examined. Some were announced 
within days of the Aer Lingus withdrawal statement and are already 
in operation with the objective of ensuring no loss of traffic on the 
London routes. In addition, eight new routes from Shannon were 
launched in November and show initial positive market reactions. 
Market entry and exit and market efficiency rather than market 
failure characterise Irish aviation. Nonetheless, there have been 
regional and political reasons advanced in the case for government 
intervention in this case. 
 
Four main reasons have been advanced for government 
intervention to retain the Shannon-Heathrow services. These are the 
promotion of business, tourism and regional development in the 
Atlantic region and the wider benefit of political intervention to 
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compel Aer Lingus to comply with government orders to operate 
services in a restoration of the pre-deregulation “national airline” 
model. These reasons are examined below. 
(i) THE PROMOTION OF BUSINESS CASE 
This case that the government should intervene to require Aer 
Lingus to remain on the Shannon-Heathrow route in order to 
promote business in the area and that even if other airlines increase 
the total number of passengers at Shannon airport they will not 
adequately serve the business community in the area.  
 
Aer Lingus does not have business class and it has a policy not 
to reintroduce it. The Ireland-United Kingdom market has adopted 
the low cost airline model apart from a single route from Dublin to 
London City. The business community in Ireland has not chosen 
the full-service airline product on the London City-Paris route 
described above. The market option for any airline to purchase slots 
at Heathrow and operate a business class service from Shannon 
remains open and unlikely. The record is that high value business 
travellers did not support in sufficient numbers the cost of full 
service provision on Irish routes whether on British Airways club 
class, British Midland diamond class, Aer Lingus business class or 
the shortlived Ryanair business class. Business class before 
deregulation delivered some inflight services for business passengers 
curtained off from the remainder of the aircraft while charging fares 
which could not be sustained in a deregulated market such as 
£650(€825) from Dublin to Brussels, a fare of over €1,200 at 2007 
prices. 
 
Davy (2006b) found that 23.15 per cent of Ryanair passengers 
were on business trips. This is higher than the 14 per cent of all 
visitors to Ireland and the 12 per cent of visits by Irish residents 
abroad who cited business as the reason for their trips according to 
CSO data for 2005. 
 
Ryanair passengers who had travelled on the airline before 
totalled 83.17 per cent. Just under 4 per cent rated their overall 
flight experience as poor or very poor. Food was purchased on 
board by 24 per cent of Ryanair passengers and 36 per cent bought 
it at the airport. Under 6 per cent of Ryanair passengers would pay 
more for an extra legroom seat.  
 
The Civil Aviation Authority study on “No Frills Carriers; 
Revolution or Evolution?” (2006) found that “no-frills carriers have 
had a noticeable impact on the profile of business passengers. 
Passengers travelling on business have lower incomes overall now 
than ten years ago, and this is true across all airline types. This 
suggests that no-frills carriers have had a beneficial effect here, as 
the factors which have made trips more viable for lower income 
business passengers, in particular the removal of fare restrictions 
and the availability of lower fares to and from more destinations, 
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particularly from the UK regions, have resulted from the entry of 
no-frills carriers.” (5-26).  
 
 The Irish and UK evidence is that low cost airlines and airports 
improve the competitiveness of the business sector and that their 
services are heavily used by business travellers who have 
overwhelmingly chosen the low cost model for air travel between 
the two countries. Should the market change against the low cost 
model in favour of the traditional business class airline product in 
the future there will be no requirement for government 
intervention. There is no market obstacle to the provision of full 
service business class flights between Heathrow and any Irish 
airport. Costs would be higher because slots at Heathrow are in 
limited supply and an entrepreneur wishing to operate such services 
would require yields per passenger correspondingly greater than on 
other routes. 
(ii) THE TOURISM PROMOTION CASE 
The case for government intervention to retain the Shannon-
Heathrow route in order to promote tourism is a variation on the 
high value business travellers theme above. High spending tourists 
will be less inclined to travel on low cost airlines and average 
spending per tourist will fall according to this argument. 
Deregulated aviation is, therefore, claimed to be detrimental to 
luxury hotels and golf courses. 
 
Lower air fares have two possible impacts on the income 
distribution of air travellers. Lower fares both increase the ability of 
low income people to fly at all and the ability of high income people 
to fly more frequently. The UK evidence is that the latter impact is 
greater than the former. The Civil Aviation Authority (2006) found 
that “…in relation to the leisure market, the advent of low cost 
carriers does not appear to have had a notable effect in terms of the 
income profile of passengers, In fact, the profile of UK leisure 
passengers in terms of income profile is similar between no-frills 
carriers and full service carriers, and has changed little over the last 
decade, and although numbers of leisure passengers from all income 
groups has increased, the majority of the absolute increase has come 
from those in higher and middle income and socio-economic 
groups.” (5-16). Fears that the passengers on low cost airlines might 
reduce average tourism spending are not supported either in the 
comparison of inflight spending by passengers. Goodbody (2007) 
found ancillary expenditure per passenger on Ryanair at €9.40 to be 
90 per cent of the expenditure per passenger on Aer Lingus at 
€10.20.   
 
The case that the government should intervene to increase the 
supply of a higher cost product (Heathrow-Shannon air services) 
because the deregulated market produces a lower cost product 
(Shannon-other London airports services) which is used by low 
income passengers is regressive. The policy implication is that that 
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governments should never deregulate a market in which low income 
persons would benefit from the resulting price reductions. 
(iii) THE REGIONAL DEVELOPMENT CASE  
The case that the entire Atlantic region of Ireland requires 
government intervention to retain the Shannon-Heathrow services 
is not supported by the data in Table 2 above. The nine counties on 
the Atlantic coast are served by nine airports, seven with direct 
service to London and two with service over Dublin. Government 
intervention to require Aer Lingus to retain the Shannon-Heathrow 
services risks undermining the new services and routes developed 
since deregulation and the development of alternatives to Shannon-
Heathrow services examined in Section 4 above.  
 
In regard to fears concerning the regional impact of low cost 
carriers the CAA stated that “…for the UK regions, there has been 
a marked change in the availability of flights for leisure and business 
purposes. This again is a consequence of deregulation, but it is 
primarily the no-frills carriers that recognised that there was 
significant demand for travel from regional airports, and exploited 
these opportunities, creating benefits for passengers in the regions, 
for the airports in question and for the regional economy”.   
 
In the absence of origin and destination surveys it is not possible 
to say how many Shannon-Heathrow passengers work or live near 
these airports. The deregulated market has opened up many new air 
services and airports both in the Atlantic region of Ireland and in 
the greater London area. Air travel between the Atlantic region and 
London grew 2.7 fold between 1990 and 2006. As shown in Section 
4 above new airlines and airports accounted for 94 per cent of that 
increase while Shannon-Heathrow traffic has been static and its 
market share has declined. 
(iv) THE CASE FOR RESTORATION OF THE PRE-
DEREGULATION NATIONAL AIRLINE 
The benefit claimed in this case for government intervention to 
retain the Shannon-Heathrow services stresses the political benefits 
of governments’ ability to use a national airline as a policy 
instrument, including ordering Aer Lingus to run services against its 
commercial judgement. In a deregulated market this interventionist 
policy would undermine an airline’s commercial freedom and harm 
its finances and viability. Before deregulation in Europe the national 
airline policy seriously reduced the efficiency of state-owned airlines 
and required a virtual ban on new entrants on trunk routes in order 
to generate the excess revenues to support the resulting inefficiency. 
The result throughout Europe was the highest air fares in the world, 
low productivity and distressed state airline syndrome (Doganis, 
2001). The elements of distressed state airline syndrome were 
substantial losses, overpoliticisation, strong unions, overstaffing, no 
clear development strategy, bureaucratic management and poor 
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service quality. Privatisation of Aer Lingus in 2006 was intended to 
reduce political interference in its business decisions but within 
months politicians overlooked their sale of the airline and called for 
government intervention in its commercial decisions. Goldman 
Sachs (2004) indicates that only small financially troubled airlines in 
Europe still remain in state control such as Air Malta, Czech, Malev, 
Olympic and TAP. 
  
 A prospect raised in the public debate over the Shannon slots at 
Heathrow is that further slot transfers could take place from the 
Cork and Dublin routes. There is also the prospect that the Belfast 
International-Heathrow route might fail to cover the cost of slots 
and the extra operating costs at Heathrow.  
7. 
The Outlook 
for Further 
Heathrow Slot 
Transfers    The passenger data in Table 7 show that, from a monopoly start, 
the decline in the Heathrow market share of its London traffic has 
been faster at Shannon than at Dublin by 9 points and than at Cork 
by 3 points. The allocation of 20 Heathrow slots to the Dublin 
route, 13 held by Aer Lingus and 7 held by British Midland, gives 
100,000 passengers per slot in 2006 compared to 106,000 per slot 
used on the Cork-Heathrow route. The number of passengers per 
slot used on the Shannon-Heathrow route varies between 81,000 
and 107,000, depending on whether three or four slots are used on 
the route. The Heathrow-Ireland market in 2006 had 2.7 million 
passengers, 73 per cent on the Dublin route, 16 per cent on the 
Cork route and 12 per cent on the Shannon route. 
Table 7: London Airport Shares of Passengers on Dublin, Cork and 
Shannon Routes, 2006 
    
London Airport Dublin Cork Shannon 
 % % % 
Heathrow 46.7 40.9 37.7 
Gatwick 17.5 31.1 18.7 
Stansted 24.2 27.9 33.9 
Luton 8.5   - 9.7 
London City 3.3 - - 
Passengers 000s 4,268 1,038 856 
    
Source: Civil Aviation Authority. 
 
 Slots at Heathrow have acquired a scarcity value due to unsatisfied 
demand for access to the airport by new entrants and by 
incumbents wishing to increase their flight numbers. 
8. 
 Summary and 
Conclusions  
The slots were allocated by grandfather rights. Aer Lingus and 
British Midland are beneficiaries of that allocation of property rights 
at Heathrow and in 2007 allocated slots worth over €400 million to 
their services to Dublin, Cork and Shannon. Yields on Heathrow 
services to Ireland must cover this outlay and the other additional 
costs of serving a high cost airport. In the deregulated aviation 
market on Ireland-United Kingdom routes since 1986, passengers 
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have transferred the majority of their London trips to London 
airports other than Heathrow such as Stansted, Gatwick, Luton, and 
London City. The decline in the Heathrow share of Ireland-London 
traffic has been faster at Shannon than the declines at Dublin and 
Cork. Shannon passengers to the other London airports in 2006 
outnumbered those on Shannon-Heathrow by 65 per cent. 
 
Passenger numbers between the seven Atlantic region airports 
with direct service, and London in 2006 were 270 per cent of the 
1990 number. Of the 1.687 million extra passengers in this market 
94 per cent used new entrant airports and airlines. The deregulated 
market has not isolated the Atlantic coast of Ireland. Airports such 
as Stansted, Gatwick, Luton, Knock, Derry, Kerry, Galway and 
Waterford, with new airlines, have increased connectivity, almost 
trebled the market size and reduced fares and costs.  
 
Arguments favouring government intervention to retain the 
Shannon-Heathrow service on the grounds of promotion of 
businesses, tourism and regional development are shown to be weak 
as is the case made that Ireland needs a “national airline” policy 
with government powers to order Aer Lingus to serve routes such 
as Shannon-Heathrow. Airline deregulation has been a major 
success in the Irish economy and alternatives to the Shannon-
Heathrow services are already attracting consumer support. The 
market failure arguments for government intervention do not apply. 
Successful deregulation requires the removal of both barriers to 
entry and barriers to exit. 
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BUILDING FOR THE 
FUTURE?  
INTERPRETING AN 
“IRISH” CURRENT 
ACCOUNT DEFICIT 
Martin O’Brien∗
 In recent Commentaries, attention was drawn to the dramatic 
increase in the Irish current account deficit on the balance of 
payments. The deficit, which stood at -0.7 per cent of GNP in 2004, 
widened sharply to over -4 per cent of GNP in 2005 and at the end 
of 2006 was -4.9 per cent of GNP. Analysis of the Irish current 
account has taken on a new dimension in the context of European 
Monetary Union, where the union level current account is broadly 
in balance, while individual member states exhibit diverse balance of 
payments positions. Since Euro Area member states are insulated 
against speculative currency attacks as a result of the single currency, 
the traditional concerns about financing the deficits of countries 
with negative balance of payments positions do not directly arise. 
However, the dispersion between Euro Area countries current 
account balances has increased in recent years. Ireland is among a 
group of countries (Greece, Portugal and Spain) that have seen their 
current account deficits grow significantly within EMU.  
1. 
Introduction 
 
Quarterly Economic Commentary, Winter 2007, pp. 80-103 
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Individual Euro Area member states current account positions 
may become less relevant over time, as is the case for individual 
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colleagues at The Economic and Social Research Institute (ESRI) for helpful 
references and discussion at various stages of the paper’s development. All errors 
remain my own. E-mail: martin.obrien @esri.ie 
 
states in the US. However, the relatively low level of labour mobility 
and the lack of a federalised fiscal structure in the Euro Area implies 
that their respective current account positions are important in 
highlighting country-specific issues and their adjustment and 
integration within EMU. If the determinants of balance of payments 
deficits/surpluses are structural and systematic as opposed to 
transitory some member states may be faced with difficult periods 
of adjustment. This arises when the single monetary policy adopted 
by the European Central Bank is pro-cyclical in these member 
states, not promoting an automatic stabilising force when the 
economy grows too far above trend (typically deficit countries) or 
too far below trend (typically surplus countries). In this context the 
responsibility is on domestic policymakers to use other tools to 
ensure any eventual correction is managed optimally, or more 
preferably to avoid the need for correction in the first instance. 
 
Monetary union can be seen as both a blessing and a curse in 
terms of a country’s balance of payments. The more benign 
approach relies on the definition of the current account balance as 
the corollary of flows on the capital account, identified by the 
difference in aggregate saving and aggregate investment in a 
country. Modern open economy macroeconomics1 sees the current 
account as responding to easier flows of capital resulting from the 
financial integration brought about by a monetary union. If the 
member states of the monetary union have sufficiently developed 
domestic financial institutions (as is the case in the Euro Area) 
theory suggests capital will flow from countries with a lower return 
on capital to those with higher returns. This enables the latter to 
invest without having to have large domestic savings. Countries that 
exhibit higher rates of economic growth, such as Ireland, provide 
higher rates of return on capital and are therefore typically 
characterised by higher rates of inward investment. Theories of 
economic development suggest that this trend will continue until 
the return on capital in both sets of countries are equalised, as the 
countries with initially lower capital stock invests in the necessary 
infrastructure to promote sustainable growth. Typically, this is 
accompanied by per capita income levels in both sets of countries 
converging. 
 
The less benign interpretation takes a more traditional approach, 
looking at the trade implications of movements in aggregate real 
incomes and real exchange rates between countries. In the context 
of monetary union these movements can result in significant shifts 
in relative competitiveness between member states. These 
developments are not necessarily worrying if they are consistent 
with the necessary adjustment to being part of a monetary union 
and are as a result transitory. However, if these movements in 
aggregate incomes and real exchange rates do not lead to an 
appropriate adjustment the current account balance may reflect an 
 
1 See for example Obstfeld and Rogoff  (1995). 
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unsustainable competitiveness position. In this instance the 
particular member state obviously cannot devalue their currency in 
the light of competitiveness pressures. For a country with a current 
account deficit this is typically compounded by relatively higher 
inflation as a result of growth being above trend. Higher inflation 
leads to relatively lower real interest rates, adding further stimulus to 
an already overheating economy. This could potentially lead to long 
and painful adjustment periods where net exports and real activity in 
the economy steadily decline until such a time as competitiveness is 
regained.  
 
This paper focuses on whether the recent development of the 
Irish current account balance within EMU reflects the benign or the 
worrying interpretations discussed above. As a small open economy, 
sustaining reasonable increases in the Irish standard of living in the 
medium to long-term requires a competitive traded sector. Does the 
evolution of the current account balance within EMU merely reflect 
higher relative growth in Ireland as opposed to significant losses in 
competitiveness, and if so is the nature of this growth consistent 
with the objective of maintaining sustainable growth in the future? 
Ahearne et al. (2007) show how for the Euro Area and some of its 
individual member states, higher rates of economic growth relative 
to their main extra-EMU trading partners leads to a fall in their 
trade balance. However for Ireland, Honohan (2006) noted that the 
scale and nature of foreign capital flows into the country may have 
contributed to the housing boom of recent years. To the extent that 
this foreign capital driven expansion in the construction sector 
impacted upon Ireland’s competitiveness it has provided a “double-
hit” on the trade side of the balance of payments.  
 
The paper proceeds with both formal and comparative analysis 
to determine how we should interpret Ireland’s growing current 
account deficit, paying particular attention to the role of 
competitiveness and the implications for policy. Section 2 outlines 
the development of Irish current account determinants. In Section 3 
an econometric analysis examines which process, falling 
competitiveness or relatively higher economic growth, is more 
relevant to the long run determination of the current account. 
Section 4 places the Irish current account in a comparative Euro 
Area context and highlights the importance of the construction 
boom in the recent development of the Irish balance of payments 
deficit. Section 5 discusses the implications of the analysis and 
concludes. 
 
 The current account is dominated by the balance of trade (net 
exports) and net factor income from the rest of the world. The 
trade balance has been positive for many years as Irish merchandise 
exports continue to be greater than the deficit (albeit falling) on 
services trade that the country faces. However, the balance of trade 
has been narrowing since 2002 (20 per cent of GNP) to 12 per cent 
2. 
Determinants 
of the Current 
Account 
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of GNP in 2006. Net factor income, which includes profit 
repatriation by foreign multi-nationals operating in Ireland, has 
continued to be a major outflow, but has also contracted over the 
same period from -22 per cent of GNP to -17 per cent of GNP (see 
Table 1). The reduction in profit repatriation outflows concurrent 
with a fall in exports is unsurprising given Ireland’s position as an 
export hub for many multinational companies. These credit (net 
exports) and debit (net factor income) flows have in the past 
cancelled each other out for the most part. However, in 2005 and 
2006 the balance of trade fell much faster than the negative net 
factor income contracted resulting in a gap emerging between the 
two. Some of this may be explained by changes in the US tax 
regime2 which incentivised US firms operating abroad to repatriate 
more profits back to their home country. By the end of 2006, 
however, this distortion should be fully accounted for. The balance 
of payments statistics for 2007 Q1 indicate no significant difference 
in income flows with respect to the preceding quarters suggesting 
the effect of the US tax changes may not have been of most 
significance.  
 
It would appear that the deterioration in the balance of trade is a 
driving force behind the widening of the current account deficit 
from 2002 to 2006. This may be evidence of underlying 
competitiveness problems for the Irish economy. Such problems are 
usually reflected in an appreciation of the real exchange rate. Figure 
1 shows that Ireland’s real exchange rate3 has indeed appreciated in 
recent years. This reflects two realities: first the nominal 
appreciation of the Euro since the start of the century against the 
currencies of our main extra-Euro Area trading partners and second 
the rise in relative consumer prices in Ireland compared to those of 
our main trading partners both within and outside the Euro Area. 
The nominal exchange rate movements are obviously an issue 
which domestic factors have no influence over as Ireland has such a 
small share of the Euro Area economy. However, domestic factors 
can and have had an important effect on increases in relative 
consumer prices. 
 
The rise in relative consumer prices can be attributed in part to 
strong domestic demand, spurred on by historically low interest 
rates, extremely favourable employment growth and fast wage 
growth. Many authors see this rise in relative prices as a necessary 
adjustment  to  Euro  Area  membership4 as expectations of a faster  
 
2 The American Job Creation Act, 2004. 
3 The real exchange rate used in this paper is the OECD Real Effective Exchange 
Rate index, which is a weighted exchange rate index based on the country’s share 
of both its domestic and foreign markets vis-à-vis its main competitors deflated by 
their relative consumer price indices. A rise in the index points to a fall in 
competitiveness. See Durand et al. (1992) for a more detailed discussion. 
4 See, for example, Traistaru-Siedschlag (2007). 
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Figure 1: Irish Real Effective Exchange Rate and Merchandise 
Terms of Trade 
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Source: OECD Main Economic Indicators Database (2000=100); 
External Trade Statistics, Central Statistics Office (1990=100). 
 
 
convergence in living standards took hold. To the extent that the 
wage  inflation  experienced  during  this  period  was  matched  by 
productivity growth, the impact on competitiveness would be less 
and the divergence in real interest rates and real exchange rates 
across the Euro Area, exacerbated by the single monetary policy, 
would diminish over time. Table 1 highlights trends in key 
macroeconomic variables, which show that productivity growth has 
not matched real wage growth in recent years. This indicates 
underlying competitiveness pressures with which the economy 
cannot continue indefinitely. Eventually a period of competitive 
disinflation is required, where growth slows, and perhaps rising 
unemployment until such a time as real and nominal wage growth 
moderates and productivity growth improves. Ireland appears to be 
entering such a process at the moment.  
 
Blanchard (2001) highlighted how Ireland’s real exchange rate 
needed to appreciate during the EMU integration process given that 
excess demand was driven both domestically and internationally. 
Referring again to Table 1, both domestic consumption and net 
export growth were significant in the early years of monetary union. 
The growth in net exports has diminished over time as the real 
exchange rate has appreciated. To the extent that the appreciation, 
attributable in part to rising relative consumer prices, was in the 
context of productivity growth outstripping real wage growth it 
could be considered as part of the convergence process. However, 
the more recent reality  of low  productivity  growth  points towards  
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Table 1: Various Macroeconomic Indicators, Growth Rates (Unless Specified*) 
 
 1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
GDP 11.3 13.2 5.3 5.9 5.1 3.2 5.9 5.7 
GNP 8.5 12.2 3.9 2.8 5.5 3.9 4.9 6.5 
Consumer Prices 1.6 5.6 4.9 4.6 3.5 2.2 2.5 4.0 
Unemployment Rate* 5.6 4.3 3.9 4.4 4.6 4.4 4.4 4.4 
Productivity (GDP per worker) 2.8 3.9 4.2 4.6 1.7 1.5 1.0 1.1 
Real Wages 3.5 2.0 2.5 0.9 2.8 3.9 3.1 0.9 
Consumer Expenditure 8.3 10.4 5.4 3.8 3.2 3.8 6.6 6.2 
Exports 15.5 19.8 8.6 4.5 0.5 7.3 3.9 4.9 
Imports 12.4 20.8 7.2 2.4 -1.2 8.6 6.5 5.3 
Balance of Trade % GNP* 15.6 15.0 17.6 20.3 18.3 16.9 13.9 12.0 
Net Factor Income % GNP* -16.9 -16.5 -18.7 -22.2 -18.6 -17.9 -18.3 -16.6 
         
Source: National Income and Expenditure Accounts 2006, Central Statistics Office. 
 
more structural constraints which may have to be addressed 
through competitive disinflation and a real adjustment. 
 
Meanwhile, a simple comparison of Irish and Euro Area or 
EU15 economic growth rates would suggest that the widening of 
the balance of payments deficit is due at least in part to Ireland’s 
higher growth in recent years. Figure 2 plots the ratio of an index of 
Irish GDP to EU15 GDP expressed in logs from 1997-2006. The 
steady rise in the series is attributable to Irish GDP growth being 
consistently above that of the EU15 over the period.  
Figure 2:  Quarterly OECD Indices of Irish GDP Relative to EU15 
GDP, 1997-2006 
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GROWTH AND CAPITAL FLOWS 
The combination of higher growth rates and international financial 
market integration can have significant impact on a country’s 
balance of payments position. Blanchard and Giavazzi (2002) 
highlight the potential effect on the current account in the context 
of Euro Area integration.5 The process allows member states with 
potentially higher growth rates, due to coming from a low base, to 
borrow much more readily and invest without having to have high 
levels of domestic saving. Greater integration of international capital 
markets can cause capital to flow more readily to countries with 
higher potential growth rates. Ahearne et al. (2007) have found this 
to be the case in the Euro Area, where investment capital can now 
more easily flow from the core countries (Germany, France etc.) to 
the peripheral countries (Ireland, Greece, Portugal, Spain) where the 
rate of return can be higher because of the relatively low initial 
capital stock level. This aids in the integration process in that these 
peripheral countries can more easily finance expenditure on 
infrastructure and expand potential output. This investment, (Total 
Gross Domestic Physical Capital Formation in Figure 3), does not 
necessarily arise because of a current account deficit but may in fact 
cause it when the deficit is expressed as the excess of investment 
over saving. Thus, running a current account deficit is not 
necessarily a bad thing.  
Figure 3: Gross National Savings and Total Gross Domestic 
Physical Capital Formation (Investment), % of GNP 
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Source: National Income and Expenditure Accounts, 2006, CSO. 
 
 
5 The analysis focused on the Greek and Portuguese deficits. Blanchard (2006) 
revises the opinion for Portugal indicating that structural competitiveness issues 
were more pertinent for that country than the income convergence theory. 
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The Irish experience in recent years has seen the excess of 
investment over saving increase, particularly from 2004 to 2005. 
This is particularly striking when one considers the relatively high 
rate of national savings in Ireland. Gross national saving stood at 
27.6 per cent of GNP in 2006 whereas investment was 31.8 per cent 
of GNP. This interpretation of the current account is usually 
discussed in an inter-temporal setting, where neoclassical growth 
theory predicts investment capital will flow from high income 
countries to low income countries until the latter converges in terms 
of per capita income.  
 
The recent development of the Irish current account does not 
fully fit the inter-temporal interpretation, as per capita income 
converged to EU15 levels before the balance of payments began its 
steady movement into deficit. However, higher relative growth can 
also impact negatively upon the trade balance, as seen in Ahearne et 
al. (2007). The construction sector boom in Ireland is undoubtedly a 
factor in the higher relative growth rate in most recent years. The 
extent to which the high rate of investment in construction was 
financed by foreign capital, as illustrated by Honohan (2006), is also 
reflected in the increasing gap between investment and national 
saving in Figure 3. The empirical analysis in this paper aims to 
highlight the relative importance of competitiveness pressures and 
higher growth rates by examining the role of both the real exchange 
rate and relative output levels in determining the current account. 
COMPETITIVENESS AND THE REAL EXCHANGE RATE 
The real exchange rate has been a mainstay in the theoretical 
literature on current account determination, from the more 
traditional approaches (Friedman, 1953; Dornbusch, 1976) to the 
new open macroeconomics models (Obstfeld and Rogoff, 1995). 
The primary channel considered is through domestic and foreign 
consumers switching their expenditure away from domestically 
produced goods which become relatively more expensive as the real 
exchange rate appreciates. Krugman and Obstfeld (2001) highlight 
the “value” and “volume” effects that changes in the real exchange 
rate have on the balance of trade and hence the current account. 
The value effects refer to the fact that as a currency appreciates the 
value of each unit of exports rises vis-à-vis each unit of imports, 
leading to an increase in the terms of trade and an improvement in 
the balance of payments in the short run. The volume effects are 
expected to be more dominant in the long run as the fall in 
competitiveness as a result of the real exchange rate appreciation 
leads to net exports diminishing.6 Therefore, in the long run 
determination of the current account we expect a negative 
relationship between changes in the real exchange rate and the 
evolution of the current account balance.  
 
6 These theoretical underpinnings are usually described in the context of a real 
depreciation, leading to the textbook J-curve effect on the balance of payments. 
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Ireland’s terms of trade7 increased substantially from 2000 Q4 to 
2002 Q4 alongside the real exchange rate appreciation, as can be 
seen in Figure 2. This was accompanied by a reduction in the 
balance of payments deficit during 2002, moving into surplus in 
2003. However, since 2003 the continued real exchange rate 
appreciation has not been matched by increasing terms of trade and 
the current account balance has moved steadily into deficit since the 
beginning of 2004 as the trade balance has fallen. Not only does this 
provide more evidence for the role of competitiveness pressures in 
analysing Ireland’s balance of payments but it also may indicate that 
a real adjustment is inevitable in the context of continued real 
exchange rate appreciation, particularly through 2006. The extent to 
which this is the case depends on the overall importance of the real 
exchange rate in current account determination, particularly when 
compared to the independent effect of Ireland’s relatively higher 
growth rate. If the long run current account position is mostly due 
to higher rates of economic growth, the situation as at the end of 
2006 of a balance of payments deficit of over -4 per cent of GDP 
could be considered appropriate and the prospects for adjustment 
more benign. 
 
Having discussed both potential drivers of the current account, 
the next section aims to determine empirically the independent role 
of competitiveness pressures and relatively higher economic growth 
rates respectively, on the long run determination of the current 
account balance. 
 
 
DATA AND METHODOLOGY 
3. 
Empirical 
Analysis 
The purpose of this analysis is to examine the potential links 
between the current account expressed as a proportion of Gross 
Domestic Product (CA), domestic output relative to foreign (EU15) 
output levels (Yie/Yeu) and the real exchange rate (Z). More 
specifically, the results should isolate the relative importance of 
changes in competitiveness (as given by changes in the real 
exchange rate) and higher growth rates with respect to the EU15 in 
the evolution of the Irish current account balance. 
 
Data are quarterly in frequency from 1997 Q1 to 2006 Q4.8 The 
current account to GDP series are derived from Quarterly National 
Accounts and Balance of Payments statistics (CSO). There was distinct 
evidence of seasonality in the series which was accounted for by an 
adjustment using the Census X-11 procedure in EViews. For 
domestic and foreign (EU15) income levels the seasonally adjusted 
real GDP indices from the OECD are used. The real exchange rate 
 
7 Terms of trade refer to merchandise imports and exports only. 
8 Given the limited time span and number of observations included, these results 
are indicative not definitive. 
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is the Real Effective Exchange Rate index published by the OECD. 
All OECD indices have a base year of 2000=100. 
Figure 4: Current Account Balance (% GDP, Seasonally Adjusted) 
-6
-4
-2
0
2
4
6
97 98 99 00 01 02 03 04 05 06
%
 G
D
P
 
The analysis is undertaken using an unrestricted cointegrated 
VAR set-up (Johansen and Juselius, 1990).9 Essentially this 
procedure allows useful long run relationships between the variables 
of interest to be examined by exploiting the statistical properties of 
the individual time series. Comprehensive details of the analysis, 
including all the necessary preliminaries, are available from the 
author on request. 
ESTIMATION RESULTS 
The result of the econometric analysis is given by the following long 
run relationship 
 
CA = 1.05 + 0.01 (t) - 0.26 (Z) - 0.56 (Yie/Yeu) 
  [ 6.18] [-6.00]  [-4.67] 
 
where t is a time trend, Z is the real exchange rate, Yie/Yeu is 
relative GDP and CA is the current account expressed as a 
proportion of GDP. The corresponding t-statistics for the 
coefficients are given in brackets and show that all the coefficients 
are statistically significant at conventional levels. The primary 
interest for this analysis is the sign and relative magnitude of the real 
exchange rate (Z) and relative growth (Yie/Yeu) coefficients. Both 
coefficients have the expected negative sign: a real appreciation 
 
9 Many authors have applied VAR analysis to the determination of the current 
account balance, recent examples of which include Nason and Rogers (2002), Lee 
and Chinn (2006) and Bems et al. (2007). 
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results in a fall in the current account balance and the same dynamic 
holds as the pace of growth in Ireland is above that of the EU15. 
However, the relative growth coefficient is greater than that of the 
real exchange rate, indicating that this has more relevance in the 
long run determination of the Irish current account balance.  
 
A further step in the analysis allows us to examine whether the 
current magnitude of the deficit is an equilibrium position or 
whether some manner of adjustment is necessary. Figure 5 plots the 
estimated cointegrating relationship highlighted above over recent 
years, where deviations from zero indicate the current account 
balance being away from its long run equilibrium. It is evident that 
at the end of 2006 the seasonally adjusted current account deficit of 
over -4 per cent of GDP was an equilibrium position justified by 
the determinants of real exchange rates and relative growth. 
Figure 5: Current Account Balance Long Run Cointegrating Relationship 
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The results above indicate that at a macro-level the scale of the 
Irish balance of payments deficit is appropriate. Higher relative 
growth in Ireland as opposed to our trading partners is more 
important than real exchange rate appreciation in determining the 
current account balance. However, much of that growth in most 
recent years has been driven by a boom in construction, a sector 
with low productivity growth not open to international competition. 
The increasing importance of construction in overall economic 
activity has contributed to the economy-wide slowdown in 
productivity growth noted in Table 1. Combined with the low 
productivity growth in other sectors not open to international 
competition it has possibly contributed to Ireland’s loss of 
competitiveness as wage growth outstripped productivity growth in 
the most recent past. The next section places the Irish balance of 
payments deficit in a comparative European context by explicitly 
examining some of these factors, specifically the nature of capital 
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investment and, following on from that, the impact this has had on 
Ireland’s competitiveness. 
 
 Estimates for the Euro Area balance of payments indicate that the 
current account was broadly in balance at the end of 2006, with 
sharp differences across individual member states: Portugal at one 
end with a deficit touching double-figures as percentage of GDP, 
and the Netherlands at the other with a near mirror opposite 
surplus position.10 In effect, individual Euro Area member states 
find themselves as net borrowers (deficit position) and net lenders 
(surplus position). The development of Ireland’s current account 
position in recent years is not particularly unique among Euro Area 
member states. The trend since 2003 to deficit is similar to that of 
Spain, Greece and Portugal, although not at the same scale. 
However, the underlying components of the current account tell a 
familiar tale for Ireland which differs from all other Euro Area 
states. Unlike these countries Ireland exhibits a trade surplus, and 
indeed the largest surplus in the Euro Area. As discussed above, 
Ireland’s position as a major export hub for multi-nationals lends 
itself towards a large negative flow of income, which as a percentage 
of GDP is the highest among Euro Area “net borrowers”, as per 
Table 5. 
4. 
Ireland – A 
Euro Area 
Comparison 
Table 5: GDP Growth, Net Exports and Factor Income as Percentage of GDP, 1999-
2006 
          
  1999 2000 2001 2002 2003 2004 2005 2006 
Real GDP Growth         
 Ireland 11.3 13.2 5.3 5.9 5.1 3.2 5.9 5.7 
 Greece 3.4 4.5 5.1 3.8 4.8 4.7 3.7 4.3 
 Spain 4.7 5 3.6 2.7 3.1 3.3 3.6 3.9 
 Portugal 3.9 3.9 2 0.8 -0.7 1.5 0.5 1.3 
 Euro Area 3 3.8 1.9 0.9 0.8 2 1.5 2.8 
Net Exports         
 Ireland 13.3 13.4 14.8 16.3 15.5 14.4 12.1 10.8 
 Greece -8.5 -10.5 -9.4 -8.3 -7.2 -5.9 -6.5 -3.9 
 Spain -1.9 -3 -2.3 -1.9 -2.1 -3.8 -5.1 -5.9 
 Portugal -10.3 -11.1 -9.8 -7.9 -6.5 -7.6 -8.7 -7.6 
 Euro Area 0.9 0.2 1 2 1.7 1.7 1 0.8 
Net Factor Income         
 Ireland -14 -14.3 -15.7 -18.1 -15.8 -15.2 -15.1 -14 
 Greece -0.5 -0.8 -1.5 -1.4 -2.4 -2.4 -3 -0.7 
 Spain -1.5 -1.2 -1.8 -1.7 -1.3 -1.4 -1.9 -2.1 
 Portugal -1.5 -2.2 -3 -2.3 -1.7 -2 -2.6 -3.5 
  Euro Area -0.6 -0.7 -0.6 -0.5 -0.5 -0.2 -0.1 0 
Source: Eurostat. 
 
10 See Ahearne et al. (2007) for a more detailed appraisal of individual Euro Area 
member states balance of payments positions. 
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All the countries listed in Table 5 have experienced an 
appreciation of their real exchange rate since EMU along with 
Ireland. While the respective fiscal positions are quite different, the 
most interesting contrast is found in the role of investment and its 
contribution to growth. Ireland, Greece and Spain have consistently 
enjoyed rates of economic growth higher than the Euro Area since 
1999. The scale of total investment as a proportion of GDP is, as 
would be expected, higher in these countries than for the Euro Area 
as a whole. However, Table 6 presents a worrying trend in the 
composition of investment use in Ireland in comparison to the 
Euro Area average. The share of housing in overall investment in 
Ireland has soared since 2002 to almost two and a half times the 
Euro Area average in 2006. This is possibly crowding out 
investment in more productive areas such as transport, commercial 
machinery and equipment and commercial buildings despite the 
overall increase in total investment. McElligot and Stuart (2007) 
have shown that lending by Irish banks has become more 
concentrated in construction and real estate sectors alongside the 
sharp increase in overall lending in recent years. While their analysis 
excludes the household sector, and property related lending includes 
commercial property, it is noteworthy that the increasing 
concentration in property related lending they find was at the 
expense of manufacturing. Spain, a fellow Euro Area “borrower”, 
has similar levels of overall investment, yet its housing investment 
has been significantly lower than that of Ireland since 1999. For the 
years that comparable data are available (2000-2004), Portugal’s level 
of productive investment has been above Ireland’s except in the 
area of transport. Meanwhile, Portuguese housing investment was 
significantly lower than the Irish level. A similar pattern is evident 
when comparing Ireland and Greece, although the high levels of 
non-housing investment in the latter could be attributable to 
preparations for the Olympic games in 2004. 
 
Demographically Ireland, Greece, Spain and Portugal have 
similar proportions of their population in the typical first time 
homeowner age bracket (25-34 years). In 2005, the last year 
comparable data is currently available, Ireland had an estimated 16.7 
per cent of its population in this age bracket,11 behind Spain (17.2 
per cent), and ahead of Portugal (15.6 per cent) and Greece (15.4 
per cent).12 At a first glance there should be no apparent reason why 
Ireland has such a demand for housing over and above the other 
“net borrower” Euro Area countries given the similar demographic 
profiles. Other fundamental factors, such as the relatively larger 
increases in real disposable incomes in Ireland, lower initial dwelling 
stock and more favourable tax and credit regimes can explain much 
of the higher demand for housing (Rae and van de Noord, 2006). 
However, the demographic component is also more complicated 
 
11 According to Census 2006 the proportion of 25-34 year olds in the total 
population was 17 per cent. 
12 Eurostat. 
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than the simple comparison of population age profiles would have 
us believe. Ireland has had a population shock since 2004 with the 
accession of the New Member States (NMS) to the EU. Alongside 
the UK and Sweden, Ireland opened up its labour market to NMS 
citizens, unlike Spain, Portugal and Greece. When the Irish and  
the UK levels of investment  are  compared  (Table 6),  housing  has  
Table 6: Investment Total and by Type, as Percentage of GDP, 1999-2006 
          
    1999  2000   2001   2002   2003  2004  2005  2006 
Total          
 Euro Area 20.9 21.4 20.9 20.2 20.1 20.2 20.5 21.2 
 Ireland 24.0 23.4 22.6 21.7 22.3 23.6 26.1 26.3 
 Greece 22.7 23.1 23.5 23.5 25.3 25.2 23.7 25.7 
 Spain 24.6 25.8 26.0 26.3 27.2 28.1 29.3 30.3 
 Portugal 26.8 27.1 26.5 25.0 22.9 22.6 21.9 21.2 
 UK 17.1 16.8 16.5 16.4 16.0 16.4 16.7 17.2 
Housing          
 Euro Area 5.5 5.4 5.2 5.1 5.2 5.3 5.5 5.7 
 Ireland 7.4 7.8 8.2 8.3 9.9 11.4 13.0 13.3 
 Greece 5.3 4.8 4.8 5.0 5.0 4.8 4.5 : 
 Spain 5.5 6.1 6.5 7.1 7.8 8.4 8.9 9.3 
 Portugal 13.6 5.6 5.3 5.0 4.1 4.0 11.5 10.7 
 UK 2.8 2.9 3.0 3.3 3.4 3.7 3.9 4.3 
Other Construction*         
 Euro Area 5.2 5.3 5.4 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.3 5.5 
 Ireland 6.2 6.3 6.4 6.1 5.4 5.2 5.0 5.1 
 Greece 7.7 8.1 8.5 8.2 8.8 9.0 8.2 : 
 Spain 7.1 7.2 7.5 7.7 7.7 7.9 8.3 8.4 
 Portugal : 8.3 8.7 8.4 8.1 8.0 : : 
 UK 4.7 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.7 4.6 4.9 5.2 
Machinery (Industry)         
 Euro Area 5.8 6.1 5.8 5.3 5.1 5.0 5.0 5.1 
 Ireland 4.3 4.6 3.7 3.0 3.0 2.5 2.8 2.6 
 Greece 5.7 6.2 5.9 5.5 5.9 4.9 4.8 : 
 Spain 5.6 5.7 5.3 4.9 4.7 4.6 4.7 5.0 
 Portugal 6.4 6.5 6.3 5.6 5.2 5.3 4.9 4.7 
 UK 6.6 6.6 6.0 5.3 4.8 4.7 4.6 4.5 
Transport Equipment         
 Euro Area 2.0 2.1 2.0 1.9 1.9 2.0 2.0 2.1 
 Ireland 4.1 2.9 2.5 2.6 1.9 2.2 2.7 2.2 
 Greece 2.7 2.7 3.1 3.5 4.0 5.0 4.5 : 
 Spain 2.3 2.4 2.3 2.1 2.2 2.2 2.3 2.4 
 Portugal 3.1 3.0 2.6 2.1 1.9 1.8 1.8 2.0 
 UK 1.6 1.4 1.5 1.5 1.4 1.3 1.2 1.2 
Source: Eurostat and CSO. 
* Includes roads. 
 
increased in both since 2004, but the magnitude of the Irish increase 
is significantly greater. This is not surprising given that 
proportionately the UK has not had as large a population shock and 
it has a long history of in-migration. However, the investment in 
machinery in Ireland has fallen significantly in the face of the 
increased dependence on residential construction, a trend that is not 
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as stark in the UK. Barrell et al. (2007) show how the migration into 
Ireland from the NMS leads to productivity growth below what it 
would have been without the population shock, as public 
infrastructure and in particular the housing stock13 do not rise 
sufficiently to curb a fall in the ratio of capital to labour. The 
resulting increase in the rate of return on capital causes capital flows 
into Ireland to increase and a balance of payments deficit on the 
current account. Despite evidence of the dampening effect on wage 
growth immigration has had in Ireland (Barrett et al., 2006) it has 
still not been sufficient to curb wage growth in excess of 
productivity growth. This may be due to the concentration of 
migrant labour in sectors with lower productivity growth i.e. 
construction and services. 
CONSTRUCTION AND COMPETITIVENESS 
Has Ireland’s reliance on construction to drive overall economic 
growth impacted negatively on competitiveness? One way of 
judging this is to refer to a theoretical definition of the measure of 
competitiveness used in this paper, the real exchange rate. 
Movements in the real exchange rate between two markets (in this 
case Ireland and the Euro Area) can be decomposed into changes in 
the deviation from purchasing power parity (PPP)14 and the 
difference between the relative price of non-traded and traded 
goods in the home (Ireland) market and the foreign (Euro Area) 
market. For our purposes traded goods are taken as the output from 
the manufacturing industry and non-traded goods as the output of 
the construction industry, which in Ireland has been heavily biased 
in house building.15 Nominal exchange rate movements do not 
feature as the Euro Area is used as the foreign market. A back of 
the envelope calculation of these movements of the Irish real 
exchange rate vis-à-vis the rest of the Euro Area yields the results in 
Table 7. 
 
The “Total” column in Table 7 shows that Ireland’s real 
exchange rate has consistently appreciated with respect to the rest of 
the Euro Area since 1999, indicating a loss of competitiveness. In 
terms of the decomposition of these changes, the contribution of 
changes in the relative price of non-traded goods was larger than 
deviations from PPP in the traded sector in every year. As detailed 
in the Appendix, the relative price of non-traded goods with respect 
to traded goods is a proxy for the domestic price level. Therefore, as 
the price of the construction sector output increased faster than that 
 
13 See also Duffy et al. (2005) for more detailed discussion of the relationship 
between immigration and the Irish housing market. 
14 The PPP hypothesis holds if the price of internationally traded goods are equal 
in both the home and foreign markets when expressed in terms of the same 
currency. 
15 See Appendix 1 for details. A more comprehensive decomposition would also 
incorporate the services sector, which is becoming increasingly tradable. This is an 
avenue for further research. 
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of manufacturing industry in Ireland as compared to the Euro Area, 
the overall Irish price level increased more rapidly also. This led to 
the appreciating real exchange rate and a fall in competitiveness. 
The effect is compounded by the increasing share of construction in 
total output over the period, driven in part by housing investment 
financed by foreign capital. 
Table 7: Decomposition of Movements (Annual Percentage Changes) in Irish Real 
Exchange Rate Vis-à-Vis the Euro Area, 1999-2006 
       
 Total  
PPP 
Deviations  
Relative Price 
of Non-traded of which 
      
Relative Price of 
Non-traded 
(Ireland) 
Relative Price of 
Non-traded  
(Euro Area) 
1999 8.9 3.6  5.3 8.5 3.3 
2000 18.2 2.4  15.8 19.1 3.4 
2001 7.6 1.9  5.7 8.2 2.5 
2002 3.1 -0.4  3.5 5.9 2.5 
2003 1.7 -6.4  8.0 12.4 4.3 
2004 3.1 -7.2  10.4 14.3 3.9 
2005 3.0 -2.7  5.7 9.4 3.7 
2006 1.4 -2.0  3.5 7.9 4.4 
       
Source: Own calculations based on National Income and Expenditure Accounts, 2006 (CSO), and Eurostat.  
See Appendix 1 for details. 
 
Extending this type of analysis, as seen in Canzoneri et al. (2002), 
relates the relative price of non-traded goods to relative productivity 
in the traded and non-traded sectors via the supply side Balassa-
Samuelson hypothesis. Since the formation of the single currency 
the average annual rate of productivity growth for the Irish 
economy has been 2.6 per cent. When broken down on a sectoral 
basis average annual productivity growth for the same period in 
industry was 7.4 per cent, whereas in construction productivity 
actually fell by 3 per cent on average each year since 1999. The 
higher productivity growth in the traded industry sector is 
consistent with the relative price of the non-traded construction 
sector increasing, thus contributing to a higher inflation in Ireland, 
á-la Balassa-Samuelson.  
 
An equally valid interpretation focuses on the demand side, as 
per De Gregorio et al. (1994). They highlight the role of higher 
aggregate demand in increasing the share of the non-traded sector in 
employment, reducing productivity and raising the relative price of 
non-traded goods since these goods cannot be imported. The strong 
growth in aggregate demand in Ireland, thanks to low interest rates 
and robust employment and wage growth, has undoubtedly 
contributed to a rise in the relative price of non-traded goods, in 
particular housing. Honohan (2006) noted the sharp rise in 
mortgage related credit in tandem with a sharp rise in the net 
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external liabilities of the Irish banking sector, which imported 
foreign capital equal to about 40 per cent of GDP in 2005 to lend to 
Irish residents. Monetary union has not only provided a low interest 
rate environment for Irish households and banks to borrow from 
abroad but has also contributed to the integration of financial 
markets to make the process much easier.  
 
 In a broad sense, the scale of the current account deficit witnessed 
towards the end of 2006 is appropriate given its determinants. The 
primary determinant of the current account balance, as seen from 
Section 3, is Ireland’s relatively high rate of economic growth. The 
scale of investment financed by foreign capital is what can be 
expected when financial markets become more integrated, as has 
been fostered by EMU. This investment is best put to use in those 
sectors that have the scope to increase potential output and have 
prospects for reasonable productivity growth. Private productive 
infrastructure and the necessary supporting public infrastructure 
would be prioritised in a best-case scenario. The trends highlighted 
in Sections 2 and 4 show that the recent development of the Irish 
current account deficit does not fit this scenario.  
5. 
Discussion and 
Conclusion 
 
Ireland is unique in the Euro Area concerning the relationship 
between the scale of housing investment and the development of 
the current account deficit, with damaging effects on Ireland’s 
competitiveness. Despite the evidence in favour of the benign 
interpretation for the current account position at the end of 2006 in 
Section 3, it is evident that the nature of economic growth in recent 
years, dominated by growth in non-traded sectors, cannot be 
maintained. Indicators such as the divergence between movements 
in the terms of trade and the real exchange rate (Figure 1), and the 
relatively much higher wage and asset price growth in Ireland, are 
somewhat consistent with a “dis-equilibrium” real appreciation, as 
discussed by Boz (2007), particularly since 2003. The crowding out 
effect that the dominance of the non-traded construction sector 
appears to have had on the traded sector needs to be undone. As 
2007 progresses, a slowdown in housing investment is apparent. 
Can this be accompanied by an increase in Ireland’s traded sector 
performance? 
 
Without government intervention, be it through fiscal policy or 
more structural reform such as eliminating barriers to competition 
in sectors with low productivity growth and promoting labour 
mobility, the lack of competitiveness for exports is usually 
addressed through competitive disinflation. Faced with increasing 
costs and low productivity gains relative to their international 
competitors, firms in Ireland would streamline by laying off workers 
in an effort to reduce costs. Nationally this would result in 
increasing unemployment until such a time as nominal and real 
wages have reduced to a level where firms exporting from Ireland 
regain competitiveness. The real exchange rate Irish firms face in 
this instance would thus depreciate making exports more attractive 
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internationally and imports more expensive for the domestic 
market. This could be a long and difficult adjustment. 
 
Prior to the days of independent central banks policymakers 
often devalued their domestic currency to avoid such a painful 
adjustment. This nominal policy instrument is not available to the 
Irish government given membership of EMU, and as such any 
domestic policy to minimise the detrimental effects of the 
adjustment must come from the real side of the economy and an 
increase in unemployment. In any case, if wage growth is not curbed 
simultaneously a nominal devaluation of the currency can only delay 
the necessary real adjustment. The imported inflation through the 
higher price of goods and services bought in from abroad would 
feed through to wages and eventually end up impacting negatively 
on competitiveness.  
 
What are the options available to the government to alleviate the 
impact of the adjustment process on unemployment? There are 
obvious incentives to promote productivity growth as a medium to 
long-term objective. Short-term actions can be taken to tackle the 
sources of the increasing costs faced by Irish exporters which have 
contributed to the contraction of net exports. These immediate 
policy options should also aid in the medium-term objective of 
productivity growth.   
 
The first option is to reduce nominal wages (or at least nominal 
wage growth) relative to that of our trading partners. As part of the 
National Wage Agreements, government only directly effects the 
wages in the public sector, while the effect on wages in the private 
sector are considered to be minimal. Despite this, the containment 
of costs in non-market public services as a result of wage restraint 
would be more consistent with the reality of public sector 
productivity growth being much lower than that in the market 
economy. As with productivity in the construction sector, public 
sector productivity has actually fallen in recent years at an average 
annual rate of 2.6 per cent over the period 1999-2006.  
 
An accompanying measure is to increase competitiveness and 
reduce prices in the non-traded sector relative to the traded sector 
(Blanchard, 2006). There are two elements to this strategy.  
 
First, in promoting competition in previously closed sectors, 
particularly services, significant gains in efficiency and productivity 
can be achieved. This also promotes more flexible wage and price-
setting behaviour in labour and product markets, which in turn can 
offset the need for significant increases in unemployment. 
Competition and regulation reform in utilities, transport services,16 
and the professions could benefit both consumers and Irish 
 
16 See, for example, Malaguzzi-Valeri (2006) and Lyons et al. (2007) in terms of 
electricity and Massey (2007) in terms of bus transport. 
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exporters. In a comparative study of twenty-one OECD countries 
Ireland is ranked twentieth, ahead only of Greece, in relation to 
regulatory barriers in energy, transport and communications 
(Conway and Nicoletti, 2006).   
 
Second, and more immediately, government spending on non-
tradables can be curtailed thereby reducing the overall demand for 
these goods and services. By reducing the relative price of non-
tradables, the costs that exporting firms and their workers face in 
consuming these non-tradables decreases, which in turn increases 
the relative price of tradables in the domestic economy, increasing 
profitability in the traded sector. This adjustment would also send 
important price signals to investors concerning the relative returns 
on traded and non-traded sectors. In the Irish case, for example, the 
returns to investment in the domestic construction sector, which 
has relatively low productivity, may be diverted to the more 
productive traded sector as the relative price of the latter increases 
thus supporting the long-term objective of productivity growth. Any 
incentive to stimulate investment in the residential construction 
sector would not be advisable. Workers would be more likely to 
agree to nominal wage restraint in an environment where the prices 
of non-tradables would be reduced. The nominal wage restraint 
would then be passed on in the form of reduced relative prices for 
Irish exports on international markets and the necessary real 
depreciation would occur. Blanchard (2006) argues that there is also 
scope for a government to run a somewhat expansionary fiscal 
policy to smooth the adjustment in this case, in so far as the 
expenditure is biased toward the traded sectors as opposed to the 
non-traded. The provision of economically viable public 
infrastructure should also be continued.17
 
Government action in this latter regard may be desirable, but 
only if necessary. There are signs that an adjustment is taking place 
in 2007 as the construction sector slows. Now that the scale of 
economic activity devoted to housing in Ireland is winding down, 
investment in productive sectors in the economy should pick up. 
This has the potential to increase the role of the traded sector and 
contribute more positively to productivity growth and potential 
output thus making the appropriate balance of payments deficit (in 
terms of scale) more acceptable (in terms of its determinants lending 
themselves towards more sustainable growth). The market, 
therefore, may be leading the adjustment process and government 
intervention may not be necessary. The coming months will reveal 
how well the transition process out of construction is faring and 
whether policy intervention is warranted. Inappropriate 
intervention, particularly if it stimulated the residential construction 
sector would be worse than doing nothing at this juncture. 
 
17 See Morgenroth and Fitz Gerald (2006) for a discussion of the role of public 
infrastructure in promoting growth and competitiveness. 
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APPENDIX 1: 
THEORETICAL 
DECOMPOSITION OF 
THE REAL EXCHANGE 
RATE 
Assume that national price levels are given by a weighted average 
of the price of non-traded and traded goods 
 
   (1) Ttii
NT
tiiti ppp ,,, )1( αα −+≡
 
where the superscripts NT and T refer to non-traded and traded 
goods respectively and iα  is the share of non-traded goods in 
Gross Value Added (GVA) in country i. In the following 
decomposition of the real exchange rate, industrial goods are 
considered tradable (T) and construction output considered non-
tradable (NT). The real exchange (z) rate of Ireland i with respect to 
the Euro Area j is thus 
 
 tjtititi ppdz ,,,, −+=   (2) 
 
where all variables are expressed in natural logarithms and tid ,  is 
the deviation from PPP, given as 
 
   (3) T tj
T
titi ppd ,,, −=
 
Using (1) and (3), (2) can be written as 
 
jzα+= tjjtiititi qqdz ,,,, αα −+=   (4) 
 
where q = ln(pNT/pT), the relative price of non-traded goods in the 
respective markets. Using the difference operator ∆, real exchange 
rate movements can be decomposed into deviations from PPP in 
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traded goods and movements in the relative price of non-traded 
goods in both markets. 
 
 tjjtiititi
qqdz ,,,, ∆−∆+∆=∆ αα   (5) 
 
Data for the respective series were taken from the National Income 
& Expenditure Accounts, 2006 (CSO), and Eurostat. All series have 
2005 as the base year. 
 
  pNT = price deflator for construction GVA 
  pT = price deflator for industry GVA 
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IRISH CLIMATE POLICY 
FOR 2012: AN 
ASSESSMENT 
Richard S.J. Tol*
The Irish government plans to reduce greenhouse gas emissions by 3 per cent per 
year. This can only be achieved by drastic measures on the demand side, such as 
a rapid reduction in the number of cattle or people. The Irish government also 
plans to introduce a carbon tax. A tax that applies to emissions that are not 
covered by the EU emissions trading system, and that roughly equals the 
expected permit price, would achieve emission reduction at almost the lowest 
possible cost. A carbon tax that is levied on emissions covered by the EU ETS, 
would not reduce emissions, but would cost Ireland and the rest of the EU 
money. 
Abstract 
 
 As elsewhere, climate policy in Ireland is intensifying – but as with 
most things in Ireland, the acceleration is particularly strong. 
Previously, Irish policy lagged behind that of other European 
countries, but Ireland now seems to be ahead. There may be three 
reasons for this. First, the media frenzy in the UK has affected the 
Irish public. Second, Ireland is no longer a poor country in the EU, 
and expectations for environmental policy are higher. Third, the 
Green Party entered government. 
1. 
Introduction 
 
The historical development of Irish carbon dioxide emissions is 
surprising at first sight. Diakoulaki and Mandaraki (2006) show that 
industry emissions grew by 25 per cent between 1990 and 2003, 
while output grew by 150 per cent for the same period. This implies 
that industry decarbonised at a rate of more that 5 per cent per year 
– an astounding rate, perhaps the highest in the world, and achieved 
without much of a climate policy. In 1990, Irish manufacturing 
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emitted 825 tonnes of CO2 for every million Euro value added, 
compared to an EU average of 790 g/€. In 2003, the EU average 
had fallen to 636 g/€, but the number for Ireland was only 261 g/€ 
– second to Sweden only. The main reason for this dramatic change 
is that Irish growth was concentrated in energy-extensive sectors 
(services, pharmaceuticals), while some energy-intensive production 
(base chemicals, metal) actually shrank. Power generation was 
modernised too; and new capacity has been gas-fired and wind-
powered. 
 
This places Ireland in a good position with regard to its 
emissions. The same is not true for further emission reduction. 
Much of the low-hanging fruit has been picked. There are no old 
peat or fertiliser plants that can be closed. A large share of Irish 
infrastructure, whether in transport, in power generation or in 
buildings, is of recent date (if not still under construction), and will 
not be replaced for decades. In 2005, 32 per cent of CO2 emissions 
were from power generation, 28 per cent from transport, and 15 per 
cent from residential energy use. This reduces the ability of climate 
policy to influence energy use in the medium term. 
 
The rapid and perhaps unanticipated shift in position has left 
Irish climate policy in a state of flux. There is a clear mismatch 
between ambition and implementation. McCarthy and Scott (2007) 
focus on the policy instruments that are envisaged to meet the 
emission targets. In this paper, the focus is on two key elements of 
the climate policy of the current government: the 3 per cent per year 
target (Section 2), and the carbon tax (Section 3). Section 4 
concludes. 
 
 As part of the agreement for government, Ireland is to reduce its 
greenhouse gas emissions by 3 per cent per year. It is not clear 
where this target comes from: 3 per cent per year corresponds to an 
80 per cent emission reduction in 50 years time. This is in line with 
stabilisation of the atmospheric concentration of greenhouse gases 
at 400 ppm CO2eq. Such a concentration would imply an 85 per cent 
chance of keeping the rise in the global mean temperature below 
2°C (den Elzen and Meinshausen, 2006). A maximum global 
warming of 2°C is the official target of the European Union. 
2. 
The 2012 
Emission 
Reduction 
Target 
 
However, the 2°C target does not meet the cost-benefit test 
(Nordhaus and Yang, 1996) and its justification on non-economic 
grounds is questionable too (Tol, 2007). Furthermore, there are 
cheaper strategies to meet a 400 ppm CO2eq target. In general, one 
would not recommend a constant rate of emission reduction. 
Rather, one would let the price of carbon rise with the interest rate 
(Hotelling, 1931). With constant prices and technologies, this would 
imply that emission abatement accelerates over time. Climate policy 
would accelerate stronger if the price of fossil fuels rises over time, 
and if technological progress reduces the costs of renewable 
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energies (Wigley et al., 1996). This is the cheapest way of meeting 
any target. 
 
Figure 1 shows the implication of the 3 per cent target: a rather 
sharp trend break. Figure 1 also shows the Kyoto commitment – 
under the EU burden sharing agreement, Irish emissions are to be 
113 per cent of their 1990 value, averaged over the period 2008-
2012. A 3 per cent per year emission reduction would bring 2008-
2012 emissions to 118 per cent of 1990. The new government is as 
committed to the Kyoto Protocol as the previous government.   
 
Figure 1: Past and Possible Future Emissions  
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Therefore, the logical interpretation is that whereas the previous 
government had planned to cover the gap between actual and target 
emissions by importing emission permits, the current government 
intends to cut emissions in Ireland by 3 per cent per year and buy 
permits only for the gap between the 118 per cent and the 113 per 
cent. Carbon permits can be imported through the EU Emissions 
Trading System, and through Joint Implementation and the Clean 
Development Mechanism under the Kyoto Protocol. 
 
Figure 1 also shows projected emissions in the absence of policy, 
with average emissions growth rates of 1.5 per cent per year 
(HERMES; Fitz Gerald et al., 2002) and 0.9 per year (ISus; 
O’Doherty and Tol, 2007). An absolute 3 per cent emission 
reduction per year implies a 3.9-4.5 per cent annual emission 
reduction from baseline, or 21.1-24.6 per cent in the five year period 
of government. This is a considerable task. 
 
Estimates of the costs of emission reduction suggest the 
following relationship: 
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2C R
Y E
α ⎛ ⎞= ⎜ ⎟⎝ ⎠  (1) 
where C is emission reduction cost, normalised by gross domestic 
product Y; R is emission reduction, normalised by business as usual 
emissions E; and α is a parameter, interpretable as unit cost 
(€/tCO2). Estimates of α vary between 1 and 2, for a cost-effective 
implementation (see Barker et al., 2007; Weyant et al., 2006). For the 
short term, α = 2 may be more appropriate. This means that a 1 per 
cent emission reduction from baseline would cost 0.02 per cent of 
GDP; and that a 10 per cent emission reduction would cost 2 per 
cent of GDP. The carbon tax would be in the order of €400/tCO2 
– about 8 times higher than the expected price of permits in the EU 
ETS, and about 40 times higher than the estimated social cost of 
carbon (Tol, 2005). €400/tCO2 is about 25 ¢/kWh and ¢90 per litre 
gasoline. 
 
The planned 3.9-4.5 per cent emission reduction would thus cost 
about 0.3-0.4 per cent of GDP per year. (If climate policy were not 
cost-effective, the costs could be much higher.) Over a period of 5 
years, this would amount to 1.5-2.0 per cent of GDP. To phrase this 
differently, the Irish economy is currently projected to grow by 2.9 
per cent. This is without climate policy. With climate policy, 
projected growth is 2.5-2.6 per cent – a reduction in the growth rate 
of one-fifth to one-tenth. Put differently still, the economy would 
grow in 10 years what it would otherwise grow in 8 or 9 years. 
 
In fact, the problem is more severe than these numbers suggest. 
The above relationship is for emission reduction that is announced 
well in advance. It assumes that the bulk of emission reduction 
would be achieved at the supply side of the energy sector – 
particularly fuel switching and energy efficiency improvement – 
without reducing the services provided by energy use. In a five-year 
period, however, emissions are by and large reduced at the demand 
side, that is, by reducing the volume of energy services. 
 
According to Lyons et al. (2007), some 10 per cent of the power 
generation capacity needed for 2012 does not yet exist – but there is 
planning permission for two new gas-fired plants. This means that 
at most 20 per cent of 2012 electricity will be carbon-neutral – only 
slightly higher than what it is today. The gas-fired power plants will 
replace oil-fired ones, but as the oil plants are used at peak times 
only, the effect on emissions is minimal. Closing existing plant 
before the end of their economic lifetime would be very expensive, 
and would lead to electricity shortages as the lead time to build new 
plant is too long. The current government, therefore, has almost no 
control over the stock of power plants in 2012, and the amount of 
carbon dioxide emitted from electricity generation. 
 
Similar reasoning holds for other major emission sources. The 
2012 housing stock will not be very different from today’s, as 
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buildings currently under construction and those with planning 
approval are subject to the current building standards. Public 
transport will expand at best marginally between now and 2012. The 
Irish car fleet is relatively young, and with slowing economic 
growth, fewer people will replace their cars. On a time scale of 5 
years, emission reduction policy can affect the demand side only. 
The supply side is largely fixed. 
 
Figure 2 has the 2005 distribution of emissions over the main 
sectors, and the projected emissions for 2007 and 2012. This gives 
some idea of the size of the challenge to reduce emissions by 3 per 
cent per year. To make things easy, the low projection is used, so 
that an emission reduction of one-fifth rather than one-quarter is 
required. 
Figure 2: Greenhouse Gas Emissions by Source as Observed for 
2005 and as Projected for 2007 and 2012 – and again in 
2012 for Four Extreme Policy Proposals 
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Four extreme policy cases are considered in Figure 2. In the 
first case, all sectors reduce emissions by the same proportion. In 
the second case, emissions associated with agriculture are reduced 
by 54 per cent. Roughly, this would imply that the cattle population 
would be cut in half. In the third case, residential emissions are cut 
by 50 per cent, services and transport by half that, and electricity use 
by one-third. Roughly, this would imply that one-half of the 
population emigrates – or that the average resident uses 50 per cent 
less energy. Only some 10 per cent of electricity use is for consumer 
electronics, so one would have to give up the television, the 
dishwasher, the washing machine and the refrigerator; and refrain 
from travelling by car for four days a week. In the fourth case, 
industrial emissions are cut by 44 per cent, services and transport by 
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half that, and electricity by two-thirds. Roughly, this would imply 
that more than two-fifths of production would move offshore. 
 
If emissions in the absence of additional policy were to grow by 
1.5 per cent per year rather than 0.9 per cent, as assumed here, 
emission reduction would become harder still. Reducing emissions 
by 3 per cent reduction per year is a radical proposal. 
 
Besides, the extreme emission reduction scenarios above would 
not affect climate change, as emissions would increase elsewhere. 
For Ireland to reduce emissions from agriculture, for example, it 
would not suffice to ban every second cow from the island. In fact, 
the consumption of dairy and meat would have to be cut in half, or 
the reduction in Irish production would be compensated by an 
increase elsewhere. Similarly, reducing industrial output in Ireland is 
irrelevant if production is moved abroad. In a statistical sense, one 
could reduce Ireland’s greenhouse gas emissions in the short term 
by targeting a small group of producers (e.g., farmers). However, 
actual emissions reduction would affect all consumers. 
 
The emission reduction target of the Irish government can only 
be met by draconian measures. It would therefore better be 
abandoned. 
 
 The government agreement also indicates that there will be a 
carbon tax, but it is as yet unknown when the tax will be introduced, 
how high the tax will be, or who will pay the tax. 
3. 
A Carbon Tax 
 
In principle, a carbon tax is the preferred instrument for 
reducing greenhouse gas emissions, outperforming even auctioned 
permits (Pizer, 1999). At present, however, the EU emission trading 
system (ETS) is the prime instrument. The EU ETS covers only 
carbon dioxide emissions, and only a part of all CO2 emissions. This 
may be politically expedient, but it does increase the cost of 
compliance. If the Irish carbon tax covered the other emissions, and 
the carbon tax equalled the permit price, then emission reduction 
costs would be at their theoretical minimum. 
 
The price of permits has varied considerably (see Figure 3) while 
taxes are fixed and announced in advance. A carbon tax cannot 
equal the permit price. However, there is also a futures market for 
the EU ETS – see Figure 4 – and the government could use this to 
set the carbon tax. For example, the government could announce 
the carbon tax in September of the previous year, using the future 
price of September 1 as the basis.1
 
 
1 There is probably sufficient liquidity in the EU ETS to prevent Irish companies 
from influencing the futures price at the EU market. 
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Figure 3: The Spot Price of Carbon Permits in €/tCO2 (top panel) and the Traded 
Volume in Metric Tonnes of CO2 (bottom panel) 
Source: www.eex.de (2 Oct, 2007). 
 
 
Figure 4. The Futures Price of 2008 Carbon Permits in €/tCO2 (top panel) and the 
Traded Volume in Metric Tonnes of CO2 (bottom panel) 
 
Source: www.eex.de (2 Oct, 2007). 
 
The actual permit price will deviate from the future permit price. 
This would lead to a different carbon price in different parts of the 
economy, and emission reduction would be more expensive than 
needed. However, the welfare loss is probably limited. Welfare 
losses are large if direct competitors face different carbon prices, 
because in that case differentiated regulation creates distortions on 
the output markets. If it is different sectors that are regulated 
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differently, markets are distorted only to the extent that these 
sectors compete on the input markets for labour and capital. See 
Boehringer et al. (2006). 
 
There is an interesting twist to this. There are arguments to allow 
companies, that are not covered by the EU ETS, to voluntarily opt 
in. A company may do so to enhance its image, or because it can 
reduce emissions at a lower cost than the expected permit price. If 
taxes and permits co-exist, then a company can opt out of the tax 
and opt into the permit market. If the permit price (spot or future) 
falls below the tax, this is the rational course of action. The permit 
market would be even more attractive if there is a promise of 
grandfathered permits in the future. If the opt-in clause for the EU 
ETS becomes solid, then the expected permit price puts a cap on 
the effective carbon tax. 
 
In the absence of an opt-in clause, tax industries would lobby for 
inclusion in the EU ETS if the tax is higher than the permit price. 
Lobbying is probably more intense and perhaps more successful 
with taxes than with direct regulation, because the difference 
between carbon tax and permit price is obvious. 
 
In sum, a carbon tax alongside a permit market is not an optimal 
solution, but it is not bad either – provided that carbon tax and 
permit price are reasonably close. Market or political forces would 
prevent divergence of tax and permit price. 
 
However, it is not clear that the carbon tax will apply only to the 
sectors not covered by the EU ETS. It may be that tax will apply to 
the ETS sectors as well, as suggested by Minister Eamon Ryan in an 
interview with the Irish Times (July 13, 2007). In the Appendix, we 
show the consequences with a simple model of the international 
emission permit market. The results are intuitive. 
 
Let us assume, reasonably, that Ireland is a net importer of 
carbon permits. A carbon tax would make it less attractive for Irish 
companies to import emission permits from the rest of the 
European Union, because extra permits imply higher emissions 
imply higher taxes. As a result, emissions would fall further in 
Ireland than in the case without a carbon tax. However, emissions 
would increase in the rest of the EU as there would be less export 
of emission permits to Ireland. These two effects exactly offset each 
other, because the EU ETS imposes a cap on total EU emissions. 
Total EU emissions are not affected by a carbon tax in Ireland. 
Only the distribution of emissions between the member states is 
affected by an Irish tax. A domestic tax superimposed on 
internationally traded emission permits has a leakage rate of 100 per 
cent. 
 
Furthermore, the reduced demand for emission permits would 
depress the European price of emission permits, albeit only slightly. 
111 
This means that the rest of the EU exports fewer permits for a 
lower price – total emission reduction costs rise in the rest of the 
EU. 
 
However, the drop in the price of emission permits is less than 
the carbon tax. As a result, in Ireland, the sum of the carbon tax and 
the permit price is always greater than the permit price if the tax is 
zero. In Ireland, more emissions are reduced and at a higher price. 
The cost of emission reduction, therefore,  goes up in Ireland too. 
 
In sum, an Irish carbon tax on sectors covered by the EU ETS 
increases the costs of emission reduction in Ireland and in the other 
member states. It makes everybody worse off, without improving 
the environment, as emissions are unchanged. 
 
 Politics and climate policy mix badly. It will take a global, century-
long effort to drive greenhouse gas emissions to zero – but every 
politician wants to be seen doing something in every constituency 
while in office. The optimal solution for the climate problem 
consists of a carbon tax that starts low but increases over time – 
combined with additional incentives for industry to develop energy 
sources that are cheap, safe, convenient, and carbon-free.2
4. 
Discussion and 
Conclusion 
 
In this paper, two key components of Irish climate policy are 
discussed. The emission reduction target of 3 per cent per year for 
the current government period would be very difficult to meet, if 
not infeasible, and would be very expensive. It is best forgotten. A 
carbon tax is an excellent idea, provided that the tax does not 
deviate too much from the price of emission permits in the EU 
ETS, and provided that the tax is applied to emissions outside the 
EU ETS only. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
2 A carbon tax provides an incentive for the commercialisation of carbon-free 
energy, but companies can appropriate only a small share of the benefits of their 
own R&D. Additional incentives are therefore justified. 
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APPENDIX 
The model closely follows Rehdanz and Tol (2005), but considers 
a case that these authors omitted. 
 
Let us assume that there is an international market of tradable 
emission permits with two players: a small, importing country 
(Ireland) and a large, exporting country (the rest of the European 
Union). The importing country levies a tax on emissions. 
 
Companies in the importing country A solve the following 
welfare programme: 
2
,
min  s.t. :
A
A A A A A A AR P
C R P R R P E Aα π τ AT= + − + ≥ − =      (A1) 
where C are emission reduction costs; E are baseline emissions, A is 
the emission allocation, so that T is the emission reduction target; R 
is emission reduction, and P are imported permits; π is the permit 
price; τ is the carbon tax; α is unit emission reduction cost. In a 
more general set-up, the quadratic specification would be replaced 
by any convex function, but then the model cannot be explicitly 
solved. 
 
The exporting country B solves: 
    (A2) 2
,
min  s.t. :
B
B B B B B BR P
C R P R P E Aα π= − − ≥ − = BT
0
Note that (A1) and (A2) are independent of the initial allocation 
of permits. Regardless of whether permits are grandparented or 
auctioned, the initial allocation is a sunk cost or benefit. The permit 
price in (A1) and (A2) represents the opportunity cost of emissions. 
 
The first order conditions of (A1) and (A2) are: 
 2 A A ARα λ τ− − =  (A3) 
 2 B B BR 0α λ− =  (A4) 
 0Aπ λ− =  (A5) 
 0Bπ λ− + =  (A6) 
 0A AR P T+ − =  (A5) 
 0B AR P T− − =  (A6) 
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This solves as: 
 
2 ( )A B A B B
A B
T Tα α απ α α
τ+ −= +  (A7) 
 
2A A B B
A B
T TP α α τα α
− −= +  (A8) 
 
( )B A B
A
A B
T TR 2α τα α
+ += +  (A9) 
 
( )A A B
B
A B
T TR 2α τα α
+ −= +  (A10) 
This solution collapses to the base case of Rehdanz and Tol 
(2006) for τ=0. 
 
For τ>0, the following holds: 
 (A11)
( ) 2 ( ) 2B A B A A B
A B A
A B A B
T T T T
BR R T T
α τ α τ
α α α α
+ + + −+ = + =+ + +   
That is, Country A reduces more, but Country B reduces less, 
and these effects exactly offset one another. As emission reduction 
is shifted from the country with low emission reduction costs, to the 
country with high emission reduction costs, total emission reduction 
costs increase. Note that this follows from the constraints, rather 
than from the specification of the abatement cost function. 
 
Emission imports fall, and so does the price. However, in 
Country A, the shadow price of emissions goes up. Equation (A3), 
(A5), and (A7) imply 
 
 (A12) 
0
2 ( ) 1A B A B B B
A B A B A B
T T
τ
α α α τ απ τ τ πα α α α α α=
⎛ ⎞++ = − + = + −⎜ ⎟+ + +⎝ ⎠
τ
 
In Country A, the shadow price increases, and more emissions 
are abated; more is done at a higher price, so the total cost goes up. 
Per (A3) and (A5), this holds for any abatement cost function. The 
quadratic specification only ensures a neat expression like (A12). 
 
In Country B, less is done at a lower price – but less is exported 
at a lower price. The latter effect is larger than the former. This is 
easily seen. The tax in Country A does not affect the cost structure 
in Country B. As Country B would voluntarily reduce domestic 
emissions and export more permits if the tax falls, it must be that, at 
the margin, emission reduction costs are lower permit revenue. 
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Algebraically, the lost export revenue minus the saved abatement 
costs equals: 
 ( )2 4
B
B B A A
A B
T Tα τ τ α αα α
⎡ ⎤+ −⎢ ⎥⎣ ⎦+  (A13) 
This is positive if TB is large relative to TA, that is, if the 
exporting country’s emission reduction target is larger, in absolute 
terms, than the importing country’s target. This is a fair assumption 
for Ireland and the European Union. The tax in Country A, 
therefore,  increases the total costs in Country B. 
 
So, a tax in Country A would increase costs in both countries, 
and would not change emissions. 
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